Ayn Rand and Max Stirner
Dr. Geoffrey Roche
Lakeland College Wisconsin
Waseda University
Ayn Rand, 1947.
Introduction Questions.
1). Is Kim Jong- Il Irrational?
2). Suppose your friend had found a magic ring that made them invisible. Suppose that she got frightened of its power and destroyed it. Was this the right thing to do, do you think?
3). Is driving a hot- rod or powerful motorcycle irrational, do you think?
1.1 Egoism: Introduction
Egoism (riko- shugi) is the tendency to place one’s own interests and well- being ahead of anyone else’s. Psychological Egoism is the view that, as a matter of psychological fact, everybody is an egoist. (This view will not preoccupy us here; Rachels explains why the theory is unsound in pp. 68-74). Ethical Egoism is an ethical theory. Its central claim is that we are not morally required to concern ourselves with others, and that we are concerned with ourselves. The implications of accepting this theory are serious: it undermines all normative ethics. In the first class we will look at Rachels’ treatment of Egoism, and the arguments of Russian- born American writer Ayn Rand (1905-1982). Rand’s philosophy is so poor that you may wonder why we bother. I think that her work is an important exercise in logical fallacies. If this handout appears long, keep in mind a). the arguments here are extremely simple; b). this covers the same material as in Rachels, so you only really need to read the handout. In the second part of this section we’ll look at the arguments of Max Stirner, a German philosopher (1806-1856).
1.2 Ayn Rand (1905-1982): Biographical Note
Ayn Rand (born Lisa Zinov'yevna Rosenbaum) was born in Saint Petersburg, Russia. Her family was ethnically Jewish, but were not religiously observant. Her father was a chemist. She was precocious, was greatly interested in literature, and began to write screenplays at the age of seven.
During the Russian Revolution her father’s pharmacy was confiscated by the Revolutionaries. Studying history and philosophy at the University of Petrograd now Saint Petersburg) she graduated in 1924. Her favorite philosophers were Aristotle and Nietzsche (she later rejected Nietzsche for his doctrine of “Might is Right,” essentially the same idea in Stirner).
In 1925 Rand migrated to the United States, settling in New York. (She never set foot in her homeland again, and in 1937 she stopped all contact, after hearing that letters from Americans may imperil their recipients). She changed her name and found work as a script reader. She later began writing film scripts. Her first novel, We the Living, appeared in 1936. The Fountainhead appeared in 1943. Both novels are philosophical novels: the first explains Rand’s disgust for the Soviet ‘morality’ that destroys individual freedom, whereas The Fountainhead expresses Rand’s egoist philosophy. The Fountainhead was made into a movie in 1949 (you can see the conclusion on Youtube). Atlas Shrugged appeared in 1957, and like its predecessors became a bestseller.
In 1950 Rand set up the Rand Institute, an organization that promulgated Rand’s philosophy (one of the first members was Alan Greenspan, the economist). She spent the rest of her life writing both fiction and non- fiction (philosophers may beg to differ on the distinction). She died in 1982. Alan Greenspan attended, and a huge wreath in the shape of a dollar- sign was placed near her casket.
An estimated 500,000 copies of Rand’s books sell each year, and 22 million of her books have been sold so far. There are also branches of her organization, the Objectivist Society, throughout the world. Libertarianism is the political version of her doctrine.
1.3 The Self- Defeating Argument.
Rachels states four arguments (p.76) that each purport to undermine the view that advocates altruism (that is, the principle of helping others). In standard form:
1.3.1 The bungler argument:
P1. to aid others, we must know exactly what they want and need, otherwise we will
bungle the job and cause unhappiness.
P2. We do not know what others want and need
∴ we will bungle the job and cause unhappiness.
1.3.2 The privacy argument
P1. It is immoral to invade the privacy of others
P2. Helping others is an invasion of the privacy of others
∴ it is immoral to help others
1.3.3 The insult argument
P1. It is immoral to rob people of their dignity and self respect
P2. Helping others robs them of their dignity and self respect
∴ It is immoral to help others
1.3.4 The moral corruption argument
(Note that Rachels runs 1.3.3 and 1.3.4 together).
P1. It is immoral to promote immoral behavior
P2 It is immoral to promote dependence
P3. Altruism promotes laziness and dependence
∴ Altruism is immoral
1.3.5 The ‘great cause’ argument
Max Stirner offers a similar argument, although the formulation is quite loose:
‘ […]Man must make sacrifices for a great idea, a great cause! A ‘great idea,’ a ‘good cause,’ is, it may be, the honour of God, for which innumerable people have met death; Christianity, which has found its willing martyrs; the Holy Catholic Church, which has greedily demanded sacrifices of heretics; liberty and equality, which were waited on by bloody guillotines. (Stirner: 70).
As Rachels notes, there are two problems with these arguments. Firstly, they do not question the basic assumptions of Utilitarianism and Deontology. That is, they presuppose either that we should respect rights (the right not to be interfered with, for example) or that the infliction of pain is morally wrong. The arguments merely assert that altruistic behavior is the wrong way to go about promoting happiness. The second problem is that these arguments do not support egoism. On the contrary: If one was a selfish, (that is, egoistic) sadistic person, who actually believed these rather forced premises, these arguments would encourage them to give money to poor people so that they could upset and humiliate them.
Secondly, each one of these arguments has premises which are highly questionable. None of these arguments makes any sense when applied to, say, supporting Amnesty International, ending slavery in Yemen, or banning animal abuse.
1.4 Ayn Rand’s Argument for Egoism
Rachels is a little too fast with Rand, but his summary of her theory on pp. 78- 79 is essentially sound. We’ll go into Rand in more detail however. Here’s the argument Rachels discusses, in very basic terms:
P1). Altruistic theories of morality demand from the individual total self sacrifice, their money and lives wasted on supporting unproductive people.
P2). A doctrine that demands of the individual total self sacrifice is a violation of individual rights (in particular property rights)
P3). A doctrine that violates individual rights is immoral
P4). One must choose a moral theory that is not immoral
P5). One must choose between Altruistic theories of morality and Ethical Egoism.
∴ One must choose Ethical Egoism
Rachels notes that P4 is simply untrue. That is, Rand offers a false dichotomy. She also runs a severe straw man fallacy.
We will look a little more closely at Rand’s essay “The Objectivist Ethics,” given at the University of Wisconsin in 1961.
1.4.1 Premise 1: Altruistic Theories of Ethics demand Total Self Sacrifice
Rand makes the following claims concerning ‘Altruistic Ethics’:
Every code of ethics is derived from a metaphysics, that is: from a theory about the fundamental nature of the universe in which man lives and acts. The altruist ethics is based on a “malevolent universe” metaphysics, on the theory that man, by his very nature, is helpless and doomed- that success, happiness, achievement are impossible to him- that emergencies, disasters, catastrophes are the norm of his life and that his primary goal is to combat them.” (VS: 48-49).
Altruism declares that any action taken for the benefit of others is good, and any action taken for one’s own benefit is evil. Thus the beneficiary of an action is the only criterion of moral value- and so long as that beneficiary is anybody other than oneself, anything goes.
Hence the appalling immorality, the chronic injustice, the grotesque double standards, he insoluble conflicts and contradictions that have characterized human relationships and human societies throughout history, under all the variants of altruistic ethics (VS: viii).
[Altruism is] “the ethical theory which regards man as a sacrificial animal, which holds that man has no right to exist for his own sake, that service to others is the only justification of his existence, and that self- sacrifice is his highest moral duty, virtue and value.” (34).
In short, Altruistic ethics is invalid as an ethics because it a). causes unhappiness, and b). violates personal rights to liberty and one’s own property. That is, when a state (or a moral system) demands that one assist others, through taxation or other means, it is a total violation of a person’s rights and liberty. Any socialist ethics is therefore “cannibalism,”(VS: 81); “Altruism is incompatible with freedom, with capitalism and with individual right […] One cannot combine the pursuit of happiness with the moral status of a sacrificial animal” (p.95). State health plans, paid for with tax money, are morally equivalent to robbery:
“Medicare” is an example of such a project. “Isn’t it desirable that the aged should have medical care in times of illness?” its advocates clamor. Considered out of context, the answer would be: yes, it is desirable. Who would have a reason to say no? And it is at this point that the mental processes of a collectivized brain are cut off; the rest is fog. Only the desire remains in his sight- it’s the good, isn’t it? […] The fog hides such facts as the enslavement and, therefore, the disintegration of all medical practice, and the sacrifice of the professional integrity, the freedom, the careers, the ambitions, the achievements, the happiness, the live of the very men who are able to provide that “desirable” goal- the doctors.
Note that Rand does not attack any specific moral philosophy, lumping them all together as ‘altruistic ethics’ (as they all make non- egoistic demands). Note that she frequently presupposes a). Utilitarian ethics (in suggesting that altruistic ethics causes unhappiness) and b). deontology, in particular the right to be free and own property. Many of her statements on particular issues seem quite sensible (spaceflight is a waste of money, Soviet Russia is immoral as its policies are cruel) but have more to do with Utilitarian or Kantian principles than egoism (84,88). What has gone wrong here?
1.4.2 The Argument from Naturalism (in Rand’s terms, ‘Objectivity’).
The following is Rand’s ‘Naturalistic Argument’ for egoism. I call it a naturalistic argument as she argues that ‘egoism’ is somehow in nature. (Rousseau, similarly, argued that we are naturally moral so should be moral; Nietzsche argued that we are naturally aggressive so should be aggressive, and so on). (Rand thought that this theory was ‘objective,’ so called her theory ‘Objectivism’).
P1. Every living thing tries to stay alive, for its own sake. [for the sake of being alive].
P2. Therefore, for any living thing, its own life, and nothing else, is valuable for its
own sake.
P3. Because all people are living things, it follows that everyone should do what keeps them alive. (for this is what they should value).
P4. A person can only live if they are rational. (corollary: Irrational behavior leads to death).
P5. [‘Rational’ means “do only what is good for me.”] (implied premise)
P6 [‘Rational’ means ‘do productive work’]
P6 [‘Rational’ means ‘do not hurt or exploit other people or live off their labors’] (implied premise)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
∴ We should only do what is good for ourselves, but should not exploit other people
There are some problems with this argument.
1.4.3 The is- Ought Fallacy (premise 3).
A simple is- ought argument:
Humans are logical
∴Humans should be logical
Dogs have four legs
∴Dogs should have four legs
Looks reasonable enough. But what about this one?
I am 183 centimeters tall
∴ I should be 183 centimeters tall
Tokyo is full of air pollution
∴Tokyo should be full of air pollution
There is war
∴There should be war
Women are polite and pretty and bad at studying
∴ Women should be polite, pretty, and bad at studying
There’s a problem with this type of argument, and some very dangerous ideas have the same form:
Life is a painful, pitiless struggle for survival
∴ Life should be a painful, pitiless struggle for survival
Note that the naturalistic fallacy and the appeal to tradition fallacies are essentially the same.
In Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume explains the problem with this sort of argument (book III, part I, section I):
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when all of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given; for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.
What does that mean? It just means: we cannot go from a description of the world to making prescriptions⎯ that is ⎯ rules about how things should be.
So, back to Rand’s argument: she argues that humans are a). logical and b). want to be alive, and that we need to be logical to be alive. That premise has something wrong with it. But then she argues that these facts mean that people should be logical and alive. But that just does not follow. “People typically have bad breath” does not entail “people should have bad breath.” “Most people do not understand calculus” does not entail “most people should not understand calculus.” Maybe logic dictates that we die (such as when fighting in a war).
Rand is aware that this objection will come up, but she attempts to argue that there is no is- ought fallacy (page 17). But her argument is essentially question- begging: she is just saying “everyone else is wrong.”
In answer to those philosophers who claim that no relation can be established between ultimate ends or values and the facts of reality, let me stress that the fact that living entities exist and function necessitates the existence of values and of an ultimate value which for any given living entity is its own life. Thus the validation of value judgments is to be achieved by reference to the facts of reality. The fact that a living entity is, determines what it ought to do. So much for the issue of the relation between “is” and “ought.” (VS:17).
1.4.4 Questionable Premise: P2
Rand assumes that the only ‘end’ (or goal) for living things, including humans, is staying alive. As such, she contradicts some basic facts about living things- reproduction is more important than merely staying alive, and in any case, all living things die whatever they do.
1.4.5 Fallacy of Equivocation: P2-P3.
Rand slips from one meaning of the word ‘value’ to another. She makes the following claims:
It is a value to an animal to stay alive
Human values are based on the will to stay alive
And assumes that the term ‘value’ is the same in both. Is this correct?
1.4.6 Questionable Premise: P4.
Rand gives two reasons as to why you have to be fully logical. Firstly, we need to be logical to make things we need. Secondly, she states that if we are not logical, we die.
When man unfocuses his mind, he may be said to be conscious in a subhuman sense of the word, since he experiences sensations and perceptions. But in the sense of this word applicable to man- in the sense of a consciousness which is aware of reality and able to deal with it […] an unfocused mind is not conscious. (VS: 21).
Man is free to choose not to be unconscious, but not free to escape the penalty of unconsciousness: destruction. (VS: 22).
Of the latter claim, it is not clear if she means we are merely inferior, or if we actually die in the normal sense of the word. (p.21 paragraphs 2 and 3). (If she thinks that we are morally inferior, the question is: how can this make sense, assuming pure egoism?)
1.4.7 Questionable Premise: P5. “Rational” means “Do only what is good for me.”
Rand never gives a reason why this is true. Instead she relies on her ‘refutation’ of all other ethical theories (1.4, 1.4.1 above).
1.4.8 Questionable Premise: P6 “Rational” means “do productive work.”
Rand holds that it is morally wrong to be lazy, and morally good to do productive work. As she assumes ‘rationality’ to mean ‘morality,’ she assumes that doing productive work is rational.
Productive work is the central purpose of a rational man’s life, the central value that integrates and determines the hierarchy of all his other values. Reason is the source, the precondition of his productive work- pride is the result (VS: 25).
There is no argument here as such: it’s just added on without explanation. (She holds that ambition and self- assertiveness are good qualities, but these do not follow from mere egoism. And they don’t collide with normative ethics⎯ even Kant thought that it was immoral to waste talents, and Utilitarians can easily explain why ambition is good for society). If we reject any moral principle besides egoism, Rand has to explain why the following:
1.4.9 Questionable Premise: P7: Enslaving, stealing from or killing others is irrational.
P6 [‘Rational’ means ‘do not hurt or exploit other people or live off their labors’]
Rand argues that rationality is necessary for survival, and to survive requires that one needs to be rational. So, it seems that whatever we do is good, so long as we don’t die. So, if we are egoists, why not enslave or rob others? This is what Rand says:
The men who attempt to survive, not by means of reason, but by means of force, are attempting to survive by the method of animals. But just as animals would not be able to survive by attempting the method of plants, by rejecting locomotion and waiting for the soil to feed them- so men cannot survive by attempting the method of animals, by rejecting reason and counting on productive men to serve as their prey. Such looters may achieve their goals for the range of a moment, at the price of destruction: the destruction of their victims and their own. As evidence, I offer you any criminal or any dictatorship (VS: 24).
Arguments from analogy:
P1. A person using force to get what they want is like a person behaving like an animal
P2. Animals do not use reason
∴So a person using force to get what they want is behaving like an animal.
∴So a person using force to get what they want is not using reason.
P1. A person behaving like an animal is like an animal behaving like a plant
P2. An animal behaving like a plant will die.
∴A person behaving like an animal will die.
Are these strong analogies? Note that Rand does not explain why it is irrational to use force (or deceit, or whatever) to get what one wants. She tries to show that it is dangerous: she asserts that “any individual or any dictatorship” that loots will be destroyed instantly. But this is neither a). obviously true nor b). a moral reason: it is merely prudent. Why is Kim Jong- Il, for example, irrational? Rand can’t say.
A hot- rod: irrational? Kim Jong- Il: irrational?
Rand does not merely argue that using force to get what one wants, or being lazy, are immoral: any pleasure or hobby she does not approve of is described in the same way: the road to instant death or sub- human status. This is what she has to say about Hot- Rods:
Happiness is that state of consciousness which proceeds from the achievement of one’s values. If a man values productive work, his happiness is the measure of his success in the service of his life. But if a man values destruction, like a sadist ⎯ or self torture, like a masochist ⎯ or life beyond the grave, like a mystic, or mindless “kicks,” like the driver of a hotrod car ⎯ his alleged happiness is the measure of his success in the service of his own destruction. It must be added that the emotional state of all these irrationalists cannot be properly designated as happiness or even as pleasure: it’s merely a moment’s relief from their chronic state of terror (VS: 28).
Again, notice how Rand sneaks normative ethical principles in through the back door. As an egoist, she is committed to saying that only I matter, and that other people do not matter. Yet she presupposes a non- egoistic principle in assuming that sadism is morally wrong. The only way she can reject sadism is that it leads to self destruction. That’s just naively optimistic.
1.4.10 Rand’s Objectivism
In conclusion, we can say of Rand’s doctrine:
1). Her arguments have premises which are false
2). She begs the question (she has premises that are the same as the conclusion)
3). She attacks a straw man
4). She presupposes non- egoistic moral principles
So how did such a bad arguer become so popular? I think it’s because she said what people wanted to hear: it is morally okay to be selfish. That is, her conclusions are appealing. She writes in a style which appears to be philosophical, which seems impressive for people who don’t know philosophy, and revolting to anyone who does. Rand is to philosophy as McDonalds’ is to food.
1.5 The Compatibility Argument
Rachels discusses this argument on pp. 79-81. It is simply this: ethical egoism is the ‘background theory’ behind all normative ethics. We follow moral rules out of self interest. Don’t lie, and people will trust you. Do not harm others, and we will not be shunned and hated, and so on. This is essentially the same theory as Hobbes’ Social Contract.
The theory, according to Rachels, has one basic problem: it explains why it is best to do the right thing when nobody is watching. So long as one is intelligent or powerful enough to avoid the Police, there is no pressing reason to follow the moral rules of society. Ethical Egoism is not compatible with normative ethics (but may be compatible with Hobbes).
1.6 Arguments Against Ethical Egoism.
Rachels offers four arguments against Ethical Egoism: the Wickedness Argument, the Conflicts of Interest argument, the Inconsistency Argument, and the Arbitrariness Argument (pp. 81-88).
1.6.1 The Wickedness Argument
As Rachels notes, the most obvious objection to Ethical Egoism is that it endorses wicked actions (p. 81). Yet note that this presupposes some traditional notion of the good. That is, it begs the question, as it presupposes a non- egoistic notion of morality.
Three options are open here to the Ethical Egoist: a). give up; b). deny that Ethical Egoism really leads to accepting immoral acts, or c) bite the bullet (that is, accept the unpleasant implications), and assert that Ethical Egoism is superior to any theory that holds to traditional notions of right and wrong. (Friedrich Nietzsche {1844-1900} most famously rejected all such notions of morality, declaring his ethics ‘beyond good and evil’). These options are discussed below.
1.6.2 The Conflicts of Interest Argument
Kurt Baier, in the text The Moral Point of View, argues that Ethical Egoism can provide no solution for conflicts of interest. Normative ethics exists so that we can resolve conflicts of interest. He takes this to be an essential quality in a moral theory. Ethical Egoism has no such power, so it is inadequate as a moral theory.
Rachels cites an example from Baier’s book: two men, B and K, are both egoists and both want to be the president. So it is in B’s interest to kill K, and in K’s interest to kill B, yet this contradicts B and K’s self- interests to not be dead.
Rachels notes that this argument only works if one accepts Baier’s assumption about what a moral theory needs. An Ethical Egoist might simply not care about resolving disputes. (This is where Ethical Egoism completely separates from Hobbes). A true Egoist might simply accept the ‘law of the Jungle.’
1.6.3 The Logical Inconsistency Argument
Baier offers a more sophisticated argument, based on the example above (taken from Rachels p.84).
1). Suppose it is each person’s duty to do what is in his own best interests
2). It is in B’s best interests to murder K.
3). It is in K’s best interests to prevent B from murdering him.
4). (sub- conclusion). Therefore, it is B’s duty to murder K, and K’s duty is to prevent B from doing it.
5). But it is wrong to prevent someone from doing his duty.
6). Therefore, it is wrong for K to prevent B from murdering him.
7). Therefore, it is both wrong and not wrong for K to prevent B from murdering him.
8). But no act can be both wrong and non- wrong; that is a self- contradiction.
9). Therefore the assumption with which we started- that it is each person’s duty to
do what is in his own best interests- cannot be true.
Rachels (p. 85). Notes that Baier fails to reveal a real contradiction. Premise 5 is not a Ethical Egoistic principle. An Ethical Egoist is concerned only with their own duties, so premises 5 and 6 presuppose the claim that Ethical Egoism is untrue. (Writes Rachels, “ [for the egoist,] whether one ought to prevent someone from doing his duty depends entirely on whether it would be to one’s own advantage to do so.”
1.6.4 The Arbitrariness Argument
This argument is the real monster- killer. It also emphasizes the importance of dealing with egoism as a philosophical problem.
Rachels notes that racists and other bigots, whenever forced to articulate their views, fall back on the following principle:
The Principle of Equal Treatment: We should treat people in the same way unless there is a [morally] relevant difference between them.
Racists and sexists argue that there are relevant distinctions between themselves and others that justify differential treatment. (Kant and Hume argued, for example, that Africans were intellectually deficient). Any group, whether national, tribal, religious or criminal, that treats non- members as morally less significant than its own members, must (on pain of contradiction) either reject the Principle of Equal Treatment or find some morally relevant difference.
As Rachels notes, Ethical Egoism has essentially the same basic logic as racism or any other doctrine that makes an arbitrary in- group out- group distinction. Just as racists draw an arbitrary line between people of their own phenotype [physical appearance type] and everyone else, and the Yakuza draw an arbitrary line between themselves and the general public, Ethical Egoists arbitrarily draw a line between themselves and everyone else. That is, Ethical Egoism reduces the logic of racism down to a single person. (See Rachels pp. 85-88).
1.6.5 Further Note
Ethical Egoism may seem a fairly exotic idea: an idea so bizarre, in fact, that very few would want to actually follow it. This is not the case. Firstly, as a personal doctrine, the work of Ayn Rand is massively popular, most probably the most popular philosopher in history. Secondly, all groups, nations, corporations etc. that justify wars of conquest, imperialism, etc. for reasons other than defense, were they to attempt to justify their acts, would need to cite some theory resembling Ethical Egoism. If we can refute EE, we can refute such justifications.
Egoism Lecture 2:
Max Stirner
Drawing of Stirner by Engels Translation by Tsuji Jun. uiitsusha to sono shoyû", 1920
2.1 Introduction: Stirner’s Thought.
We are looking at Stirner for one reason: we need to know what Ayn Rand’s premises actually lead to. She thinks that everybody living selfishly will lead to a flourishing, healthy society in which proud, hardworking people will get what they deserve, and everyone else should just stop complaining and get a job. But she also complains about, for example, the injustice of tax money spent on pointless public monuments, and the cruelty of Stalinist Russia and Nazi Germany. She agrees with Stirner that you should be an egoist, if you are free and rational, but she thinks that you shouldn’t hurt anyone else. By contrast, on this point, Stirner just does not care. Egoism for Stirner means nobody else matters.
This is the central question: who is the more logically consistent egoist: Rand or Stirner? Remember: egoism by definition means you do not care about other people. Instead of explaining why the leaders of nations are immoral, he wants to become like them. He wants to, in the language of Starwars, ‘turn to the Dark Side.’
2.2 Stirner: Biographical Note.
Max Stirner (born Johann Kaspar Schmidt, 1806-1856) was born in Bayreuth, Bavaria, on October 25, 1806. His father, a flute maker, died when Stirner was six months old. At the age of 20 Stirner attended the University of Berlin, where he studied philology (the analysis of ancient texts), philosophy and theology. During his studies he attended lectures by the philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770- 1831).
In 1841 Stirner joined a discussion group of intellectuals called “The Free” (Die Freien), which included Bruno Bauer, Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Karl Marx and Ludwig Feuerbach. Stirner found work teaching at a girl’s high school (university work was impossible as he was an avowed atheist) and in 1844 published his only book, The Ego And Its Own, in which he attacks religion, the government, morality, Communism, Hegel, and Feuerbach. The text was not a commercial success; an early ban on the book was immediately lifted because it was judged “too absurd” to be a danger to society.
Stirner married twice; his first wife died in childbirth; the second left him after he had wasted all her inheritance on a failed milk business. He had continual money problems, and was imprisoned for debt in 1853 and 1854. In 1856 he was killed after being bitten by a ‘winged insect.’ His life was quite unhappy, but happiness was less important to him than being unique.
Nobody is really sure of Stirner’s influence. Marx hated his work, once writing 400 pages explaining why Stirner was wrong. Yet it seems likely that the text influenced Marx a great deal. Stirner is recognized as being the pioneer of the Anarchy movement, in particular the American anarchist Benjamin R. Tucker. In 1939, Sidney Hook stated that the debate between Marx and Stirner involved “the fundamental problems of any possible system of ethics or public morality,” and in 1939, Isaiah Berlin noted that “the theory of the alienation of the proletarians was enunciated by the Max Stirner at least one year before Marx.” It is also suggested that Stirner greatly influenced Nietzsche’s moral thought.
Stirner was also discovered in Japan; seven editions of The Ego and Its Own were published in Japanese between 1900- 1929.
2.3 The Genealogy of Morals argument.
Stirner’s central argument against morality is that it has a Christian origin. Originally, morality was simply a matter of doing what God, that is, the Church, wanted you to do. As Protestantism challenged the authority of the Church, its authority was transformed into that of the State. The ‘spirit’ of God has become replaced with the ‘idea of humanity,’ and the idea of morality was transformed from doing God’s will to doing the Will of the State. “Society,” for Stirner, “is a new master, a new spook, a new ‘supreme being,’ which ‘takes us into its service and allegiance’! (111).
[…] one thing certainly happened, and visibly guided the progress of post-Christian history: this one thing was the endeavor to make the Holy Spirit more human, and bring it nearer to men, or men to it. Through this it came about that at last it could be conceived as the ‘spirit of humanity,’ and, under different expressions like ‘idea of humanity, mankind, humaneness, general philanthropy,’ appeared more attractive, more familiar, and more accessible. (p.87).
As ‘the brotherhood of man’ is both a Christian idea and a basic assumption of ethics, Stirner rejects it:
Is not ‘right’ a religious concept, something sacred? Why, ‘equality of rights’ […] is only another name for ‘Christian equality,’ the ‘equality of the brethren,’ of ‘God’s children,’ ‘of Christians’; in short, fraternité [‘brotherhood,’ in French] …When the [French] revolution stamped equality as a ‘right,’ it took flight into the religious domain, into the region of the sacred, of the ideal. Hence, since then, the fight for the ‘sacred, inalienable rights of man.’ (168-169).
Stirner makes the following claims (those claims which are necessary for the argument to make sense, but are not stated, are in square brackets).
‘Morality’ means ‘following the dictates of society.’
Society is an abstract idea.
Abstract ideas have their origins in fictions, not in facts.
[Fictions are not sound grounds for morality.]
The idea of society has its origins in religious beliefs.
The idea of morality has its origins in religious beliefs.
[Religious beliefs are irrational].
The conclusion is that morality is essentially a religious fiction. More simply:
Morality and society are myths, because they have their origins in religion, which is itself a fiction.
The following quotes illustrate this idea.
The Christian people has produced two societies whose duration will keep equal measure with the permanence of that people: these are the societies state and church. Can they be called a union of egoists? Do we in them pursue an egoistic, personal, own interest, or do we pursue a popular, an interest of the Christian people, namely, a state, and church interest? Can I and may I be myself in them? May I think and act as I will, may I reveal myself, live myself out, busy myself? Must I not leave untouched the majesty of the state, the sanctity of the Church? (189).
If the church had deadly sins, the state has capital crimes; if the one had heretics, the other has traitors; the one ecclesiastical penalties, the other criminal penalties; the one inquisitorial processes, the other fiscal; in short, there sins, there crimes, there inquisition and here- inquisition. Will the sanctity of the state not fall like the church’s? The awe of its laws, the reverence for its highness, the humanity of its ‘subjects,’ – will this remain? Will the ‘saint’s face’ not be stripped of its adornment? (213).
Stirner also takes the ban on homicide to be essentially religious, for the same reason.
p.213. [On Homicide]. “A man who lets a man’s life continue in existence because to him it is sacred and he had a dread of touching it is simply a- religious man.
2.4 The Injustice of Society
The second central argument in Stirner appears to be something like this:
P1 ‘Ethics’ simply means ‘doing that which society demands of us.’
P2 ‘Society’ (the Government, economic forces etc.) is unjust
∴ we should reject ethics
Stirner also believes that the people in power (the government and the wealthy) are also entirely egoistic, and that the Law is merely an instrument for protecting their own wealth. (Note how different this to Rand, who would say that wealthy people deserve their wealth, and that property rights are absolute). If you do not fight and die for the country’s leaders, or if you refuse to follow their laws, you will go to jail. We see this in the Justice system: white- collar criminals who steal millions of dollars often get light sentences, whereas those who merely steal cars can get heavier sentences.
Just observe the nation that is defended by devoted patriots. The patriots fall in bloody battle or in the fight with hunger and want; what does the nation care for that? By the manure of their corpses the nation comes to ‘its bloom’! The individuals have died ‘for the great cause of the nation,’ and the nation sends some words of thanks after them and- has the profit of it. I call that a kind of lucrative egoism.
But only look at that Sultan [ruler of a Muslim country- here Stirner means the rulers of our own societies] who cares so lovingly for ‘his people.’ Is he not pure unselfishness itself, and does he not hourly sacrifice himself for his people? Oh, yes, for’ his people.’ Just try it; show yourself not as his, but as your own; for breaking away from his egoism you will take a trip to jail. The Sultan has set his cause on nothing but himself; he is to himself all in all [he only cares about himself], he is to himself the only one, and tolerates nobody who would dare not to be one of ‘his people.’ (p.6).
But Stirner goes a little overboard here. He is committed to saying that “Every state is a despotism” (175).
[ …] I am free in no state. The lauded tolerance of states is simply a tolerating of the ‘harmless,’ the ‘not dangerous’; it is only elevation above pettymindedness, only a more estimable, grander, prouder- despotism. (201).
Why does he say this?
2.5 Freedom as Absolute Value
Stirner thinks that anything that limits freedom is bad. Hence, he is committed to saying that freedom is the only good.
But the social reformers preach to us a ‘law of society.’ There the individual becomes society’s slave, and is in the right only when society makes him out in the right, when he lives according to society’s states and so is- loyal. Whether I am loyal under a despotism or in a ‘society’ à la Weitling [1808-1871, a Utopian socialist], it is the same absence of right in so far as in both cases I have not my right but foreign right. (168).
One influential idea in Stirner is that workers are enslaved by their employers (recall that Stirner had a large, if unacknowledged, influence on Marx).
The labourers have the most enormous power in their hands, and, if they once become thoroughly conscious of it and used it, nothing would withstand them; they would only have to stop labour, regard the product of labour as theirs, and enjoy it. This is the sense of the labour disturbances which show themselves here and there. The state rests on the – slavery of labour. If labour becomes free, the state is lost. (105).
But note the tension here: Stirner thinks that slavery and injustice are morally wrong. Stirner presupposes a morality, according to which slavery is evil, and freedom is good.
Now […] when every one is to cultivate himself into man, condemning man to machine- like labour amounts to the same thing as slavery (108).
How can a pure egoist recognize a morality that makes such claims?
2.6 Might Makes Right
“Your property is mine. My property is also mine!”
Jaian, of Doraemon.
If there is no ‘equality of rights,’ what, for Stirner, is the basis of rights? One answer could be ‘there is no basis to the idea of rights.’ But Stirner thinks there are rights— the rights of the powerful. For Stirner There are no other rights. “You long for freedom? You fools! If you took might, freedom would come of itself. See, he who has might ‘stands above the law.” (p.151).
But let the individual man lay claim to ever so many rights because man or the concept man ‘entitles’ him to them, because his being man does it: what do I care for his right and his claim? If he has his right only from man and does not have it from me, then from me he has no right. His life, for example, counts to me only for what it is worth to me. I respect neither a so- called right of property (or his claim to tangible goods) nor yet his right to the ‘sanctuary of his inner nature’ (or his right to have the spiritual goods or services, his gods, remain unaggrieved). His goods, the sensuous as well as the spiritual, are mine, and I dispose of them as proprietor, in the measure of my- might (219).
What then is my property? Nothing but what is in my power! To what property am I entitled? To every property to which I- empower myself. I give myself the right of property in taking property to myself, or giving myself the proprietor’s power, full power, empowerment. (p.227).
As such, the only solution to social injustice is a War of All against All: “the property question cannot be solved so amicably as the socialists, yes, even the communists, dream. It is solved only by the war of all against all. The poor become free and the proprietors only when they- rebel, rise up.” (230).
Stirner also argues that this view is not unusual. In fact, he argues that it is the actual thinking of any truly powerful person. Many people in positions of power may talk of morality, but in reality they are not moral. They are egoists, they care only about themselves, and they function like (immoral) Gods. Instead of basing his ethics on making everyone happy (Utilitarianism) or duty (Kant) or a social contract (which he would dismiss as a hoax), Stirner thinks: “who has the best ethics for survival in this unfair, horrible world?” The answer:
And will you not learn by these brilliant examples that the egoist gets on best? I for my part take a lesson from them, and propose, instead of further unselfishly serving those great egoists, rather to be the egoist myself… let me hen likewise concern myself for myself, who am equally with God the nothing of all others, who am my all, who am the only one [der Einzige](EH: 6).
Discussion question: Is this a good argument? Are there any other alternatives that have better reasoning behind them?
Note the implication: if the Government decides that Stirner is a dangerous writer and should be locked up, and it has the power to arrest, sentence and imprison him, or even kill him, Stirner has no argument against this. Why? Because might makes right.
A second implication: nothing is forbidden to the egoist. If you can do a particular action, and you want to, it is the right thing to do.
I decide whether it is the right thing in me; there is no right outside me. If it is right for me, it is right. Possibly this may not suffice to make it right for the rest; that is their care, not mine: let them defend themselves (170).
Stirner (and all other egoists, including Rand) may be able to avoid contradiction only by making this assertion: I am totally selfish, and I think you should be too, but I must accept that you may harm or destroy me because of your own selfish motives. This may be logical, but it is psychologically unlikely. It seems more logical to just accept Hobbes (which is essentially ‘cooperation amongst egoists’ anyway).
2.7 Implications: The Poor
Stirner, unlike Rand, is more explicit in the economic consequences of Egoism as a doctrine: people will have whatever they can steal or earn; anyone who cannot fight or work for food will starve.
If you are competent to furnish pleasure to thousands, then thousands will pay you an honorarium for it; for it would stand in your power to forbear doing it, hence they must purchase your deed. If you are not competent to captivate anyone, you may simply starve (235).
If your person is of consequence to me, you pay me with your very existence; if I am concerned with only one of your qualities, then your compliance, perhaps, or your aid, has a value (a money value) for me, and I purchase it (s; 235).
There is clearly something seriously wrong with Stirner’s philosophy, but it is important (and good practice) to concentrate on the internal contradictions in Stirner’s thought, rather than the implications.
2.8 Marx’s Critique
Marx argued that Stirner’s whole system is self- defeating. If we live with a group (which requires that we follow its rules and conventions) we are better placed to follow our projects and live our lives than in a war of all against all. Even if we were totally free in a non- society of egoists, we would be too busy avoiding being killed or robbed to do anything else. Stirner’s philosophy is essentially Hobbes without the contract.
2.9 Other Problems with Stirner
[internal contradictions]
[questionable premises].
2.10 Conclusion
We can at least credit Stirner with being more thorough and more honest than Rand. Further, Stirner’s criticism of the State will not simply go away: we should always be wary of governments who attempt to convince the people that the Will of the Government, the Will of the People and Morality (capital ‘M’) are one and the same thing.
2.11 Egoists in Movies
Kill Bill
It’s mercy, compassion and forgiveness I lack, not rationality.
Arlene Machiavelli /Beatrix Kiddo
Quentin Tarantino Kill Bill Volume 1.
The Third Man
In Italy, for thirty years under the Borgias, they had warfare, terror, murder, bloodshed, but they produced Michelangelo – Leonardo Da Vinci, and the Renaissance ...in Switzerland, they had brotherly love. They had five hundred years of democracy and peace, and what did that produce? The cuckoo clock.
Harry Lime, in Graham Green The Third Man (screenplay)
Egoists in Real Life
This is rat eat rat, dog eat dog. I'll kill ‘em, and I'm going to kill ‘em before they kill me. You're talking about the American way – of survival of the fittest.
Ray Kroc, founder of McDonald’s (1902-1984)
The greatest pleasure is to vanquish your enemies, to chase them before you, to rob them of their wealth, to see their near and dear bathed in tears, to ride their horses and sleep on the white bellies of their wives and daughters.
Ghengis Khan (1167-1227)
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