Kant lectures- lectures 7 and 8
Lectures 7 and 8
Immanuel Kant ( 1724- 1804)
7.1 Main features of Kant’s Ethics:
Kant formulates ethical principles that respect the dignity and equality of human beings;
§ without presupposing theological claims
§ without presupposing a metaphysical concept of the good.
Kant felt that consequentialist ethics (in particular Utilitarianism)- is basically immoral.(He would refer to the “ serpent-windings of Utilitarianism”). This is because consequentialism not merely permits but requires that persons be used as mere means if this will produce good results. Kant's view is that the consequences of actions are simply not relevant to deciding whether an act is moral.
§ Kant’s ethical thought is deontological. (Etymology: from the Greek, deon, ‘obligation' or 'duty').This is simply the view that there are certain duties that one must do.
§ Kant attempted to codify some key aspects of Jewish - Christian notions of ethics and justice, in a clear and rational way.
7.2 Some central claims in Kant’s moral thought:
? Theological and Metaphysical grounds for Morality are not available to us. (This is based on Kant's theories of what we can and can't know, that is, his epistemology. This is a huge and complex topic in itself, but we don't have time to go into it in an ethics course. If you are interested, try looking at Kant's central work The Critique of Pure Reason).
?Reasons for action must be reasons for all. Ethical claims must be universalized.
? No- one must be used as a means to an end
?A person’s freedom and rationality must be respected.
? In universalizing ethical decision making, the theory (like any true morality) insists on impartiality.
( Note the assumption: people are essentially free and rational. Animals are not; therefore, they are not considered ethically relevant) .
7.3 The Categorical Imperative.
This is a more precise variant of the ‘Golden Rule’ principle as expressed in Confucius, Jesus, Rabbi Akiba, etc. The Golden Rule is ' do as to others as you would have done to yourself.’
Two famous formulations in Kant:(Both are in Rachels TRTTD:76-82 )
“Act only on that maxim (principle) through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law”RTTD:78
“...treat humanity...never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.” RTTD:81
How does the Categorical Imperative work?
7.4 The Universalizability Test.
Kant has a test that we can use tocheck if a decision is moral. A simple version it is: If you want to know what you are doing is right, turn your intention to act into a rule for everyone. This is called "universalising", because we are considering whether we can accept that our intention be acted on by everyone, universally. The result is that we will always act consistently, treating people and situations the same, and not making exceptions for ourselves. Kant thinks this follows from the application of reason. You know what a rule is (something that applies to everyone) therefore, you can "rule" yourself, by making sure that you act only in ways that everyone can act. According to Kant, all moral rules are of this form - they command categorically - no one can escape them by saying that they don't have a particular goal or desire. All moral rules are categorical imperatives - Kant's test is THE categorical imperative that grounds and justifies all the others. Notice that he seems to have succeeded in his "enlightenment project" of basing ordinary (Christian) moral rules on reason.
Another way of seeing how the categorical imperative is based on reason is to see that if we apply the same rule to everyone, we are free from inconsistency. Treating two people differently is like saying that they are the same (they are both rational beings) and they are not the same (we are treating them differently). This is a contradiction - like saying that right here and now it is both raining and not raining. (Formally, "P and not-P are both true.")
The full formal version of Kant's test is "Act only on that maxim which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." This is the first formulation of his Categorical Imperative. To be clear about what Kant is asking us to do here, we can rephrase the formulation as "Act only on that maxim which you can at the same time CONSISTENTLY OR RATIONALLY will to be a universal law."
The second formulation is "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person, or in the person of another, never simply as a means, but always at the same times as an end". A simple way of seeing the connection between the two is to see that we do not want others to treat us as "means" or tools for their purposes, (or slaves, for example) so, to be consistent, we can not treat others in this way either. This formulation of Kant's test reminds us what is (in his view) the only thing of ultimate value in the world - rational and free agents - and requires us to respect them and their self determination.
What does the first formulation mean? We will look at Kant's 4 examples of the use of the Categorical Imperative, and see that in each case, Kant means something slightly different by "consistently or rationally will".(In Rachels The Right Thing To Do pp.76-81).
1). The suicide example. p..78. (Perhaps there is a naturalistic fallacy here).
2). The false promise example p. 79
3). The talent neglect example. p.79 (this one is tricky. Would it really be a better world if everyone cultivated their talents?)
4). The helping others example. p.79
Is what Kant is saying here really an improvement on the Golden Rule? How has Kant made the obligation to help "inescapable?". The worry is that I might still be such a rugged individualist that I would never want or accept help in any form at all. Can the obligation to help others be escaped after all?
To recap- To use the test . . .
1.Identify your maxim (your intention for action)
2.Universalise – imagine the world in which everyone acts that way, as a “law”
3.Ask – are any contradictions generated?
7.5 Kant on Justice.
In Week 10 we will look at the issue of punishment. Their are two basic approaches to punishment; one is essentially Utilitarian, and the other is essentially deontological.Utilitarian philosophy tends to see all punishment as bad.Why? Because punishment causes pain. By contrast, Kant is a retributivist.. That is, he believes in the justice of retribution. He does not care that punishment increases, rather than decreases, the amount of suffering in the world. Nor does Kant care for rehabilitation ( which he would see as merely manipulative). Rehabilitation (that is, trying to correct, or reeducate the criminal) merely insults the criminal's intelligence, and treats him or her like a child.
According to Kant, Juridical punishment can never be administered merely as a means for promoting another good either with regard to the criminal himself or to civil society, but must in all cases be imposed only because the individual on whom it is inflicted has committed a crime. (You could think of what happens to Alex in the Stanley Kubrick film A Clockwork Orange, based on the novel by Anthony Burgess. Instead of merely punishing Alex for rape, the penal system uses brain surgery and drugs to alter his brain. After this 'therapy,' he feels sick whenever he thinks of being violent). Secondly, it is important to punish the criminal proportionately to the crime. Kant has this to say about punishment.
Even if a civil society resolved to dissolve itself with the consent of all its members- as might be supposed in the case of a people inhabiting an island resolving to separate and scatter throughout the whole world- the last murderer lying in prison ought to be executed before the resolution was carried out. This ought to be done in order that every one may realize the desert of his deeds, and that bloodguiltiness may not remain on the people; for otherwise they will all be regarded as participants in the murder as a public violation of justice. (Rachels EMP:137).
Kant’s theory of justice treats criminals as rational beings. That is, as a being capable of reasoning about his conduct and who freely decides what he will do, on the basis of his rational conception of what is best. Hence, a rational being is responsible for his actions. Punishment ( as opposed to ‘correction’) assumes that one not treat criminals as dumb animals.
To execute a murderer, for Kant, is to turn the murderer’s own Categorical Imperative upon themselves- their maxim being something like “ this is how one treats other people.” “ ...thus if we treat him in the same way in return, we are doing nothing more than treating him as he has decided people are to be treated” (Rachels p. 137).
What You Need to Know
You should be able to identify the main assumptions and principles of Kant's ethics
You should be able to explain the Categorical Imperative
You should be able to explain how to use the Universalizability Test
You should be able to understand the Kantian attitude towards capital punishment
For homework: please read the Kant excerpt at the end of this handout, and the Kant sections in the two Rachels books. If you're very keen, Robert Johnson's encyclopedia on Kant's ethics, 'Kant's Moral Philosophy," is available on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy website.
On Thursday I will give you a handout for writing philosophy essays, and will tell you what topics will be covered in the first test.
Lecture 8
Kant's Notion of the Good Person / Problems with Kant's Ethics
8.1 Kant's Conception of the Good Person
Kant's theory presupposes that the only way to be a moral person is to have the motive of duty. The good person, for Kant, is the person with the "good will" - i.e. having good motives or good intentions. A motive is only good if it is a motive to do the right action - to do your duty. Therefore, you have to know what the right action is ― what your duty is ― before you can say what a good person is. Duty is not what you are told to do by your parents or commanding officer, but what you work out yourself by universalising. For Kant, having the motive of duty is both necessary and sufficient for being a good person.(That is- Kant thinks that the motive of duty is all you need to be a good person). Is this true? We will look at some of Kant's counterexamples. (The text here is
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, published in 1794. (available for free from Project Gutenberg; www.gutenberg.org/etext/5682). The relevant pages are reproduced at the end of this handout.
8.2 Counterexamples to the claim that the motive of duty is necessary for being a good person.
Kant considers, and rejects, four possible counter examples to this claim. If any of the people listed below turn out to be good people, though they lack the motive of duty, that would show Kant is wrong in his claim that the motive of duty is necessary for being a good person. These cases are very important, as Kant thinks that only duty is necessary to be moral. But is this true?
8.3 The virtuous person:
Kant claims that a person who has virtues is not a good person. The Greeks thought that a person was good if she had developed certain talents of mind and a character that disposed her to act well. The virtues that Kant mentions are intelligence, wit, judgment, courage, resolution, and constancy of purpose. But, Kant argues, having these virtues does not make you a good person, because they can be used for bad purposes. We could use our intelligence and courage and judgment to help us hold up banks and do all kinds of other evil things.
8.4 The person who produces good consequences:
Kant says that the intention to do your duty is good in itself, not because of what it produces. He argues that we value the good will more than we value good consequences by pointing out that we still esteem those who have good intentions but are unable to carry them out.
8.5 The person who acts out of self-interest:
Kant gives two examples of this kind of person: a shopkeeper who deals with his customers honestly because they will shop elsewhere if he doesn't and someone who preserves their life out of a natural interest in doing so, rather than because it is their duty. Kant doesn't give an argument for why acting from self-interest is not morally worthy. He thinks that we will all agree that self-interest is not a good motive for doing the right action.
Note: Some ethicists, such as Thomas Hobbes, or Robert Nozick, seem to have thought that ethics is only coordinated self- interest. Hence, Kant would say that this is not morality. Kant actually said that even devils would agree to a social contract if it was useful to them.
8.6 The naturally kind-hearted person:
For Kant, any action that proceeds from an emotion like natural sympathy or kindness cannot have any special moral worth. The act can be in accordance with duty, but unless it is also motivated by reason, it does not make you a good person. Kant thinks that the naturally kind person has no moral worth for two reasons. First, she is unreliable, second, she is not free. Let's think about this idea.
1) The "fickle or unreliable" objection.
Kant thinks that people motivated by feelings are unreliable, because their feelings are not reliable - they might lead them in the opposite direction. Kind-hearted people might be less than perfectly kind, firstly, when they have some problem of their own overshadowing their lives - like a death in the family. In this situation they might fail to be kind and loving when duty requires them to, because the emotion that underlies kind action would be blocked by feelings of mental or physical pain. Secondly, they may be less than perfectly kind when they are faced both with the needs of their own family and the needs of strangers. In this situation, the kind-hearted person would probably be partial, for their kind actions are based on emotion and this would be stronger for their own family than for others. Duty, however, which is based on reason and not emotion, would dictate impartiality. If we are following duty, then no matter what happens in our emotional life, reason will tell us to do the right thing. Emotions fluctuate but reason is constant. Reason, therefore, is the only thing on which we can base moral obligations that must always be obeyed.
2) The "not free" objection.
A person who is naturally kind is just lucky, according to Kant. They are kind because of the way they were brought up; because of their conditioning, we would now say. If this is true, then they have not chosen to be kind-hearted but have been determined to be so by external factors, for instance, their childhood environment. If one has not freely and consciously chosen to be kind, then being kind has no special moral worth. There is an interesting implication here: only people who could be bad can be truly good.
(a possible response: very dutiful people themselves might be culturally or genetically predisposed to duty).
It is important to note that Kant does NOT think that being kind hearted disqualifies you from being a good person - he merely claims that it is not enough on its own. A person who acts from kind heartedness may be a good person, if it is true that, in cases where their emotions do not lead them to act in accordance with duty, their reason “comes to the rescue” and leads them to act appropriately.
Discussion: Counter examples to the claim that the motive of duty is sufficient for being a good person
If we can argue that the people mentioned below do have the motive of duty, but are not good people, then we have shown that the motive of duty is not sufficient to make you a good person.
1) The cold hearted person. Kant uses the example of a man who has a cold temperament, has little sympathy for others and is indifferent to their sufferings. This man might be cold hearted, but he does his duty when required. Is he a good person? We might not call him a nice person, but mustn't we admit that at least he is a good person? Perhaps Kant is right, and having the motive of duty is sufficient.
(If we have any lingering doubts about this person being a good person, it might be because we mean something different than Kant by "good". We might mean not "a morally good person" but "a good example of a person".)
2) The person who makes mistakes about what their duty is.
First case. Imagine a man who whips his children for every little mistake they make. He firmly believes that he is doing the best for them because ‘sparing the rod will spoil the child ’ But he universalizes, and asks himself: " Can I accept that my intention to whip my children for their own good is a rule for everyone?" Now clearly this man would be perfectly happy for everyone else to whip their children, because it is best for them. He would even accept it being done to him as well. It seems he is acting from the motive of duty. He thinks he is doing his duty by his children and he has succeeded in universalizing his intention.
The person who chooses the wrong intention to universalize.
Imagine a member of Al Qaeda whose job is to blow up aeroplanes. Is he doing his duty? Well, it is his duty to Al qaeda to follow orders. But of course this is not what Kant means by duty. So can the terrorist universalise his intention? He asks himself if his intention to blow up this plane to further the cause of Al Qaeda could be a rule for everyone. Lets imagine that he would be quite happy for everyone in to world to blow up planes for Al Qaeda, even if that meant he or her family might be blown up too. If we accept the way he has conducted the universalisability test, we have to say that this person is a counter-example to the claim that acting from duty is sufficient to make you a good person.
But perhaps something has gone wrong in the test. He has chosen the wrong intention to universalize. The intention he used was the intention to blow up the plane to further the cause of Al Qaeda. Now the whole point of the universalisability test is to see if you are making exceptions for yourself. What he should be asking herself is "can I accept that everybody blows up planes in their own causes." He has posed the test in that way he then has to ask himself "can I accept that my family and I be blown up in the cause of, for instance, the State of Israel or the Aum Shinrikyo Cult." And the answer to that will probably be no. In this case it seems that he has not really acted from the motive of duty, and therefore his being a bad person does not challenge Kant’s claim that the motive of duty is sufficient for goodness.
If it is possible to make mistakes though, does that show that reason is not infallible? Do we need emotions to save us from mistakes in reasoning? Or would we be able to trust our reason if our negative emotions did not get in the way? Could emotion play some important role in detecting morally significant situations?
This is the basic question : what is more important in ethical decision making: reason, or the emotions? Kant's belief is that the emotions have no importance. Is this correct?
8.7 Criticisms of Kant's Ethics
?It's too formulaic, or rigidly uniform
?As it emphasises rights and justice, it neglects other ethical categories, such
as virtue, good character or good lives
?There is no guidance as to how to deal with conflicts amongst the duties. There is no acknowledgement for moral perplexity.
More specific problems:
?People may have different notions of the good, or which principles ought to be universalized.
(We have a split even within Utilitarian thinking concerning the good).
?The Universalizability maxim may lead to absurd consequences. A masochist, or nihilist, could will the end of the Human Race; the universalization of the maxim “do banking at precisely 3pm on Tuesdays” would cause frustration and chaos; paying off your credit card; ditto. This is called the The problem of trivial duties. Say you wanted to take all your money out of the bank this Friday, but wondered if it was moral to do so. Universalising your maxim would lead to a world where everyone took their money out of the bank at the same time, thus causing the banking system to collapse. You would be willing to use the banking system, and also that it collapses and becomes unusable - and this is a clear inconsistency. Is taking my money out of the bank then immoral? Surely not.
?A rugged and selfish individualist may prefer maxims that Kant would find disagreeable; ditto the suicidal person, or the person who prefers not to develop special talents. Kant assumes that such people are irrational. (Imagine what sorts of principles Mike Tyson, or Friedrich Nietzsche, or a Yakuza boss, might universalize). Is this necessarily true?
? Certain assumptions in Kant are open to question. Socialists might think that the notion of stealing is merely grounded on the rationalization of the self- interest of a privileged class. ( Why would the desperately poor not want to universalize a maxim of theft?)
?The issue of exceptionless rules. Kant thought that moral rules had to be exceptionless in order to be valid at all. His thought was, that if there was any situation in which a rule was not valid, then that showed that the rule was not a rule at all - because rule just means something that applies universally. So if there are any rules, then they must, by definition, be exceptionless. See The Case of the Inquiring Murderer (Rachels pp.124-125). (What could we add to the theory to fix this problem?)
What You Need To Know
You should be able to explain Kant's ideas concerning the qualities of the Good Person, who has the Motive of Duty
You should be able to explain some problems with Kant's scheme.
You should be able to explain Kant's notion of justice and retributivism.
You should be able to explain some problems with Kant's ethics in general.
NB: Kant is incredibly difficult to read, so don't worry if reading Kant isn't easy. Try reading a Japanese translation side by side with the English if you can find one.
The text below is just the first three pages of a 70- page book. (available for free from Project Gutenberg; www.gutenberg.org/etext/5682).
Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals (1794)
FIRST SECTION
TRANSITION FROM THE COMMON RATIONAL KNOWLEDGE
OF MORALITY TO THE PHILOSOPHICAL
[virtues can make a person a better villain, so cannot be the basis of morality].
Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good, without qualification, except a good will. Intelligence, wit, judgement, and the other talents of the mind, however they may be named, or courage, resolution, perseverance, as qualities of temperament, are undoubtedly good and desirable in many respects; but these gifts of nature may also become extremely bad and mischievous if the will which is to make use of them, and which, therefore, constitutes what is called character, is not good. It is the same with the gifts of fortune. Power, riches, honour, even health, and the general well-being and contentment with one's condition which is called happiness, inspire pride, and often presumption, if there is not a good will to correct the influence of these on the mind, and with this also to rectify the whole principle of acting and adapt it to its end. The sight of a being who is not adorned with a single feature of a pure and good will, enjoying unbroken prosperity, can never give pleasure to an impartial rational spectator. Thus a good will appears to constitute the indispensable condition even of being worthy of happiness.
[Kant seems to be saying here that you can't be truly happy unless you have a good will, but is this true?]
There are even some qualities which are of service to this good will itself and may facilitate its action, yet which have no intrinsic unconditional value, but always presuppose a good will, and this qualifies the esteem that we justly have for them and does not permit us to regard them as absolutely good. Moderation in the affections and passions, self-control, and calm deliberation are not only good in many respects, but even seem to constitute part of the intrinsic worth of the person; but they are far from deserving to be called good without qualification, although they have been so unconditionally praised by the ancients. For without the principles of a good will, they may become extremely bad, and the coolness of a villain not only makes him far more dangerous, but also directly makes him more abominable in our eyes than he would have been without it.
[Why a good will is good even if a person is too powerless to actually help anyone]
A good will is good not because of what it performs or effects, not by its aptness for the attainment of some proposed end, but simply by virtue of the volition; that is, it is good in itself, and considered by itself is to be esteemed much higher than all that can be brought about by it in favour of any inclination, nay even of the sum total of all inclinations. Even if it should happen that, owing to special disfavour of fortune, or the niggardly provision of a step-motherly nature, this will should wholly lack power to accomplish its purpose, if with its greatest efforts it should yet achieve
nothing, and there should remain only the good will (not, to be sure, a mere wish, but the summoning of all means in our power), then, like a jewel, it would still shine by its own light, as a thing which has its whole value in itself. Its usefulness or fruitfulness can neither add nor take away anything from this value. It would be, as it were, only the setting to enable us to handle it the more conveniently in common commerce, or to attract to it the attention of those who are not yet connoisseurs, but not to recommend it to true connoisseurs, or to determine its value.
There is, however, something so strange in this idea of the absolute value of the mere will, in which no account is taken of its utility, that notwithstanding the thorough assent of even common reason to the idea, yet a suspicion must arise that it may perhaps really be the product of mere high-flown fancy, and that we may have misunderstood the purpose of nature in assigning reason as the governor of our will. Therefore we will examine this idea from this point of view.
In the physical constitution of an organized being, that is, a being adapted suitably to the purposes of life, we assume it as a fundamental principle that no organ for any purpose will be found but what is also the fittest and best adapted for that purpose. Now in a being which has reason and a will, if the proper object of nature were its conservation, its welfare, in a word, its happiness, then nature would have hit upon a very bad arrangement in selecting the reason of the creature to carry out this purpose. For all the actions which the creature has to perform with a view to this purpose,
and the whole rule of its conduct, would be far more surely prescribed to it by instinct, and that end would have been attained thereby much more certainly than it ever can be by reason. Should reason have been communicated to this favoured creature over and above, it must only have served it to contemplate the happy constitution of its nature, to admire it, to congratulate itself thereon, and to feel thankful for it to the beneficent cause, but not that it should subject its desires to that weak and delusive guidance and meddle bunglingly with the purpose of nature. In a word, nature would have taken care that reason should not break forth into practical exercise, nor have the presumption, with its weak insight, to think out for itself the plan of happiness, and of the means of attaining it. Nature would not only have taken on herself the choice of the ends, but also of the means, and with wise foresight would have entrusted both to instinct.
[Reason does not make us happy- so reason must be for some other purpose, such as helping us to be good people].
And, in fact, we find that the more a cultivated reason applies itself with deliberate purpose to the enjoyment of life and happiness, so much the more does the man fail of true satisfaction. And from this circumstance there arises in many, if they are candid enough to confess it, a certain degree of misology, that is, hatred of reason, especially in the case of those who are most experienced in the use of it, because after calculating all the advantages they derive, I do not say from the invention of all the arts of common luxury, but even from the sciences (which seem to them to be after all only a luxury of the understanding), they find that they have, in fact, only brought more trouble on their shoulders, rather than gained in happiness; and they end by envying, rather than despising, the more common stamp of men who keep closer to the guidance of mere instinct and do not allow their reason much influence on their conduct. And this we must admit, that the judgement of those who would very much lower the lofty eulogies of the advantages which reason gives us in regard to the happiness and satisfaction of life, or who would even reduce them below zero, is by no means morose or ungrateful to the goodness with which the world is governed, but that there lies at the root of these judgements the idea that our existence has a different and far nobler end, for which, and not for happiness, reason is properly intended, and which must, therefore, be regarded as the supreme condition to which the private ends of man must, for the most part, be postponed.
For as reason is not competent to guide the will with certainty in regard to its objects and the satisfaction of all our wants (which it to some extent even multiplies), this being an end to which an implanted instinct would have led with much greater certainty; and since, nevertheless, reason is imparted to us as a practical faculty, i.e., as one which is to have influence on the will, therefore, admitting that nature generally in the distribution of her capacities has adapted the means to the end, its true destination must be to produce a will, not merely good as a means to something else, but good in itself, for which reason was absolutely necessary. This will then, though not indeed the sole and complete good, must be the supreme good and the condition of every other, even of the desire of happiness. Under these circumstances, there is nothing inconsistent with the wisdom of nature in the fact that the cultivation of the reason, which is requisite for the first and unconditional purpose, does in many ways interfere, at least in this life, with the attainment of the second, which is always conditional, namely, happiness. Nay, it may even reduce it to nothing, without nature thereby failing of her purpose. For reason recognizes the establishment of a good will as its highest practical destination, and in attaining this purpose is capable only of a satisfaction of its own proper kind, namely that from the attainment of an end, which end again is determined by reason only, notwithstanding that this may involve many a disappointment to the ends of inclination.
We have then to develop the notion of a will which deserves to be highly esteemed for itself and is good without a view to anything further, a notion which exists already in the sound natural understanding, requiring rather to be cleared up than to be taught, and which in estimating the value of our actions always takes the first place and constitutes the condition of all the rest. In order to do this, we will take the notion of duty, which includes that of a good will, although implying certain subjective restrictions and hindrances. These, however, far from concealing it, or rendering it unrecognizable, rather bring it out by contrast and make it shine forth so much the brighter.
Immanuel Kant ( 1724- 1804)
7.1 Main features of Kant’s Ethics:
Kant formulates ethical principles that respect the dignity and equality of human beings;
§ without presupposing theological claims
§ without presupposing a metaphysical concept of the good.
Kant felt that consequentialist ethics (in particular Utilitarianism)- is basically immoral.(He would refer to the “ serpent-windings of Utilitarianism”). This is because consequentialism not merely permits but requires that persons be used as mere means if this will produce good results. Kant's view is that the consequences of actions are simply not relevant to deciding whether an act is moral.
§ Kant’s ethical thought is deontological. (Etymology: from the Greek, deon, ‘obligation' or 'duty').This is simply the view that there are certain duties that one must do.
§ Kant attempted to codify some key aspects of Jewish - Christian notions of ethics and justice, in a clear and rational way.
7.2 Some central claims in Kant’s moral thought:
? Theological and Metaphysical grounds for Morality are not available to us. (This is based on Kant's theories of what we can and can't know, that is, his epistemology. This is a huge and complex topic in itself, but we don't have time to go into it in an ethics course. If you are interested, try looking at Kant's central work The Critique of Pure Reason).
?Reasons for action must be reasons for all. Ethical claims must be universalized.
? No- one must be used as a means to an end
?A person’s freedom and rationality must be respected.
? In universalizing ethical decision making, the theory (like any true morality) insists on impartiality.
( Note the assumption: people are essentially free and rational. Animals are not; therefore, they are not considered ethically relevant) .
7.3 The Categorical Imperative.
This is a more precise variant of the ‘Golden Rule’ principle as expressed in Confucius, Jesus, Rabbi Akiba, etc. The Golden Rule is ' do as to others as you would have done to yourself.’
Two famous formulations in Kant:(Both are in Rachels TRTTD:76-82 )
“Act only on that maxim (principle) through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law”RTTD:78
“...treat humanity...never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.” RTTD:81
How does the Categorical Imperative work?
7.4 The Universalizability Test.
Kant has a test that we can use tocheck if a decision is moral. A simple version it is: If you want to know what you are doing is right, turn your intention to act into a rule for everyone. This is called "universalising", because we are considering whether we can accept that our intention be acted on by everyone, universally. The result is that we will always act consistently, treating people and situations the same, and not making exceptions for ourselves. Kant thinks this follows from the application of reason. You know what a rule is (something that applies to everyone) therefore, you can "rule" yourself, by making sure that you act only in ways that everyone can act. According to Kant, all moral rules are of this form - they command categorically - no one can escape them by saying that they don't have a particular goal or desire. All moral rules are categorical imperatives - Kant's test is THE categorical imperative that grounds and justifies all the others. Notice that he seems to have succeeded in his "enlightenment project" of basing ordinary (Christian) moral rules on reason.
Another way of seeing how the categorical imperative is based on reason is to see that if we apply the same rule to everyone, we are free from inconsistency. Treating two people differently is like saying that they are the same (they are both rational beings) and they are not the same (we are treating them differently). This is a contradiction - like saying that right here and now it is both raining and not raining. (Formally, "P and not-P are both true.")
The full formal version of Kant's test is "Act only on that maxim which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." This is the first formulation of his Categorical Imperative. To be clear about what Kant is asking us to do here, we can rephrase the formulation as "Act only on that maxim which you can at the same time CONSISTENTLY OR RATIONALLY will to be a universal law."
The second formulation is "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person, or in the person of another, never simply as a means, but always at the same times as an end". A simple way of seeing the connection between the two is to see that we do not want others to treat us as "means" or tools for their purposes, (or slaves, for example) so, to be consistent, we can not treat others in this way either. This formulation of Kant's test reminds us what is (in his view) the only thing of ultimate value in the world - rational and free agents - and requires us to respect them and their self determination.
What does the first formulation mean? We will look at Kant's 4 examples of the use of the Categorical Imperative, and see that in each case, Kant means something slightly different by "consistently or rationally will".(In Rachels The Right Thing To Do pp.76-81).
1). The suicide example. p..78. (Perhaps there is a naturalistic fallacy here).
2). The false promise example p. 79
3). The talent neglect example. p.79 (this one is tricky. Would it really be a better world if everyone cultivated their talents?)
4). The helping others example. p.79
Is what Kant is saying here really an improvement on the Golden Rule? How has Kant made the obligation to help "inescapable?". The worry is that I might still be such a rugged individualist that I would never want or accept help in any form at all. Can the obligation to help others be escaped after all?
To recap- To use the test . . .
1.Identify your maxim (your intention for action)
2.Universalise – imagine the world in which everyone acts that way, as a “law”
3.Ask – are any contradictions generated?
7.5 Kant on Justice.
In Week 10 we will look at the issue of punishment. Their are two basic approaches to punishment; one is essentially Utilitarian, and the other is essentially deontological.Utilitarian philosophy tends to see all punishment as bad.Why? Because punishment causes pain. By contrast, Kant is a retributivist.. That is, he believes in the justice of retribution. He does not care that punishment increases, rather than decreases, the amount of suffering in the world. Nor does Kant care for rehabilitation ( which he would see as merely manipulative). Rehabilitation (that is, trying to correct, or reeducate the criminal) merely insults the criminal's intelligence, and treats him or her like a child.
According to Kant, Juridical punishment can never be administered merely as a means for promoting another good either with regard to the criminal himself or to civil society, but must in all cases be imposed only because the individual on whom it is inflicted has committed a crime. (You could think of what happens to Alex in the Stanley Kubrick film A Clockwork Orange, based on the novel by Anthony Burgess. Instead of merely punishing Alex for rape, the penal system uses brain surgery and drugs to alter his brain. After this 'therapy,' he feels sick whenever he thinks of being violent). Secondly, it is important to punish the criminal proportionately to the crime. Kant has this to say about punishment.
Even if a civil society resolved to dissolve itself with the consent of all its members- as might be supposed in the case of a people inhabiting an island resolving to separate and scatter throughout the whole world- the last murderer lying in prison ought to be executed before the resolution was carried out. This ought to be done in order that every one may realize the desert of his deeds, and that bloodguiltiness may not remain on the people; for otherwise they will all be regarded as participants in the murder as a public violation of justice. (Rachels EMP:137).
Kant’s theory of justice treats criminals as rational beings. That is, as a being capable of reasoning about his conduct and who freely decides what he will do, on the basis of his rational conception of what is best. Hence, a rational being is responsible for his actions. Punishment ( as opposed to ‘correction’) assumes that one not treat criminals as dumb animals.
To execute a murderer, for Kant, is to turn the murderer’s own Categorical Imperative upon themselves- their maxim being something like “ this is how one treats other people.” “ ...thus if we treat him in the same way in return, we are doing nothing more than treating him as he has decided people are to be treated” (Rachels p. 137).
What You Need to Know
You should be able to identify the main assumptions and principles of Kant's ethics
You should be able to explain the Categorical Imperative
You should be able to explain how to use the Universalizability Test
You should be able to understand the Kantian attitude towards capital punishment
For homework: please read the Kant excerpt at the end of this handout, and the Kant sections in the two Rachels books. If you're very keen, Robert Johnson's encyclopedia on Kant's ethics, 'Kant's Moral Philosophy," is available on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy website.
On Thursday I will give you a handout for writing philosophy essays, and will tell you what topics will be covered in the first test.
Lecture 8
Kant's Notion of the Good Person / Problems with Kant's Ethics
8.1 Kant's Conception of the Good Person
Kant's theory presupposes that the only way to be a moral person is to have the motive of duty. The good person, for Kant, is the person with the "good will" - i.e. having good motives or good intentions. A motive is only good if it is a motive to do the right action - to do your duty. Therefore, you have to know what the right action is ― what your duty is ― before you can say what a good person is. Duty is not what you are told to do by your parents or commanding officer, but what you work out yourself by universalising. For Kant, having the motive of duty is both necessary and sufficient for being a good person.(That is- Kant thinks that the motive of duty is all you need to be a good person). Is this true? We will look at some of Kant's counterexamples. (The text here is
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, published in 1794. (available for free from Project Gutenberg; www.gutenberg.org/etext/5682). The relevant pages are reproduced at the end of this handout.
8.2 Counterexamples to the claim that the motive of duty is necessary for being a good person.
Kant considers, and rejects, four possible counter examples to this claim. If any of the people listed below turn out to be good people, though they lack the motive of duty, that would show Kant is wrong in his claim that the motive of duty is necessary for being a good person. These cases are very important, as Kant thinks that only duty is necessary to be moral. But is this true?
8.3 The virtuous person:
Kant claims that a person who has virtues is not a good person. The Greeks thought that a person was good if she had developed certain talents of mind and a character that disposed her to act well. The virtues that Kant mentions are intelligence, wit, judgment, courage, resolution, and constancy of purpose. But, Kant argues, having these virtues does not make you a good person, because they can be used for bad purposes. We could use our intelligence and courage and judgment to help us hold up banks and do all kinds of other evil things.
8.4 The person who produces good consequences:
Kant says that the intention to do your duty is good in itself, not because of what it produces. He argues that we value the good will more than we value good consequences by pointing out that we still esteem those who have good intentions but are unable to carry them out.
8.5 The person who acts out of self-interest:
Kant gives two examples of this kind of person: a shopkeeper who deals with his customers honestly because they will shop elsewhere if he doesn't and someone who preserves their life out of a natural interest in doing so, rather than because it is their duty. Kant doesn't give an argument for why acting from self-interest is not morally worthy. He thinks that we will all agree that self-interest is not a good motive for doing the right action.
Note: Some ethicists, such as Thomas Hobbes, or Robert Nozick, seem to have thought that ethics is only coordinated self- interest. Hence, Kant would say that this is not morality. Kant actually said that even devils would agree to a social contract if it was useful to them.
8.6 The naturally kind-hearted person:
For Kant, any action that proceeds from an emotion like natural sympathy or kindness cannot have any special moral worth. The act can be in accordance with duty, but unless it is also motivated by reason, it does not make you a good person. Kant thinks that the naturally kind person has no moral worth for two reasons. First, she is unreliable, second, she is not free. Let's think about this idea.
1) The "fickle or unreliable" objection.
Kant thinks that people motivated by feelings are unreliable, because their feelings are not reliable - they might lead them in the opposite direction. Kind-hearted people might be less than perfectly kind, firstly, when they have some problem of their own overshadowing their lives - like a death in the family. In this situation they might fail to be kind and loving when duty requires them to, because the emotion that underlies kind action would be blocked by feelings of mental or physical pain. Secondly, they may be less than perfectly kind when they are faced both with the needs of their own family and the needs of strangers. In this situation, the kind-hearted person would probably be partial, for their kind actions are based on emotion and this would be stronger for their own family than for others. Duty, however, which is based on reason and not emotion, would dictate impartiality. If we are following duty, then no matter what happens in our emotional life, reason will tell us to do the right thing. Emotions fluctuate but reason is constant. Reason, therefore, is the only thing on which we can base moral obligations that must always be obeyed.
2) The "not free" objection.
A person who is naturally kind is just lucky, according to Kant. They are kind because of the way they were brought up; because of their conditioning, we would now say. If this is true, then they have not chosen to be kind-hearted but have been determined to be so by external factors, for instance, their childhood environment. If one has not freely and consciously chosen to be kind, then being kind has no special moral worth. There is an interesting implication here: only people who could be bad can be truly good.
(a possible response: very dutiful people themselves might be culturally or genetically predisposed to duty).
It is important to note that Kant does NOT think that being kind hearted disqualifies you from being a good person - he merely claims that it is not enough on its own. A person who acts from kind heartedness may be a good person, if it is true that, in cases where their emotions do not lead them to act in accordance with duty, their reason “comes to the rescue” and leads them to act appropriately.
Discussion: Counter examples to the claim that the motive of duty is sufficient for being a good person
If we can argue that the people mentioned below do have the motive of duty, but are not good people, then we have shown that the motive of duty is not sufficient to make you a good person.
1) The cold hearted person. Kant uses the example of a man who has a cold temperament, has little sympathy for others and is indifferent to their sufferings. This man might be cold hearted, but he does his duty when required. Is he a good person? We might not call him a nice person, but mustn't we admit that at least he is a good person? Perhaps Kant is right, and having the motive of duty is sufficient.
(If we have any lingering doubts about this person being a good person, it might be because we mean something different than Kant by "good". We might mean not "a morally good person" but "a good example of a person".)
2) The person who makes mistakes about what their duty is.
First case. Imagine a man who whips his children for every little mistake they make. He firmly believes that he is doing the best for them because ‘sparing the rod will spoil the child ’ But he universalizes, and asks himself: " Can I accept that my intention to whip my children for their own good is a rule for everyone?" Now clearly this man would be perfectly happy for everyone else to whip their children, because it is best for them. He would even accept it being done to him as well. It seems he is acting from the motive of duty. He thinks he is doing his duty by his children and he has succeeded in universalizing his intention.
The person who chooses the wrong intention to universalize.
Imagine a member of Al Qaeda whose job is to blow up aeroplanes. Is he doing his duty? Well, it is his duty to Al qaeda to follow orders. But of course this is not what Kant means by duty. So can the terrorist universalise his intention? He asks himself if his intention to blow up this plane to further the cause of Al Qaeda could be a rule for everyone. Lets imagine that he would be quite happy for everyone in to world to blow up planes for Al Qaeda, even if that meant he or her family might be blown up too. If we accept the way he has conducted the universalisability test, we have to say that this person is a counter-example to the claim that acting from duty is sufficient to make you a good person.
But perhaps something has gone wrong in the test. He has chosen the wrong intention to universalize. The intention he used was the intention to blow up the plane to further the cause of Al Qaeda. Now the whole point of the universalisability test is to see if you are making exceptions for yourself. What he should be asking herself is "can I accept that everybody blows up planes in their own causes." He has posed the test in that way he then has to ask himself "can I accept that my family and I be blown up in the cause of, for instance, the State of Israel or the Aum Shinrikyo Cult." And the answer to that will probably be no. In this case it seems that he has not really acted from the motive of duty, and therefore his being a bad person does not challenge Kant’s claim that the motive of duty is sufficient for goodness.
If it is possible to make mistakes though, does that show that reason is not infallible? Do we need emotions to save us from mistakes in reasoning? Or would we be able to trust our reason if our negative emotions did not get in the way? Could emotion play some important role in detecting morally significant situations?
This is the basic question : what is more important in ethical decision making: reason, or the emotions? Kant's belief is that the emotions have no importance. Is this correct?
8.7 Criticisms of Kant's Ethics
?It's too formulaic, or rigidly uniform
?As it emphasises rights and justice, it neglects other ethical categories, such
as virtue, good character or good lives
?There is no guidance as to how to deal with conflicts amongst the duties. There is no acknowledgement for moral perplexity.
More specific problems:
?People may have different notions of the good, or which principles ought to be universalized.
(We have a split even within Utilitarian thinking concerning the good).
?The Universalizability maxim may lead to absurd consequences. A masochist, or nihilist, could will the end of the Human Race; the universalization of the maxim “do banking at precisely 3pm on Tuesdays” would cause frustration and chaos; paying off your credit card; ditto. This is called the The problem of trivial duties. Say you wanted to take all your money out of the bank this Friday, but wondered if it was moral to do so. Universalising your maxim would lead to a world where everyone took their money out of the bank at the same time, thus causing the banking system to collapse. You would be willing to use the banking system, and also that it collapses and becomes unusable - and this is a clear inconsistency. Is taking my money out of the bank then immoral? Surely not.
?A rugged and selfish individualist may prefer maxims that Kant would find disagreeable; ditto the suicidal person, or the person who prefers not to develop special talents. Kant assumes that such people are irrational. (Imagine what sorts of principles Mike Tyson, or Friedrich Nietzsche, or a Yakuza boss, might universalize). Is this necessarily true?
? Certain assumptions in Kant are open to question. Socialists might think that the notion of stealing is merely grounded on the rationalization of the self- interest of a privileged class. ( Why would the desperately poor not want to universalize a maxim of theft?)
?The issue of exceptionless rules. Kant thought that moral rules had to be exceptionless in order to be valid at all. His thought was, that if there was any situation in which a rule was not valid, then that showed that the rule was not a rule at all - because rule just means something that applies universally. So if there are any rules, then they must, by definition, be exceptionless. See The Case of the Inquiring Murderer (Rachels pp.124-125). (What could we add to the theory to fix this problem?)
What You Need To Know
You should be able to explain Kant's ideas concerning the qualities of the Good Person, who has the Motive of Duty
You should be able to explain some problems with Kant's scheme.
You should be able to explain Kant's notion of justice and retributivism.
You should be able to explain some problems with Kant's ethics in general.
NB: Kant is incredibly difficult to read, so don't worry if reading Kant isn't easy. Try reading a Japanese translation side by side with the English if you can find one.
The text below is just the first three pages of a 70- page book. (available for free from Project Gutenberg; www.gutenberg.org/etext/5682).
Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals (1794)
FIRST SECTION
TRANSITION FROM THE COMMON RATIONAL KNOWLEDGE
OF MORALITY TO THE PHILOSOPHICAL
[virtues can make a person a better villain, so cannot be the basis of morality].
Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good, without qualification, except a good will. Intelligence, wit, judgement, and the other talents of the mind, however they may be named, or courage, resolution, perseverance, as qualities of temperament, are undoubtedly good and desirable in many respects; but these gifts of nature may also become extremely bad and mischievous if the will which is to make use of them, and which, therefore, constitutes what is called character, is not good. It is the same with the gifts of fortune. Power, riches, honour, even health, and the general well-being and contentment with one's condition which is called happiness, inspire pride, and often presumption, if there is not a good will to correct the influence of these on the mind, and with this also to rectify the whole principle of acting and adapt it to its end. The sight of a being who is not adorned with a single feature of a pure and good will, enjoying unbroken prosperity, can never give pleasure to an impartial rational spectator. Thus a good will appears to constitute the indispensable condition even of being worthy of happiness.
[Kant seems to be saying here that you can't be truly happy unless you have a good will, but is this true?]
There are even some qualities which are of service to this good will itself and may facilitate its action, yet which have no intrinsic unconditional value, but always presuppose a good will, and this qualifies the esteem that we justly have for them and does not permit us to regard them as absolutely good. Moderation in the affections and passions, self-control, and calm deliberation are not only good in many respects, but even seem to constitute part of the intrinsic worth of the person; but they are far from deserving to be called good without qualification, although they have been so unconditionally praised by the ancients. For without the principles of a good will, they may become extremely bad, and the coolness of a villain not only makes him far more dangerous, but also directly makes him more abominable in our eyes than he would have been without it.
[Why a good will is good even if a person is too powerless to actually help anyone]
A good will is good not because of what it performs or effects, not by its aptness for the attainment of some proposed end, but simply by virtue of the volition; that is, it is good in itself, and considered by itself is to be esteemed much higher than all that can be brought about by it in favour of any inclination, nay even of the sum total of all inclinations. Even if it should happen that, owing to special disfavour of fortune, or the niggardly provision of a step-motherly nature, this will should wholly lack power to accomplish its purpose, if with its greatest efforts it should yet achieve
nothing, and there should remain only the good will (not, to be sure, a mere wish, but the summoning of all means in our power), then, like a jewel, it would still shine by its own light, as a thing which has its whole value in itself. Its usefulness or fruitfulness can neither add nor take away anything from this value. It would be, as it were, only the setting to enable us to handle it the more conveniently in common commerce, or to attract to it the attention of those who are not yet connoisseurs, but not to recommend it to true connoisseurs, or to determine its value.
There is, however, something so strange in this idea of the absolute value of the mere will, in which no account is taken of its utility, that notwithstanding the thorough assent of even common reason to the idea, yet a suspicion must arise that it may perhaps really be the product of mere high-flown fancy, and that we may have misunderstood the purpose of nature in assigning reason as the governor of our will. Therefore we will examine this idea from this point of view.
In the physical constitution of an organized being, that is, a being adapted suitably to the purposes of life, we assume it as a fundamental principle that no organ for any purpose will be found but what is also the fittest and best adapted for that purpose. Now in a being which has reason and a will, if the proper object of nature were its conservation, its welfare, in a word, its happiness, then nature would have hit upon a very bad arrangement in selecting the reason of the creature to carry out this purpose. For all the actions which the creature has to perform with a view to this purpose,
and the whole rule of its conduct, would be far more surely prescribed to it by instinct, and that end would have been attained thereby much more certainly than it ever can be by reason. Should reason have been communicated to this favoured creature over and above, it must only have served it to contemplate the happy constitution of its nature, to admire it, to congratulate itself thereon, and to feel thankful for it to the beneficent cause, but not that it should subject its desires to that weak and delusive guidance and meddle bunglingly with the purpose of nature. In a word, nature would have taken care that reason should not break forth into practical exercise, nor have the presumption, with its weak insight, to think out for itself the plan of happiness, and of the means of attaining it. Nature would not only have taken on herself the choice of the ends, but also of the means, and with wise foresight would have entrusted both to instinct.
[Reason does not make us happy- so reason must be for some other purpose, such as helping us to be good people].
And, in fact, we find that the more a cultivated reason applies itself with deliberate purpose to the enjoyment of life and happiness, so much the more does the man fail of true satisfaction. And from this circumstance there arises in many, if they are candid enough to confess it, a certain degree of misology, that is, hatred of reason, especially in the case of those who are most experienced in the use of it, because after calculating all the advantages they derive, I do not say from the invention of all the arts of common luxury, but even from the sciences (which seem to them to be after all only a luxury of the understanding), they find that they have, in fact, only brought more trouble on their shoulders, rather than gained in happiness; and they end by envying, rather than despising, the more common stamp of men who keep closer to the guidance of mere instinct and do not allow their reason much influence on their conduct. And this we must admit, that the judgement of those who would very much lower the lofty eulogies of the advantages which reason gives us in regard to the happiness and satisfaction of life, or who would even reduce them below zero, is by no means morose or ungrateful to the goodness with which the world is governed, but that there lies at the root of these judgements the idea that our existence has a different and far nobler end, for which, and not for happiness, reason is properly intended, and which must, therefore, be regarded as the supreme condition to which the private ends of man must, for the most part, be postponed.
For as reason is not competent to guide the will with certainty in regard to its objects and the satisfaction of all our wants (which it to some extent even multiplies), this being an end to which an implanted instinct would have led with much greater certainty; and since, nevertheless, reason is imparted to us as a practical faculty, i.e., as one which is to have influence on the will, therefore, admitting that nature generally in the distribution of her capacities has adapted the means to the end, its true destination must be to produce a will, not merely good as a means to something else, but good in itself, for which reason was absolutely necessary. This will then, though not indeed the sole and complete good, must be the supreme good and the condition of every other, even of the desire of happiness. Under these circumstances, there is nothing inconsistent with the wisdom of nature in the fact that the cultivation of the reason, which is requisite for the first and unconditional purpose, does in many ways interfere, at least in this life, with the attainment of the second, which is always conditional, namely, happiness. Nay, it may even reduce it to nothing, without nature thereby failing of her purpose. For reason recognizes the establishment of a good will as its highest practical destination, and in attaining this purpose is capable only of a satisfaction of its own proper kind, namely that from the attainment of an end, which end again is determined by reason only, notwithstanding that this may involve many a disappointment to the ends of inclination.
We have then to develop the notion of a will which deserves to be highly esteemed for itself and is good without a view to anything further, a notion which exists already in the sound natural understanding, requiring rather to be cleared up than to be taught, and which in estimating the value of our actions always takes the first place and constitutes the condition of all the rest. In order to do this, we will take the notion of duty, which includes that of a good will, although implying certain subjective restrictions and hindrances. These, however, far from concealing it, or rendering it unrecognizable, rather bring it out by contrast and make it shine forth so much the brighter.
posted by G. Roche at 7:41 PM
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