Hume and Ethics November 2007
Lectures 19 and 20
Slave to the Passions: David Hume’s Ethics
Dr. Geoffrey Roche
19.1 Resources for these lectures
Secondary resources:
A.J Ayer. Hume: A very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
David Hume “Morality as Based on Sentiment” in James Rachels and Stuart Rachels,
eds. The Right Thing to Do Boston: McGraw Hill, 2007:65- 70.
Stephen Darwall, University of Michigan. Phil 433 course: History of Modern Ethics. Available at: http://www-personal.umich.edu/~sdarwall/433dh1200.txt
http://www-personal.umich.edu/~sdarwall/433dh200.txt
William Edward Morris “David Hume” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume/
James Fieser “David Hume” in The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy Available at: http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/h/humelife.htm
Rachel Cohon “Hume’s Moral Philosophy” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-moral/
Primary resources:
David Hume Treatise of Human Nature (1739- 1740).
http://www.class.uidaho.edu/mickelsen/ToC/hume%20treatise%20ToC.htm [accessed Nov 5th 2007].
Or here:
http://etext.library.adelaide.edu.au/h/hume/david/h92t/
19.1 Opening Questions
a). What character traits (‘virtues’) would make a person pleasing to themselves? (That is, what traits do you need to have to enjoy your own company?)
b). What virtues make a person useful for themselves (that is, independent)?
c). What virtues would make a person pleasing, or useful, to others?
d). Is intelligence necessary and sufficient to be a good person?
e). Is the Motive of Duty necessary and sufficient to be a good person?
Disclaimer: The contents of this lecture is substantially paraphrased from Darwall and Ayer, and is not to be cited as an original work by the compiler.
19.2 David Hume: Biographical sketch
David Hume (1711-1776), philosopher, historian and essayist, is considered the greatest philosopher ever to write in English. In the words of His three main philosophical works, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-1740), the Enquiries concerning Human Nature (1748) and Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751) remain very influential, and had a major impact even on those who disagreed with him (Kant, in particular). His thought inspired Jeremy Bentham to write his Utilitarian ethics. He was also an influence on non- philosophers, such as his friend the economist Adam Smith (Hume suggesting that open markets are better for the economy) and the father of the theory of Evolution, Charles Darwin. Philosophers now consider Hume to be the father of contemporary cognitive science (the study of how the mind organizes information and creates experience). Much of what we now generally accept as logical principle, especially as applied to scientific and logical analysis, we owe to Hume. (The Naturalistic Fallacy and the Is- Ought Fallacy are two examples we’ve already seen).
David Hume was born in Edinburgh, Scotland. He was a precocious youth, and was sent to Edinburgh University at the age of twelve. He was supposed to study law, but instead secretly studied the Classical authors of ancient Greece and Rome. (He had to keep this a secret as his parents were very religious and did not approve of such pagan literature). He left university without taking his degree (you will notice that Kant always writes of “Mr. Hume” for this reason) and spent three years thinking and writing about philosophy. He briefly tried to hold a regular job at a sugar import company- he got fired because he criticized his boss’s writing style. Then he went to live in La Flèche, France (where his small stipend was enough to get by) to study French writings. There he wrote the draft for Treatise of Human Nature between 1734 and 1737, arguing with Jesuit priests about religion in his spare time.
Hume saw this book published in 1739, anonymously, with the more anti- religious parts removed (“castrated,” in Hume’s words). Hume then tried to find academic work, but no university would hire him: his thought was too controversial. He never held an academic post.
Hume found teaching work in 1745 as the private tutor to the Marquess of Annandale, but the boy was insane. Eventually he found work as a librarian, which gave him the stability, and the books, needed to write The History of England, which became a best- seller. This gave him the financial stability (at the age of 43) to write more philosophy. In 1763 Hume was made secretary to the Ambassador to France, and spent the next three years in Paris, where he frequently met the French philosophes Diderot, D’Alembert and d’Holbach (all atheists and free-thinkers). In 1766 Hume returned to England with Jean- Jacques Rousseau. Their friendship collapsed- Rousseau, totally paranoid, was convinced that Hume was organizing an international conspiracy against him.
After a year working for the Government, Hume returned to Edinburgh in 1769, this time for good. One of his young female friends, Nancy Orde, one night wrote “St. David’s Street” on the wall of Hume’s home in chalk. The street still bears the name.
Hume died of intestinal cancer in 1776, not before preparing his most controversial works for publication.
David Hume, 1 St. David’s Street, Edinburgh.
Hume’s philosophical work was very carefully argued, firmly grounded in solid logical and scientific principles, and profoundly skeptical. Although never explicitly stating his lack of faith, he was attacked for his atheism and skepticism. He rigorously argued that we have no way of knowing that external reality exists, that causality is quite possibly an illusion, and that there is no self or free will. He was also an influential critic of conventional religious belief, in particular Christian belief (for his brilliant argument against the Argument from Design, see Ayer: 115).
Hume summarizes his general approach in the final lines of the Enquiries concerning Human Understanding: philosophy is not about being nice and respecting everyone’s point of view. It is about destroying falsity. Philosophy before Hume was about discovering theoretical explanations based on pure reason, or mere speculation. After Hume, philosophy is a descriptive inquiry based on direct experience of what can be observed. (This philosophy is called Empiricism, as opposed to Rationalism).
When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc must we make? If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance, let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion (E:165).
Here we will concern ourselves with Hume’s ethical theory, in which we see this attitude that philosophy is a confused mess, and someone has to clean it up.
19.3 Hume’s ethics: background
Hume is not so interested in what the rules of morality should be (he just assumes Utilitarianism, more or less, in particular Rule Utilitarianism, as a theory of morality, and a variant of Virtue Theory as a theory of how to be moral). Hume’s main concern in ethics is the psychological foundation of morals. For Kant, morality was grounded in reason. For Kant, moral decision- making is based on intelligible ideas and inescapable conclusions. For Hume, by contrast, morality is grounded on an immediate, innate sense of right and wrong that is conceptually distinct from the operations of pure reason. I will quote and expand on Ayer (19.4- 19.13) in summarizing Hume’s eleven moral principles (Ayer: 98- 100).
19.4 The Limits of Reason.
Reason alone, being concerned only with the discovery and falsehood, “can never be the motive for any action of the will” (Treatise: 413). It is from this principle that Hume derives his celebrated dictum:
Reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them (Treatise: 415).
What does this mean? It means that reason can never be the motive of any action. For Hume, reason is merely the capacity to draw inferences and appraise statements for their truth or falsehood.
As such, Hume is presenting an Emotive theory of morality. A simple Emotivist theory says that moral statements are statements of our feelings about a particular action, rather than statements actually describing anything objectively real. “Murder is immoral” in this sense is more akin to the statement “I hate you” or “ouch” than “There are 28 chairs in room 602.” Ayer thinks that Hume is not offering such a crude theory, however: moral language expresses our moral sentiments, but not our personal mental condition (Ayer: 104).
Hume’s Ethics: The Basics
Hume's position in ethics, which is based on his empiricist theory of the mind, is best known for asserting four theses: (1) Reason alone cannot be a motive to the will, but rather is the “slave of the passions” (2) Morals are not derived from reason (3) Morals are derived from the moral sentiments: feelings of approval (esteem, praise) and disapproval (blame) felt by spectators who contemplate a character trait or action (4) While some virtues and vices are natural others, including justice, are artificial (that is, created by particular societies for their own long- term benefit). We’ll go over the first three points.
Against Rationalism: Reason alone cannot be a motive to the will, but rather is the “slave of the passions”
Against the moral rationalists – in particular Kant- Hume argues that it is actually impossible to understand their theory of distinguishing between right and wrong (T, 455-470). (Recall that Kant can hardly explain why telling lies is always immoral). Reason, Hume argues, judges either of matters of fact or of relations. Nothing else. Morality never consists in any single matter of fact that could be immediately perceived, intuited, or grasped by reason alone; morality for rationalists must therefore involve the perception of relations. Distinguishing these cases requires more than reason alone can provide.
Hume also rejected the rationalist model of ethics proposed by the Social Contract theorists, in particular Hobbes. Morality cannot be reduced to self- interest, Hume reasons, because an accurate description of the social virtues, benevolence and justice, will show that there is more to these phenomena than mere selfishness.
Hume also argues that our benevolent sentiments can't be reduced to self-interest. It is true that, when we desire the happiness of others, and try to make them happy, we may enjoy doing so. But benevolence is necessary for our self-enjoyment, and although we may act from the combined motives of benevolence and enjoyment, our benevolent sentiments aren't identical with our self-enjoyment.
What is reason good for then, according to Hume? It can recommend the best means for attaining a given end, but it can't recommend ultimate ends. (It can’t tell us which is better: a life of adventure, or a life of hard work, or a life in front of television). Reason can provide no motive to action, for reason alone is insufficient to produce moral blame or approbation. We need sentiment to give a preference to the useful tendencies of actions.
Hume not only argues against Kant. He is arguing against a very old, in fact traditional belief that reason and the passions are opposed to each other. (A recent argument against the Jury system in Japan: people will be overwhelmed by emotion if they have to sit on a very horrific court case, so they will not be able to judge rationally). Hume rejects this dichotomy [division]. Instead he states that “reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will,” and that reason alone “can never oppose passion in the direction of the will” (T 413).
From Hume’s Treatise on Human Nature:
Nothing is more usual in philosophy, and even in common life, than to talk of the combat of passion and reason, to give the preference to reason, and to assert that men are only so far virtuous as they conform themselves to its dictates. Every rational creature, 'tis said, is oblig'd to regulate his actions by reason; and if any other motive or principle challenge the direction of his conduct, he ought to oppose it, 'till it be entirely subdu'd, or at last brought to a conformity with that superior principle. (T: Part III, Section III Book II, paragraph 1).
What is Hume’s argument here, exactly? He reasons as follows. Human Understanding has two rational functions. It can analyze the relations of ideas (such as mathematical or logical reasoning). Human understanding can also judge, using probability, the relations of objects, especially their causal relationships, revealed by our experience. That’s all it can do.
As such, Human Understanding cannot cause any action by itself. It is our feelings of pleasure or pain, or our aversion or attraction to them, that really decide which action we should take. “'Tis from the prospect of pain or pleasure that the aversion or propensity arises.”
Hume has a second argument which is the corollary (the logical twin) of the first. Reason alone cannot prevent or stop any passion or impulse. If reason could prevent an impulse, then it would be able to give rise to a contrary impulse. But if it could do that, it would be an original impulse on the will (that is, a capacity to cause volition). So, when we calm ourselves down and hold ourselves back from some passionate but violent or immoral act, it is actually a calming passion, and not reason, that stops us.
A second aspect of this theory: as reason alone cannot guide actions, neither actions or passions can be contrary to reason. (Recall Ayn Rand’s argument that attacking people, or driving a hotrod, is against reason). According to Hume's definition of reason, something can be contrary to reason only if it can be false, or mistakenly inferred. But, he says, neither actions nor passions can be contrary to reason in this sense since they aren't even the sort of thing which can be false (or inferred). To say that “reason shows that doing dangerous things is irrational” is just a category error. Something can be false only if it has a "representative quality," that is, if it claims to represent reality in some way, and if it represents incorrectly (For example, we can say “this argument is invalid” or “that picture of Godzilla attacking Tokyo Tower is incorrect, because Godzilla does not exist.” “But passions and actions have no such quality--each is an "original existence" (415) and "compleat in themselves" (458). Therefore, they can neither be false, nor mistakenly inferred. Therefore, they cannot be contrary to reason (Derived from Darwall: Hume I).
Hume expresses these thoughts in some rather shocking ways.
Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger.
Tis not contrary to reason for me to chuse my total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian or person wholly unknown to me.
A more vivid version of the same insight occurs in the work of Donatien Alphonse François, the Marquis de Sade, in the novel Juliette (1797).
If from immolating three million human victims you stand to gain no livelier pleasure than that to be had from eating a good dinner, slender though this pleasure may appear in the light of its price, you ought to treat yourself to it without an instant’s hesitation; for if you sacrifice the good dinner, the necessary result is a privation for you, whereas no privation results from the disappearance of the three million insignificant creatures you must do away with to obtain the dinner, because between it and you there exists a relationship, however tenuous, whereas none exists between you and the three million victims (J: 642).
(Again, the question is: is Kim Jong- Il irrational?)
19.5 The Passions (Hume’s Moral Psychology).
The passions by which we are motivated, according to Hume, may be direct or indirect, calm or violent. The direct passions, such as those of joy, grief, hope or fear, arise either from natural instinct, or from our desire of good, which can here be equated with pleasure, or aversion from evil, which can here be equated with pain. The indirect passions, such as those of pride, humility, love, or hatred, arise from a combination of these primitive motives with other factors. This distinction is independent of that between calmness and violence. It is because the motivation may be [so] violent that “men often act knowingly against their interest” and are not always influenced by “their view of the greatest possible good” (Treatise: 418).
19.6 Hume’s Virtue Ethics
Recall that Kant argued that an action must be done out of a sense of duty to be truly moral. Hume turns this thinking on its head. For Hume, and action is only moral if it is done out of some motive other than a sense of its morality. Ayer explains: understanding the morality of a particular action does not confer any merit on an action. The moral subject must have a good motive or a good character to truly be good. They must be habitually good.
A man who is of a miserly disposition may grow ashamed of it [his miserliness] and so force himself to perform acts of generosity. In time his initial reluctance to perform them may or may not be overcome. It is not, however, necessary that it should be overcome in order for his actions to be morally good. Their goodness depends on their conforming to a habitual practice of generosity… (Ayer: 107).
In this sense Hume is reviving the ancient Greek notion of Ethics as an art of self- cultivation. Ethics, in this Virtue Ethics sense, is not about following rules or maximizing the good, but of making oneself an ‘excellent person’ through cultivating good character traits (‘virtues’). Aristotle sums up this principle: “Excellence, […] is not an act but a habit.” As a theory of ethical motivation it has its advantages, but its main weakness is that it gives (arguably) little guidance in what to do in any particular instance. In any case, Hume poses an important challenge to Kant’s moral schema. For Hume (reasons Ayer) to rely entirely on a sense of duty for one’s morality suggests that one is “deficient in natural benevolence” (Ayer: 107).
19.7 Sympathy
All humans, reasons Hume, have two sentiments: self- love and sympathy. Sympathy here means ‘sense of humanity.’ Hume holds that it is a natural instinct. It strength is such that although it is “rare to meet with one, who loves any single person better than himself,” it is equally “rare to meet with one, in whom all the kind affections, taken together, do not over- balance all the selfish” (Treatise: 487). This natural instinct or sympathy or benevolence plays a large part in the formation of our moral and political attitudes. He also takes it to be Utilitarian in nature. From the Enquiry: Hume charts all virtues as being either useful or agreeable.
For ourselves (self- love) For others (sympathy)
Agreeable Qualities immediately Agreeable to ourselves Qualities immediately agreeable to others
Useful (= productive of something agreeable) Qualities useful to ourselves Benevolence
Justice
Below is Hume’s Table of Virtues:
To Ourselves To Others
Agreeable Tranquility
Good Taste Politeness
Wit
Decency
Useful Discretion
Industry
Frugality
Honesty and Fidelity
Strength of Mind Benevolence
Gratitude
Generosity
Friendliness
Justice
(Note that a). this idea of an ethics as good for the ethical agent, and yet also good for other people, is the ‘missing third option’ that Ayn Rand fails to consider in rejecting all non- egoistic ethics. Note also that Hume can explain why industry and strength of mind are good to have, whereas Rand merely asserts it).
Here is Hume’s argument for justifying moral rules.
Any being which has feelings of sympathy and self- love will be pleased by anything useful or pleasant to itself or others (when considered in general without reference to our particular interest).
Man has the feelings of sympathy and self- love.
It follows that man will be pleased by anything useful or pleasant to ourselves or others (when considered in general without reference to our particular interest).
Hence, for example, Justice is useful to ourselves and others.
So, justice pleases us (when considered in general without reference to our particular interest).
Any character [trait] that pleases (when considered in general without reference to our particular interest] is morally good.
Therefore, we ought to be just.
19.8 On Reason and Morality
“Since morals… have an influence on the actions and affections, it follows that they cannot be deriv’d from reason” (Treatise: 457). Accordingly, “the rules of morality are not conclusions of our reason.”
19.9 Moral Judgments are Not Facts, and cannot be Derived from Facts
Moral judgments are not descriptions of matter of fact.
Take any action allow'd to be vicious: wilful murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice. In which-ever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. (T:468).
when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it. (T: 469)
Similarly, when “instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not,” one suddenly meets “with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not” (Treatise: 469), one is being tricked. It is not possible that “this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.”
19.10 (3) Morals are derived from the moral sentiments: feelings of approval (esteem, praise) and disapproval (blame) felt by spectators who contemplate a character trait or action
[This idea is similar to the theory of perception developed by the Empiricists, in particular John Locke {1632-1704} and George Berkeley {1685-1753}]. “Vice and virtue may be compared to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which according to modern philosophy [that is, Empiricism and Science, which was then called ‘natural philosophy,’] are not qualities in the object, but perceptions in the mind” (T: 469). Accordingly, “when you pronounce any character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature, you have a feeling of sentiment or blame from the contemplation of it.”
The following quotes illustrate this idea.
To have the sense of virtue, is nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a character. The very feeling constitutes our praise or admiration. We do not infer a character to be virtuous, because it pleases: But in feeling that it pleases after such a
particular manner, we in effect feel that it is virtuous. The case is the same as in our judgments concerning all kinds of beauty, and tastes, and sensations (T: 471).
Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compar'd to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which according to modern philosophy, are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind." (T: 469)
19.11 Virtue and Vice are determined by Motives Only
Though one speaks of virtuous or vicious actions, they derive their merit or demerit only from virtuous or vicious motives, and it is only as signs of such motives, or the character of the person who acts from them, that actions are subject to moral evaluation.
19.12 The Utilitarian Thesis
[For Hume, our moral sentiments are essentially Utilitarian]. What arouses our approbation [approval] or disapprobation is the appraisal of qualities as being respectively productive of a preponderance of pleasure or pain. These appraisals may also be characterized as judgments of utility.
19.13 The Sense of Justice is Culturally Inculcated, rather than Innate
The sense of justice, on which both moral and political obligation depend, is derived not from any natural impressions of reflection but from impressions due to “artifice and human conventions” (T: 496).
Criticisms
Reason and Passions
Does reason really have no control over the passions? Ayer gives some counterarguments.
Anscombe J. Ayer in 1989.
Ayer writes
Reason has control over the passions, in so far as it can be used to discover that a passion is based on a false judgment, as for example when the object of one’s fear is proved not to exist, or that the means chosen to procure [get, achieve] some end are insufficient for the purpose. A third instance, which Hume failed to notice, is that in which reason shows us that the achievement of a desired end will probably result in the occurrence of something which we have a greater desire to avoid. (Ayer:108)
As such,
The dramatic statement that reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions amounts to only […] the truism that reason enters into the sphere of action only when we have been motivated to aim at some end (ibid).
Ayer also notes that another supporting argument is invalid. Hume argues that morals cannot be derived from reason, as they have an influence on our actions and affections. Ayer, in response, argues that our actions and affections may be influenced by reason. We may, for example, be influenced by the truth or falsehood of our judgments or the soundness (or cogency) of our inferences. But Ayer concedes that the main point stands (Ayer: 109).
Is the Sense of Justice Really Artificial?
Hume argues that our sense of justice is artificial because there are no natural motives to supply it. Men do not have, in particular, a natural love of mankind, so their natural benevolence towards only the people close to them is basically unjust. Hume also argues that people are more or less selfish, so it is unlikely that a sense of justice would arise naturally (Ayer:110). Hume suggests something like Hobbes’ Social Contract, and also tends towards Rule Utilitarianism, but without offering much of an explanation: tolerating exceptions would lower respect for the general rule (Ayer: 111).
WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW
Hume’s thought is so subtle, so good, and so complex that merely being able to explain it clearly will suffice. For the final exam, you should know:
§ Hume’s theory of virtue
§Hume’s argument that reason cannot motivate action
§ Hume’s theory of moral sentiments
Slave to the Passions: David Hume’s Ethics
Dr. Geoffrey Roche
19.1 Resources for these lectures
Secondary resources:
A.J Ayer. Hume: A very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
David Hume “Morality as Based on Sentiment” in James Rachels and Stuart Rachels,
eds. The Right Thing to Do Boston: McGraw Hill, 2007:65- 70.
Stephen Darwall, University of Michigan. Phil 433 course: History of Modern Ethics. Available at: http://www-personal.umich.edu/~sdarwall/433dh1200.txt
http://www-personal.umich.edu/~sdarwall/433dh200.txt
William Edward Morris “David Hume” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume/
James Fieser “David Hume” in The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy Available at: http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/h/humelife.htm
Rachel Cohon “Hume’s Moral Philosophy” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-moral/
Primary resources:
David Hume Treatise of Human Nature (1739- 1740).
http://www.class.uidaho.edu/mickelsen/ToC/hume%20treatise%20ToC.htm [accessed Nov 5th 2007].
Or here:
http://etext.library.adelaide.edu.au/h/hume/david/h92t/
19.1 Opening Questions
a). What character traits (‘virtues’) would make a person pleasing to themselves? (That is, what traits do you need to have to enjoy your own company?)
b). What virtues make a person useful for themselves (that is, independent)?
c). What virtues would make a person pleasing, or useful, to others?
d). Is intelligence necessary and sufficient to be a good person?
e). Is the Motive of Duty necessary and sufficient to be a good person?
Disclaimer: The contents of this lecture is substantially paraphrased from Darwall and Ayer, and is not to be cited as an original work by the compiler.
19.2 David Hume: Biographical sketch
David Hume (1711-1776), philosopher, historian and essayist, is considered the greatest philosopher ever to write in English. In the words of His three main philosophical works, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-1740), the Enquiries concerning Human Nature (1748) and Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751) remain very influential, and had a major impact even on those who disagreed with him (Kant, in particular). His thought inspired Jeremy Bentham to write his Utilitarian ethics. He was also an influence on non- philosophers, such as his friend the economist Adam Smith (Hume suggesting that open markets are better for the economy) and the father of the theory of Evolution, Charles Darwin. Philosophers now consider Hume to be the father of contemporary cognitive science (the study of how the mind organizes information and creates experience). Much of what we now generally accept as logical principle, especially as applied to scientific and logical analysis, we owe to Hume. (The Naturalistic Fallacy and the Is- Ought Fallacy are two examples we’ve already seen).
David Hume was born in Edinburgh, Scotland. He was a precocious youth, and was sent to Edinburgh University at the age of twelve. He was supposed to study law, but instead secretly studied the Classical authors of ancient Greece and Rome. (He had to keep this a secret as his parents were very religious and did not approve of such pagan literature). He left university without taking his degree (you will notice that Kant always writes of “Mr. Hume” for this reason) and spent three years thinking and writing about philosophy. He briefly tried to hold a regular job at a sugar import company- he got fired because he criticized his boss’s writing style. Then he went to live in La Flèche, France (where his small stipend was enough to get by) to study French writings. There he wrote the draft for Treatise of Human Nature between 1734 and 1737, arguing with Jesuit priests about religion in his spare time.
Hume saw this book published in 1739, anonymously, with the more anti- religious parts removed (“castrated,” in Hume’s words). Hume then tried to find academic work, but no university would hire him: his thought was too controversial. He never held an academic post.
Hume found teaching work in 1745 as the private tutor to the Marquess of Annandale, but the boy was insane. Eventually he found work as a librarian, which gave him the stability, and the books, needed to write The History of England, which became a best- seller. This gave him the financial stability (at the age of 43) to write more philosophy. In 1763 Hume was made secretary to the Ambassador to France, and spent the next three years in Paris, where he frequently met the French philosophes Diderot, D’Alembert and d’Holbach (all atheists and free-thinkers). In 1766 Hume returned to England with Jean- Jacques Rousseau. Their friendship collapsed- Rousseau, totally paranoid, was convinced that Hume was organizing an international conspiracy against him.
After a year working for the Government, Hume returned to Edinburgh in 1769, this time for good. One of his young female friends, Nancy Orde, one night wrote “St. David’s Street” on the wall of Hume’s home in chalk. The street still bears the name.
Hume died of intestinal cancer in 1776, not before preparing his most controversial works for publication.
David Hume, 1 St. David’s Street, Edinburgh.
Hume’s philosophical work was very carefully argued, firmly grounded in solid logical and scientific principles, and profoundly skeptical. Although never explicitly stating his lack of faith, he was attacked for his atheism and skepticism. He rigorously argued that we have no way of knowing that external reality exists, that causality is quite possibly an illusion, and that there is no self or free will. He was also an influential critic of conventional religious belief, in particular Christian belief (for his brilliant argument against the Argument from Design, see Ayer: 115).
Hume summarizes his general approach in the final lines of the Enquiries concerning Human Understanding: philosophy is not about being nice and respecting everyone’s point of view. It is about destroying falsity. Philosophy before Hume was about discovering theoretical explanations based on pure reason, or mere speculation. After Hume, philosophy is a descriptive inquiry based on direct experience of what can be observed. (This philosophy is called Empiricism, as opposed to Rationalism).
When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc must we make? If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance, let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion (E:165).
Here we will concern ourselves with Hume’s ethical theory, in which we see this attitude that philosophy is a confused mess, and someone has to clean it up.
19.3 Hume’s ethics: background
Hume is not so interested in what the rules of morality should be (he just assumes Utilitarianism, more or less, in particular Rule Utilitarianism, as a theory of morality, and a variant of Virtue Theory as a theory of how to be moral). Hume’s main concern in ethics is the psychological foundation of morals. For Kant, morality was grounded in reason. For Kant, moral decision- making is based on intelligible ideas and inescapable conclusions. For Hume, by contrast, morality is grounded on an immediate, innate sense of right and wrong that is conceptually distinct from the operations of pure reason. I will quote and expand on Ayer (19.4- 19.13) in summarizing Hume’s eleven moral principles (Ayer: 98- 100).
19.4 The Limits of Reason.
Reason alone, being concerned only with the discovery and falsehood, “can never be the motive for any action of the will” (Treatise: 413). It is from this principle that Hume derives his celebrated dictum:
Reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them (Treatise: 415).
What does this mean? It means that reason can never be the motive of any action. For Hume, reason is merely the capacity to draw inferences and appraise statements for their truth or falsehood.
As such, Hume is presenting an Emotive theory of morality. A simple Emotivist theory says that moral statements are statements of our feelings about a particular action, rather than statements actually describing anything objectively real. “Murder is immoral” in this sense is more akin to the statement “I hate you” or “ouch” than “There are 28 chairs in room 602.” Ayer thinks that Hume is not offering such a crude theory, however: moral language expresses our moral sentiments, but not our personal mental condition (Ayer: 104).
Hume’s Ethics: The Basics
Hume's position in ethics, which is based on his empiricist theory of the mind, is best known for asserting four theses: (1) Reason alone cannot be a motive to the will, but rather is the “slave of the passions” (2) Morals are not derived from reason (3) Morals are derived from the moral sentiments: feelings of approval (esteem, praise) and disapproval (blame) felt by spectators who contemplate a character trait or action (4) While some virtues and vices are natural others, including justice, are artificial (that is, created by particular societies for their own long- term benefit). We’ll go over the first three points.
Against Rationalism: Reason alone cannot be a motive to the will, but rather is the “slave of the passions”
Against the moral rationalists – in particular Kant- Hume argues that it is actually impossible to understand their theory of distinguishing between right and wrong (T, 455-470). (Recall that Kant can hardly explain why telling lies is always immoral). Reason, Hume argues, judges either of matters of fact or of relations. Nothing else. Morality never consists in any single matter of fact that could be immediately perceived, intuited, or grasped by reason alone; morality for rationalists must therefore involve the perception of relations. Distinguishing these cases requires more than reason alone can provide.
Hume also rejected the rationalist model of ethics proposed by the Social Contract theorists, in particular Hobbes. Morality cannot be reduced to self- interest, Hume reasons, because an accurate description of the social virtues, benevolence and justice, will show that there is more to these phenomena than mere selfishness.
Hume also argues that our benevolent sentiments can't be reduced to self-interest. It is true that, when we desire the happiness of others, and try to make them happy, we may enjoy doing so. But benevolence is necessary for our self-enjoyment, and although we may act from the combined motives of benevolence and enjoyment, our benevolent sentiments aren't identical with our self-enjoyment.
What is reason good for then, according to Hume? It can recommend the best means for attaining a given end, but it can't recommend ultimate ends. (It can’t tell us which is better: a life of adventure, or a life of hard work, or a life in front of television). Reason can provide no motive to action, for reason alone is insufficient to produce moral blame or approbation. We need sentiment to give a preference to the useful tendencies of actions.
Hume not only argues against Kant. He is arguing against a very old, in fact traditional belief that reason and the passions are opposed to each other. (A recent argument against the Jury system in Japan: people will be overwhelmed by emotion if they have to sit on a very horrific court case, so they will not be able to judge rationally). Hume rejects this dichotomy [division]. Instead he states that “reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will,” and that reason alone “can never oppose passion in the direction of the will” (T 413).
From Hume’s Treatise on Human Nature:
Nothing is more usual in philosophy, and even in common life, than to talk of the combat of passion and reason, to give the preference to reason, and to assert that men are only so far virtuous as they conform themselves to its dictates. Every rational creature, 'tis said, is oblig'd to regulate his actions by reason; and if any other motive or principle challenge the direction of his conduct, he ought to oppose it, 'till it be entirely subdu'd, or at last brought to a conformity with that superior principle. (T: Part III, Section III Book II, paragraph 1).
What is Hume’s argument here, exactly? He reasons as follows. Human Understanding has two rational functions. It can analyze the relations of ideas (such as mathematical or logical reasoning). Human understanding can also judge, using probability, the relations of objects, especially their causal relationships, revealed by our experience. That’s all it can do.
As such, Human Understanding cannot cause any action by itself. It is our feelings of pleasure or pain, or our aversion or attraction to them, that really decide which action we should take. “'Tis from the prospect of pain or pleasure that the aversion or propensity arises.”
Hume has a second argument which is the corollary (the logical twin) of the first. Reason alone cannot prevent or stop any passion or impulse. If reason could prevent an impulse, then it would be able to give rise to a contrary impulse. But if it could do that, it would be an original impulse on the will (that is, a capacity to cause volition). So, when we calm ourselves down and hold ourselves back from some passionate but violent or immoral act, it is actually a calming passion, and not reason, that stops us.
A second aspect of this theory: as reason alone cannot guide actions, neither actions or passions can be contrary to reason. (Recall Ayn Rand’s argument that attacking people, or driving a hotrod, is against reason). According to Hume's definition of reason, something can be contrary to reason only if it can be false, or mistakenly inferred. But, he says, neither actions nor passions can be contrary to reason in this sense since they aren't even the sort of thing which can be false (or inferred). To say that “reason shows that doing dangerous things is irrational” is just a category error. Something can be false only if it has a "representative quality," that is, if it claims to represent reality in some way, and if it represents incorrectly (For example, we can say “this argument is invalid” or “that picture of Godzilla attacking Tokyo Tower is incorrect, because Godzilla does not exist.” “But passions and actions have no such quality--each is an "original existence" (415) and "compleat in themselves" (458). Therefore, they can neither be false, nor mistakenly inferred. Therefore, they cannot be contrary to reason (Derived from Darwall: Hume I).
Hume expresses these thoughts in some rather shocking ways.
Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger.
Tis not contrary to reason for me to chuse my total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian or person wholly unknown to me.
A more vivid version of the same insight occurs in the work of Donatien Alphonse François, the Marquis de Sade, in the novel Juliette (1797).
If from immolating three million human victims you stand to gain no livelier pleasure than that to be had from eating a good dinner, slender though this pleasure may appear in the light of its price, you ought to treat yourself to it without an instant’s hesitation; for if you sacrifice the good dinner, the necessary result is a privation for you, whereas no privation results from the disappearance of the three million insignificant creatures you must do away with to obtain the dinner, because between it and you there exists a relationship, however tenuous, whereas none exists between you and the three million victims (J: 642).
(Again, the question is: is Kim Jong- Il irrational?)
19.5 The Passions (Hume’s Moral Psychology).
The passions by which we are motivated, according to Hume, may be direct or indirect, calm or violent. The direct passions, such as those of joy, grief, hope or fear, arise either from natural instinct, or from our desire of good, which can here be equated with pleasure, or aversion from evil, which can here be equated with pain. The indirect passions, such as those of pride, humility, love, or hatred, arise from a combination of these primitive motives with other factors. This distinction is independent of that between calmness and violence. It is because the motivation may be [so] violent that “men often act knowingly against their interest” and are not always influenced by “their view of the greatest possible good” (Treatise: 418).
19.6 Hume’s Virtue Ethics
Recall that Kant argued that an action must be done out of a sense of duty to be truly moral. Hume turns this thinking on its head. For Hume, and action is only moral if it is done out of some motive other than a sense of its morality. Ayer explains: understanding the morality of a particular action does not confer any merit on an action. The moral subject must have a good motive or a good character to truly be good. They must be habitually good.
A man who is of a miserly disposition may grow ashamed of it [his miserliness] and so force himself to perform acts of generosity. In time his initial reluctance to perform them may or may not be overcome. It is not, however, necessary that it should be overcome in order for his actions to be morally good. Their goodness depends on their conforming to a habitual practice of generosity… (Ayer: 107).
In this sense Hume is reviving the ancient Greek notion of Ethics as an art of self- cultivation. Ethics, in this Virtue Ethics sense, is not about following rules or maximizing the good, but of making oneself an ‘excellent person’ through cultivating good character traits (‘virtues’). Aristotle sums up this principle: “Excellence, […] is not an act but a habit.” As a theory of ethical motivation it has its advantages, but its main weakness is that it gives (arguably) little guidance in what to do in any particular instance. In any case, Hume poses an important challenge to Kant’s moral schema. For Hume (reasons Ayer) to rely entirely on a sense of duty for one’s morality suggests that one is “deficient in natural benevolence” (Ayer: 107).
19.7 Sympathy
All humans, reasons Hume, have two sentiments: self- love and sympathy. Sympathy here means ‘sense of humanity.’ Hume holds that it is a natural instinct. It strength is such that although it is “rare to meet with one, who loves any single person better than himself,” it is equally “rare to meet with one, in whom all the kind affections, taken together, do not over- balance all the selfish” (Treatise: 487). This natural instinct or sympathy or benevolence plays a large part in the formation of our moral and political attitudes. He also takes it to be Utilitarian in nature. From the Enquiry: Hume charts all virtues as being either useful or agreeable.
For ourselves (self- love) For others (sympathy)
Agreeable Qualities immediately Agreeable to ourselves Qualities immediately agreeable to others
Useful (= productive of something agreeable) Qualities useful to ourselves Benevolence
Justice
Below is Hume’s Table of Virtues:
To Ourselves To Others
Agreeable Tranquility
Good Taste Politeness
Wit
Decency
Useful Discretion
Industry
Frugality
Honesty and Fidelity
Strength of Mind Benevolence
Gratitude
Generosity
Friendliness
Justice
(Note that a). this idea of an ethics as good for the ethical agent, and yet also good for other people, is the ‘missing third option’ that Ayn Rand fails to consider in rejecting all non- egoistic ethics. Note also that Hume can explain why industry and strength of mind are good to have, whereas Rand merely asserts it).
Here is Hume’s argument for justifying moral rules.
Any being which has feelings of sympathy and self- love will be pleased by anything useful or pleasant to itself or others (when considered in general without reference to our particular interest).
Man has the feelings of sympathy and self- love.
It follows that man will be pleased by anything useful or pleasant to ourselves or others (when considered in general without reference to our particular interest).
Hence, for example, Justice is useful to ourselves and others.
So, justice pleases us (when considered in general without reference to our particular interest).
Any character [trait] that pleases (when considered in general without reference to our particular interest] is morally good.
Therefore, we ought to be just.
19.8 On Reason and Morality
“Since morals… have an influence on the actions and affections, it follows that they cannot be deriv’d from reason” (Treatise: 457). Accordingly, “the rules of morality are not conclusions of our reason.”
19.9 Moral Judgments are Not Facts, and cannot be Derived from Facts
Moral judgments are not descriptions of matter of fact.
Take any action allow'd to be vicious: wilful murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice. In which-ever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. (T:468).
when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it. (T: 469)
Similarly, when “instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not,” one suddenly meets “with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not” (Treatise: 469), one is being tricked. It is not possible that “this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.”
19.10 (3) Morals are derived from the moral sentiments: feelings of approval (esteem, praise) and disapproval (blame) felt by spectators who contemplate a character trait or action
[This idea is similar to the theory of perception developed by the Empiricists, in particular John Locke {1632-1704} and George Berkeley {1685-1753}]. “Vice and virtue may be compared to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which according to modern philosophy [that is, Empiricism and Science, which was then called ‘natural philosophy,’] are not qualities in the object, but perceptions in the mind” (T: 469). Accordingly, “when you pronounce any character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature, you have a feeling of sentiment or blame from the contemplation of it.”
The following quotes illustrate this idea.
To have the sense of virtue, is nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a character. The very feeling constitutes our praise or admiration. We do not infer a character to be virtuous, because it pleases: But in feeling that it pleases after such a
particular manner, we in effect feel that it is virtuous. The case is the same as in our judgments concerning all kinds of beauty, and tastes, and sensations (T: 471).
Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compar'd to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which according to modern philosophy, are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind." (T: 469)
19.11 Virtue and Vice are determined by Motives Only
Though one speaks of virtuous or vicious actions, they derive their merit or demerit only from virtuous or vicious motives, and it is only as signs of such motives, or the character of the person who acts from them, that actions are subject to moral evaluation.
19.12 The Utilitarian Thesis
[For Hume, our moral sentiments are essentially Utilitarian]. What arouses our approbation [approval] or disapprobation is the appraisal of qualities as being respectively productive of a preponderance of pleasure or pain. These appraisals may also be characterized as judgments of utility.
19.13 The Sense of Justice is Culturally Inculcated, rather than Innate
The sense of justice, on which both moral and political obligation depend, is derived not from any natural impressions of reflection but from impressions due to “artifice and human conventions” (T: 496).
Criticisms
Reason and Passions
Does reason really have no control over the passions? Ayer gives some counterarguments.
Anscombe J. Ayer in 1989.
Ayer writes
Reason has control over the passions, in so far as it can be used to discover that a passion is based on a false judgment, as for example when the object of one’s fear is proved not to exist, or that the means chosen to procure [get, achieve] some end are insufficient for the purpose. A third instance, which Hume failed to notice, is that in which reason shows us that the achievement of a desired end will probably result in the occurrence of something which we have a greater desire to avoid. (Ayer:108)
As such,
The dramatic statement that reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions amounts to only […] the truism that reason enters into the sphere of action only when we have been motivated to aim at some end (ibid).
Ayer also notes that another supporting argument is invalid. Hume argues that morals cannot be derived from reason, as they have an influence on our actions and affections. Ayer, in response, argues that our actions and affections may be influenced by reason. We may, for example, be influenced by the truth or falsehood of our judgments or the soundness (or cogency) of our inferences. But Ayer concedes that the main point stands (Ayer: 109).
Is the Sense of Justice Really Artificial?
Hume argues that our sense of justice is artificial because there are no natural motives to supply it. Men do not have, in particular, a natural love of mankind, so their natural benevolence towards only the people close to them is basically unjust. Hume also argues that people are more or less selfish, so it is unlikely that a sense of justice would arise naturally (Ayer:110). Hume suggests something like Hobbes’ Social Contract, and also tends towards Rule Utilitarianism, but without offering much of an explanation: tolerating exceptions would lower respect for the general rule (Ayer: 111).
WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW
Hume’s thought is so subtle, so good, and so complex that merely being able to explain it clearly will suffice. For the final exam, you should know:
§ Hume’s theory of virtue
§Hume’s argument that reason cannot motivate action
§ Hume’s theory of moral sentiments
posted by G. Roche at 2:27 PM
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