Saturday, September 30, 2006

Sade et le génocide

Sade et le génocide
Geoffrey Roche
Université d'Auckland
Nouvelle-Zélande


Il n'y aura plus ni pape ni rabbins
Nous voulons redevenir païens
Et ne plus aller à l'église en rampant
Nous sommes les joyeuses Jeunesses Hitlériennes
Nous n'avons que faire des vertus chrétiennes
Notre leader, Adolf Hitler, est notre sauveur.

Chant des Jeunesses Hitlériennes


Introduction

Pour de nombreux écrivains et philosophes, les oeuvres de Donatien-Alphonse-François, le Marquis de Sade (1740-1814) peuvent aider à faire comprendre les origines intellectuelles ou culturelles du nazisme. iii Cette interprétation de Sade suppose que ce dernier représente, d'une façon ou d'une autre, les pensées du siècle des lumières. Elle suppose également qu'un ou plusieurs courants de la pensée ou de la culture occidentale constituent un lien entre le nazisme et le siècle des lumières. Mon propos est de soutenir cette interprétation de Sade. iv
Dans L’Homme Révolté (1954), v Albert Camus estime que Sade a élaboré une philosophie qui était, en fin de compte, un fantasme de la liberté individuelle totale à tout prix :

Il n’a pas fondé une philosophie, mais poursuivi le rêve monstrueux d’un persécuté. Il se trouve seulement que ce rêve est prophétique. La revendication exaspérée de la liberté a mené Sade dans l’empire de la servitude ; sa soif démesurée d’une vie désormais interdite s’est assouvie, de fureur en fureur, dans un rêve de destruction universelle. En ceci au moins, Sade est notre contemporain. .vi

Selon Camus, l'élément central de cet idéal est la doctrine d' “aristocratie naturelle ” commune au texte de Sade et au nazisme ; toute la moralité judéo-chrétienne est niée, et la seule règle de conduite reconnue est la suprématie proclamée du fort sur le faible. Pour Camus, le fantasme de liberté de Sade est devenu ‘prophétique’ en ce sens qu'il anticipe clairement une époque à laquelle le pouvoir absolu d'une minorité est préservé par “du fil de fer barbelé et des miradors”. Toujours selon Camus, Sade a mis en relief la tyrannie implicite dans l'idéologie politique de l'époque en faisant remarquer, par exemple, que Rousseau avait proposé, dans son projet de société parfaite, de mettre à mort tous les athéistes.vii
Dans La dialectique des lumières, (1944) Theodor Adorno et Max Horkheimer adoptent une approche différente. viii A leur avis, Juliette, le personnage de Sade, est l'incorporation de l'idéal du siècle des lumières de subsomption de tout comportement à un principe rationnel unique. Le principe kantien de la raison pure libre de toute restriction sociale ou culturelle, voire de réaction émotionnelle se voit transformé en poursuite continuelle du plaisir par Juliette, que ce soient les orgasmes ou la richesse ; de même, (selon cette interprétation) l'Allemagne nazie et d'autres manifestations du capitalisme moderne sont, fondamentalement, des systèmes de domination et d'exploitation pour une minuscule élite régie, de façon implicite ou explicite, par les idéaux jumeaux de la raison instrumentale et du cynisme. ix

... l'ordre totalitaire donne libre cours aux machinations et se soumet à la science en tant que telle. Son canon est sa propre efficacité brutale. De la Critique de Kant à la Généalogie des morales de Nietzsche, c'est la philosophie qui a averti de l'avènement de cet ordre totalitaire ; mais, un homme en a donné une description détaillée. Le Marquis de Sade représente “la compréhension sans la gouverne d'une autre personne”, c'est-à-dire le bourgeois libéré de la tutelle. x

Les interprétations de Sade avancées par Camus, Adorno et Horkheimer ont ceci en commun qu'elles supposent que Sade est, dans un sens, un personnage essentiel dans l'histoire des idées ; que, par son regard imperturbable, il ne s'était pas laissé duper par l'optimisme de son époque (ou, peut-être, qu'il avait pleinement exprimé le désespoir et l'incertitude de son époque) et avait démontré comment les projections utopiques de ses contemporains pouvaient au contraire mener à un enfer terrestre créé par les humains. Selon certains, ses descriptions de génocides, de tortures et d'avilissement annoncent les pires aspects de la Modernité, à savoir les camps d'extermination nazis. Selon les deux textes, l'Allemagne nazie n'était pas une sorte de distortion obscène de la culture européenne, mais en fait une issue naturelle, si ce n'est inévitable.
Ce genre d'interprétation se heurte à l'objection suivante. Certains philosophes ont beaucoup de mal à accepter l'idée selon laquelle Adolf Hitler, ou tout autre Nazi en vue, aurait eu une perspective philosophique quelle qu'elle soit, ou que, s'ils en avaient eu une, qu'elle n'était rien d'autre qu'une rationalisation, à postériori, d'une destruction insensée ou alors qu'elle n'avait tout simplement aucune importance sur le plan historique. xi Je leur réponds, qu'à mon avis, il s'agissait d'un fait historique, étant donné que Hitler était conscient de ce qu'il faisait et que (ainsi que j'espère pouvoir le démontrer) ses pensées n'avaient pas surgi du néant. En outre, il est clair que les pensées de Hitler sont historiquement pertinentes. Je dirai aussi que même si Hitler avait simplement adopté une philosophie du monde pour justifier la manifestation d'une certaine haine pathologique, il est sûrement important, sur un plan philosophique et culturel, qu'une telle perspective ait pu être associée à une telle destruction. De plus, j'avancerai qu'un examen du texte de Sade, dans le cadre de la pensée occidentale, révèle la nature véritable des origines de l'idéologie nazie dans la culture occidentale.

J'avancerai une troisième variante de l'interprétation des liens entre Sade et le nazisme. A mon avis, une comparaison entre les oeuvres de Sade (en particulier Histoire de Juliette et La Philosophie dans le boudoir) et les deux principaux textes de Hitler, Mein Kampf et Libres propos sur la paix et la guerrexii, montre clairement que Sade avait de toute évidence anticipé une idéologie principale, et peut-être la seule, ayant servi à guider le nazisme. xiii Il s'agit de la théorie commune aux libertins de Sade (du moins à certains) et à Hitler : toute la moralité chrétienne n'est qu'un mythe, perpétré par des peuples serviles pour se protéger des peuples plus forts, des peuples-maîtres. Une telle "moralité servile" est une violation claire et nette du "principe aristocratique naturel" selon lequel les forts devraient dominer les faibles. Lorsque, soi-disant, Rome s'est laissé prendre et a adopté le christianisme, elle s'est affaiblie et s'est effondrée. Selon ce mythe, xiv les principaux instigateurs sont les Juifs et les chrétiens. Pour Hitler, le christianisme et le communisme étaient tout simplement deux armes idéologiques que les Juifs ont imposées à l'Europe pour la corrompre. Il s'agit là de la raison la plus importante avancée par Hitler pour justifier le massacre des Juifsxv ; comme l'ont suggéré les historiens (et c'est tout à fait plausible au vu des propres commentaires de Hitler sur le sujet), les chrétiens devaient être les prochaines victimes. xvi Bien que l'on suppose communément que la tentative par les Nazis d'exterminer les Juifs n'ait été qu'une question "raciale", les commentaires de Hitler montrent qu' au fond les Juifs ne représentaient pas une menace "biologique" mais idéologique ; en effet, les Juifs et leur "biologie" étaient le vecteur d'une idée, celle de l'égalité morale de toute l'humanité.
Bien que Camus se rapproche des points communs entre les textes de Sade et le nazisme décrits ci-dessus, il ne les explicite pas. Il y a un aspect de la pensée de Hitler que le texte d'Adorno/Horkheimer n'arrive pas à expliquer. Les Nazis (ou plutôt, Hitler) se souciaient apparemment plus du meurtre des Juifs que des exigences de la "raison instrumentale" (en supposant que l'exploitation économique ou la victoire de la guerre conventionnelle contre les puissances alliées aient été des objectifs instrumentaux). Le massacre des Juifs était prioritaire sur les exigences de l'industrie ou sur l'effort de guerre en général ; en assassinant les Juifs, les Nazis détruisaient une main-d'oeuvre dont ils avaient en fait crucialement besoin. xvii

SADE ET LE GÉNOCIDE

Il est évident que les écrits de Sade sur le christianisme ont été influencés par les oeuvres des philosophes - en particulier Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-78), Claude-Adrien Helvétius (1715-71), Voltaire (1694-1778) et le Baron d’Holbach (1723-89), bien que ceux-ci se soient contentés de rejeter le dogme chrétien et le judaïsme parce qu'ils étaient rétrogrades, intolérants, superstitieux et absurdes et que l'Eglise elle-même était moralement corrompue. xviii Un certain nombre de propositions d'une grande portée furent émises. Helvétius et Rousseau proposèrent d'établir une nouvelle religion libre de l' "intolérance" des anciennes croyances. Dans L’esprit du Judaïsme (1750), D’Holbach, appelle à l'élimination de l'influence des Juifs et les qualifie d' “Asiatiques lâches et dégradés ” qui avaient infecté (affligent) l'Europe avec le christianisme. xix Mais ces penseurs n'ont en fait pas élaboré de critique de la moralité centrale du judaïsme et du christianisme, une moralité de l'égalité qui est généralement implicite dans leurs critiques. Lorsqu'ils discutent du christianisme, du judaïsme et de l'Eglise, les personnages de Sade vont au-delà de l'anti-judaïsme et de l'anti-christianisme philosophique de l'époque. A travers ses personnages, xx Sade élabore une critique de la moralité judéo-chrétienne elle-même. xxi (On trouve toutefois des traces de la critique plus radicale de Sade dans les oeuvres de Rousseau qui estimait que dix-sept siècles de christianisme avaient rendu l'Europe décadente et débilexxii et qui avait exhorté l'Europe : “reprenez…votre antique et première innocence. xxiii” Rousseau a également rapproché l'apparition du christianisme et de sa moralité à l'existence “servile” de ses premiers adeptes. xxiv)
Dans toute l'oeuvre de Sade, les personnages réitèrent le mythe de la "révolte des esclaves"xxv. Il y avait, à son avis, la moralité maîtresse des Grecs et des Romains qui enseignaient les vertus de la fierté, de la force et de l'intelligence et entretenaient une doctrine de la supériorité naturelle d'une élite justifiant le recours à des esclaves. Cette morale avait été corrompue par la propagande sournoise et vengeresse des pauvres et des faibles. Dans La Philosophie dans le boudoir Dolmancé argumente que c'est cette transformation culturelle qui a détruit Rome : “Rome disparut dès que le christianisme s’y prêcha, et la France est perdue s’il s’y révère encore.” xxvi Le texte de Sade donne deux variantes de la "révolte des esclaves": la première révolte se rapporte spécifiquement à la chute de Rome et à l'influence du christianisme ; la seconde est une révolte plus générale, par de sournois esclaves contre l'ordre naturel. Trois textes philosophiques clés de Sade - Justine, Juliette, et La Philosophie dans le boudoir exposent de légères variations. La version suivante est tirée de Les Infortunes de la vertu (1787) :
Au travail, esclave, au travail ! apprends que la civilisation, en bouleversant les institutions de la nature, ne lui enleva pourtant point ses droits ; elle créa dans l’origine des êtres forts et des êtres faibles, son intention fut que ceux-ci fussent toujours subordonnés aux autres comme l’agneau l’est toujours au lion, comme l’insecte l’est à l’éléphant ; l’adresse et l’intelligence de l’homme varièrent la position des individus ; ce ne fut plus la force physique qui détermina le rang, ce fut celle qu’il acquit par ses richesses. L’homme le plus riche devint l’homme le plus fort, le plus pauvre devint le plus faible, mais à cela près des motifs qui fondaient la puissance, l’énergie du fort sur le faible fut toujours dans les lois de la nature à qui il devenait égal que la chaîne qui captivait le faible fût tenue par le plus riche ou par le plus fort, et qu’elle écrasât le plus faible ou bien le plus pauvre. xxvii

Les passages suivants extraits de La philosophie dans le boudoir (1795) associent la doctrine de l'amour fraternel et de l'égalité à la propagande des opprimés :

Vous nous parlez d’une voix chimérique de cette nature, qui nous dit de ne pas faire aux autres ce que nous ne voudrions pas qu’il nous fût fait ; mais cet absurde conseil ne nous est jamais venu que des hommes, et d’hommes faibles. L’homme puissant ne s’avisera jamais de parler un tel langage. Ce furent les premiers chrétiens qui, journellement persécutés pour leur imbécile système, criaient à qui voulait l’entendre : « Ne nous brûlez pas, ne nous écorchez pas ! La nature dit qu’il ne faut pas faire aux autres ce que nous ne voudrions pas qu’il nous fût fait.» Imbéciles ! Comment la nature, qui nous conseille toujours de nous délecter, qui n’imprime jamais en nous d’autres mouvements, d’autres inspirations, pourrait-elle, le moment d’après, par une inconséquence sans exemple, nous assurer qu’il ne faut pourtant pas nous aviser de nous délecter si cela peut faire de la peine aux autres ? xxviii

La source de toutes nos erreurs en morale vient de l’admission ridicule de ce fil de fraternité qu’inventèrent les chrétiens dans leur siècle d’infortune et de détresse. Contraints à mendier la pitié des autres, il n’était pas maladroit d’établir qu’ils étaient tous frères. Comment refuser des secours d’après une telle hypothèse ? Mais il est impossible d’admettre cette doctrine. Ne naissons-nous pas tous isolés ? xxix

Le texte suivant, extrait de Juliette (1797), associe à nouveau la moralité judéo-chrétienne à un certain type psychologique "malade" qui va à l'encontre de la "nature" :
Il n’y aura jamais que le faible qui prêchera ce système absurde de l’égalité ; il ne peut convenir qu’à celui qui ne pouvant s’élever à la classe du fort, est, au moins, dédommagé en rabaissant à lui cette classe ; mais il n’est pas de système plus absurde, plus contre la nature que celui-là ; et l’on ne le verra jamais s’ériger que chez la canaille, qui elle-même y renoncera, sitôt qu’elle aura eu le temps de dorer ses haillons. xxx

Dans le roman Juliette, Braschi explique comment l'attitude des chrétiens est différente de celle des Romains, par exemple, en ce qui concerne la vie humaine :

Tant que les sacrifices humains forment spectacle, ils ne devraient jamais s’interdire chez une nation guerrière. Rome triompha de l’univers, aussi longtemps qu’elle eut des spectacles cruels ; elle tomba dans l’avilissement et dans l’esclavage, dès que la stupidité de la morale chrétienne vint lui persuader qu’il y avait plus de mal à voir tuer des hommes que des bêtes ; mais ce n’était point par humanité que raisonnaient ainsi les sectateurs de Christ, c’était par l’excessive crainte, dans laquelle ils étaient, que si l’idolâtrie reprenait son empire, on ne les sacrifiât eux-mêmes aux amusements de leurs adversaires. Voilà pourquoi les coquins prêchaient la charité, voilà pourquoi ils établissaient ce ridicule fil de fraternité, dont je sais, Juliette, que l’on vous a déjà fait voir le néant. Cette réflection explique toute cette belle morale, que les ennemies même de cette stupide religion, ont été assez timides ou assez fous pour respecter : poursuivons. xxxi

Dans Français, encore un effort si vous voulez être républicainsxxxii de Sade, le personnage de Dolmancé propose d'éliminer les prêtres et d'exiler et d'emprisonner les chrétiens, et offre un prix national pour celui qui laissera à ses compatriotes “…une faux pour culbuter tous ces fantômes et qu’un cœur droit pour les haïr.” xxxiii Toutefois, le narrateur de Sade ne pense pas que l'exécution ou l'exil soient des solutions idéales - “ces atrocités sont-elles des rois . xxxiv” Mais, l'un des personnages du roman Juliette suggère une solution plus extrême. Pour libérer la France des superstitions irrationnelles de l'Eglise, le Comte de Belmorxxxv recommande de massacrer les quinze millions de catholiques français, en commençant par les prêtres.

Le voici, dit le comte, il est violent, mais il est sûr : il faut arrêter et massacrer tous les prêtres, dans un seul jour… traiter de même tous leurs adhérents ; détruire à la même minute jusqu’au plus léger vestige du culte catholique… proclamer des systèmes d’athéisme, confier dans l’instant l’éducation de la jeunesse, à des philosophes ; multiplier, donner, répandre, afficher les écrits qui propagent l’incrédulité, et porter sévèrement pendant un demi-siècle, la peine de mort contre tout individu qui rétablirait la chimère. xxxvi

…il ne faut à cela, que de la politique, du secret, de la fermeté, surtout point de mollesse et point de queue ; vous craignez les martyres, vous en aurez tant, qu’il restera un sectateur à l’abominable Dieu des chrétiens…xxxvii

Juliette contient en fait un certain nombre de propositions de massacres approuvées par le gouvernement ; ces propositions sont toutes spécifiquement associées à ce que Zygmunt Bauman considère comme un élément-clé de la Modernité à savoir la mentalité des "Jardiniers qui traitent la société comme une étendue de terre vierge destinée à être façonnée d'une main experte puis cultivée et entretenue pour respecter le dessin original." xxxviiiDans le roman, les massacres sont proposés pour perfectionner la civilisation, que ce soit en purgeant les idéologies néfastes ou en perfectionnant la race. Le personnage de Gigi, le chef de la police romaine, tient le raisonnement suivant :

...je regarde les hôpitaux comme la chose du monde la plus dangereuse dans une grande ville ; ils absorbent l’énergie du peuple, ils entretiennent sa fainéantise, ils amollissent son courage ; ils sont pernicieux en un mot, sous tous les rapports ; le nécessiteux est à l’État ce qu’est la branche parasite à l’arbre fruitier ; elle la dessèche, elle se nourrit de sa sève, et ne rapporte rien. Que fait l’agriculteur en apercevant cette branche, il la coupe aussitôt sans remords. Que l’homme d’État agisse donc ici comme l’agriculteur : une des premières lois de la nature, est qu’il n’y ait rien d’inutile dans le monde...je veux qu’on les tue comme on faisait d’une race d’animaux venimeux. xxxix.


HITLER ET LE GÉNOCIDE

Ceux qui pensent que le national-socialisme n'est qu'un mouvement politique n'en savent pratiquement rien. C'est en fait plus qu'une religion : c'est la volonté de recréer l'humanité.
Adolf Hitler, Hitler parlexl

L'anti-judaïsmexli "intellectuel" de Hitler a des liens historiques avec une longue tradition européenne de pensée qui remonte jusqu'au siècle des lumières, une tradition selon laquelle les Juifs sont coupables d'avoir imposé le christianisme et sa moralité "étrangère" à l'Europe. xlii Les penseurs du siècle des lumièresxliii qui étaient plus ouvertement anti-chrétiens eurent pour héritiers une nouvelle génération d'anti-monothéistes. Wilhelm Marr (1819-1904), l'inventeur du terme "anti-sémitisme", qualifia le christianisme de "maladie de la conscience humaine" et de manifestation du judaïsme.xliv Eugen Dühring (1833- 1921), le grand philosophe et économiste politique, argumenta que le christianisme lui-même était "sémitique" et que toutes les religions monothéistes prêchaient la haine de la vie. xlv Richard Wagner, lui aussi, souhaitait que soit créée une nouvelle religion libre de toute influence juive : "Il nous paraît de la plus haute nécessité de nous émanciper du joug du judaïsme". xlviDes pensées similaires se répandaient également en Angleterre. Dans un article de journal de 1920 intitulé Zion contre le bolshévisme, Winston Churchill écrivit que "les Juifs" étaient en train de conspirer pour "renverser la civilisation" avec une "égalité impossible"xlvii. En dépit de tous ces penseurs "modernes" sur la question juive, Robert S. Wistrich fait remarquer que bon nombre des commentaires de Hitler sur les Juifs et sur les chrétiens remontent aux penseurs de l'époque de Sade.xlviii
Les pensées de Hitler en ce qui concerne les Juifs, le judaïsme, le christianisme et le "bolshévisme" ne s'écartent pas de l'idéologie centrale suivante. Selon Hitler, le bolshévisme tout comme le christianisme ont été imposés à l'Europe par les Juifs pour la corrompre spirituellement et pour miner ses forces ; enseigner l'égalité est une violation de l'Aristocratie Naturelle de la Nature qui fait primer le fort sur le faible ; la seule solution viable à la "terreur spirituelle"xlix judéo-chrétienne est d'éliminer toute la population juive. l
Si l'on excepte le fait que Hitler visait explicitement les Juifs plutôt que les chrétiens, li ses pensées sur la moralité sont quasiment identiques à celles des personnages libertins de Sade, et cela jusque dans l'éthique de dureté envers les autres et jusqu'à qualifier l'éthique humanitaire de "poison", la piété de "maladie"lii, et la compassion de faiblesse, de couardise et d'illusion. Tout comme les personnages de Sade, Hitler estimait que la conscience avait été inventée par les Juifs. "Les efforts pour se libérer des contraintes de la conscience étaient l'un des aspects essentiels du propre réexamen des valeurs par les Nazis. Ils croyaient qu'il fallait franchir les barrières morales et émotionnelles contre la cruauté et l'atrocité",liii le même parcours que celui suivi par les libertins de Sade dans Les Cent Vingt Journées de Sodome et dans Juliette. Les extraits suivants tirés de Mein Kampf (1924) résument, selon Hitler, la nature "diabolique" de la moralité juive :

La doctrine juive du marxisme rejette le principe aristocratique de la Nature et remplace l'éternel privilège du pouvoir et de la force par les masses et leurs poids morts. liv

De temps en temps, des illustrés attirent l'attention des petits bourgeois allemands sur le fait qu'ici ou là un nègre est, pour la première fois, devenu juriste, professeur ou quelque chose de ce genre. ... le Juif en retire habilement une nouvelle preuve de la justesse de sa théorie sur l'égalité des hommeslv. (italiques de Hitler)

Les passages suivants extraits de Libres propos sur la paix et la guerre exposent clairement la théorie de Hitler selon laquelle la "révolte des esclaves" est à l'origine de la moralité chrétienne :

Les Juifs, qui ont frauduleusement introduit le christianisme dans le monde antique pour le gâcher, ont réouvert la même brèche de nos jours, en prétextant cette fois-ci la question sociale ...

Ce sont toujours les Juifs qui détruisent cet ordre [naturel]. Ils encouragent constamment les faibles contre les forts, la bestialité contre l'intelligence, la quantité contre la qualité. Le christianisme a mis quatorze siècles pour atteindre les sommets de la sauvagerie et de la stupidité. Nous ne devrions pas être trop sûrs de nous et commettre l'erreur de proclamer la victoire définitive sur le bolshévisme. Plus nous rendrons les Juifs incapables de nous nuire, plus nous nous protégerons de ce danger. Un peuple qui s'est débarrassé de ses Juifs retourne spontanément à l'ordre naturel. lvi

Tout comme les personnages de Sade, Hitler lui aussi reprend le mythe selon lequel la conversion au christianisme, à savoir à la moralité chrétienne, a fait chuter Rome :

Si ce n'avait été pour l'avènement du christianisme, qui sait comment aurait évolué l'histoire de l'Europe ? Rome aurait conquis toute l'Europe, et l'assaut par les Huns aurait été enrayé par les légions. C'est le christianisme qui a provoqué la chute de Rome, pas les Germains ou les Huns ... Un jour se tiendront des cérémonies de gratitude pour remercier le fascisme et le national-socialisme pour avoir épargné à l'Europe une répétition du triomphe des enfers ... lvii

Dans les passages suivants, également extraits de Libres propos sur la paix et la guerre, Hitler fait part de ses espoirs pour l'avenir du mouvement nazi en des termes quasiment identiques à ceux utilisés par Belmor dans Sade qui a écrit à propos de son génocide chrétien qu' “il assurerait à jamais le bonheur de la France ; c’est un remède violent administré sur un corps vigoureux.” lviii

Notre époque assistera certainement à la fin de cette maladie qu'est le christianisme. Celui-ci continuera pendant encore un siècle, peut-être deux. Mon seul regret aura été, peu importe le prophète, de ne pas avoir pu voir la terre promise de loin. Nous sommes en train d'entrer dans une conception du monde qui sera une époque lumineuse, une époque de tolérance ... Ce qui importe par dessus tout est d'empêcher qu'un mensonge encore plus grand ne remplace celui qui est en train de disparaître. Le monde du judéo-bolshévisme doit cesser d'exister. lix

Il est toutefois un peu surprenant que l'anti-christianisme de Hitler comme celui des libertins de Sade s'applique également au domaine des moeurs sexuelles car il a dénoncé le culte chrétien de la virginité et la "morbidité"lx des moeurs sexuelles de la bourgeoisie ; “Le mariage, tel qu'il est pratiqué dans la société bourgeoise, est un péché contre la nature." lxi
En conclusion, il devrait être clair que Sade avait de toute évidence anticipé, si ce n'est le nazisme dans toute sa complexité embrouillée et affreuse, alors du moins la possibilité pour un état européen moderne d'assassiner des millions de gens, en particulier les représentants de cette moralité "servile" qui devait être remplacée au nom du progrès. Borchamps et Chigi sont des prototypes fictifs des "Jardiniers" du vingtième siècle, qui avaient prévu de produire une nouvelle humanité débarrassée de tous les défauts physiologiques ou de toutes les superstitions irrationnelles qui "rejettent la vie". Dans la mesure où l'un des enseignements essentiels du code moral rejeté est la nature sacro-sainte de la vie humaine (individuelle), la négation explicite d'une telle moralité (ainsi que l'ont fait remarquer Camus, l'analyse de Sade par Adorno et Horkheimer) ouvre la voie à la possibilité distincte de massacres au service de l'état. lxii


RÉFÉRENCES

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Berman, Lorna. “The Marquis de Sade and Religion”, Revue de L’Université d’Ottowa 39 (1969) :627- 640

Camus, Albert. L’Homme Révolté in Essais (Introduction par R.Quilliot, édition établie et annotée par R.Quilliot et L. Faucon, Paris: Gallimard, 1965)

Chadwick, Henry, Envoi: On Taking Leave of Antiquity pp.807-828 in John Boardman, Jasper Griffin,. Oswyn Murray, eds., The Oxford History of the Classical World Oxford University Press 1986.

Chamberlain, Houston Stewart. The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century (London: John Lane, the Bodley Head,1910)

Churchill, Winston S. “Zion versus Bolshevism A Struggle for the Soul of the Jewish People” Illustrated Sunday Herald, February 8th 1920

Dawidowicz, Lucy. War against the Jews (New York: Behrman House,1976)

Downie, R.S. “Kantian Ethics”, in Honderich, Ted ed. The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) 438-439

Foucault, Michel. Sade sergent du sexe-an interview conducted by G. Dupont, Cinématographe 16 (Dec.1975) 3-5

Friedrich, Carl. “Anti-Semitism: Challenge to Christian Culture” In Jews in a Gentile World: The Problem of Anti-Semitism, edited by Isacque Graeber and Steuart Henderson (New York: Macmillan,1942)

Glover, Jonathan. Humanity: A moral history of the Twentieth Century (London: Pimlico, 2001)

Goldhagen, Daniel Jonah. Hitler’s Willing Executioners (London:Abacus, 1996)

Hitler, Adolf. Hitler’s Table Talk 1941-1944 His Private Conversations introduced by Hugh Trevor- Roper, Translated by Norman Cameron and R.H.Stevens (London: Phoenix Press 2000)

. Mein Kampf translated by Ralph Manheim (London: Pimlico, 1995)

Holbach, Baron d’. L’Esprit du Judaïsme ou Examen Raisonné de la Loi de Moyse, & de son influence sur la Religion Chrétienne published anonymously, (Londres [possibly a fake place of publication], MDCCLX)

Kershaw, Ian. Hitler 1936-1945 Nemesis (London: Penguin, 2001)

Klossowski, Pierre. Sade, Mon Prochain (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1947)

Le Brun, Annie. Soudain, un bloc d’abîme, Sade (Paris: Gallimard 1986)

Nielsen, Kai. Ethics without God (New York: Prometheus Books, 1989)

Rorty, Richard and Polychroniou, Chronis. “On Philosophy and Politics, The Cold War, and the Left” New Politics 8, no. 3 Summer 2001 128-39

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. Discours sur l’origine et les fondements de L’inégalité parmi les hommes
( Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1973)

. Du Contrat Social (Paris : Garnier-Flammarion 1966)

Sade, Marquis de. La Philosophie dans le Boudoir presentée, établie et annotée par Yvon Belaval (Paris: Gallimard 1976)

. Œuvres (3 volumes) introduction, notes et variantes par Michel Delon (Paris: Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, Gallimard,Vol 1: 1990; vol.2 1995, vol. 3 1998)


Tal, Uriel. “Anti-Christian Anti-Semitism,” in The Catastrophe of European Jewry ed. Yisrael Gutman and Livia Rothkirchen (New York: Ktav Publishing house, n.d.)

Wistrich, Robert S. Hitler and the Holocaust (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2001)

. “The Cross and the Swastika” in Jacob Golomb and Robert S. Wistrich, eds, Nietzsche, Godfather of Fascism? (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002)

Friday, September 29, 2006

Ethics Course Outline- Lakeland College Shinjuku Fall 2006

Ethics Course: Fall Semester 2006
Lakeland College, Shinjuku
Tuesday and Thursday, 11:30-1:00pm
Instructor: Dr. Geoffrey Roche
Office Hours: Thursday 9-11 am. Also by appointment.

Course Description
This course will provide an introduction to some key ethical concepts and approaches, and will negotiate questions such as the following: what makes an action the right, or the ethical, thing to do? what principles of justice should a community adopt? Is there even a universally applicable moral standard, or is ethics merely subjective? And, finally, how should one live, and what does it mean to be a good person? We will consider these central debates, with an eye to the real- world implications of what answers we give.

Course Objectives
Subject specific outcomes

The student will demonstrate the ability to utilize and evaluate key concepts in ethical theory.

Transferable skills (key skills such as communication, thinking skills, computer skills, learning skills)


The student will demonstrate the ability to debate (ethical topics) in a clear and structured manner.
The student will demonstrate the ability to assess the ethical arguments, viewpoints and doctrines of others.


Course Methodology and Format
The course will be comprised of twenty- five one- and – a half hour classes, roughly grouped into two – class units. The first class of the week will be a lecture, whereas the second class of the week will be either a tutorial or (in the case of coursework presentations) a guided discussion or debate. The first half of the course will be theoretical, with an eye to the real- world implications of the ideas under discussion. The second half of the course will address real world problems that are regularly addressed in politics, policy analysis and in daily life. The two halves of the course will be integrated, in the sense that students are expected to see the connections between ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ theory.

Required Reading
James Rachels The Elements of Moral Philosophy. New York: Random House, 1999.
James Rachels The Right Thing to Do: Readings in Moral Philosophy. New
York: Random House, 1999.
Recommended Reading
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online http://www.plato.stanford.edu/contents.html
Victor Grassian Moral Reasoning: Ethical Theory and some Contemporary Moral Problems New York: Prentice Hall, 1992.
Schedule of Topics and Core Readings

Week I. Introduction

9/5 What is philosophy? What is ethics?
9/7 Moral Dilemmas.
Reading: James Rachels The Elements of Moral Philosophy (hereafter EMP) pp.1-14; James Rachels The Right Thing to Do (hereafter RTD) pp.1-20.


Discussion: The Lifeboat Case: Were you the captain of a lifeboat, and you had to make some tough decisions as to who should live, what decisions would you make, and what explanation would you give to justify those decisions?

Week II. Ethical Subjectivism
The first task of the course will be to clarify what we mean by `morality,' the three main branches of ethical inquiry ( practical, normative, and meta-ethics) and what purpose its study serves. Secondly, we will discuss the view that ethics is merely subjective, or relative to a particular culture. Two distinct arguments have been offered as to why one should adopt this view, which is termed Moral Relativism; a). the view that a relativist view best serves tolerance, and b). the view that all cultures have, ultimately, different moral frameworks, implying that a universal morality does not exist. The nuts and bolts- the specific premises- of these arguments will be discussed. Of central concern is the possibility that certain practices simply cannot be tolerated.

9/12 The Cultural Differences Argument
9/14 The Argument from Tolerance
Reading: RTD: 31-36; EMP:16-44

Discussion topic: Is being a cultural relativist really justifiable on the grounds that it promotes tolerance?


Week III. The Utilitarian Approach.

Here we will discuss the Utilitarian approach to ethics (The ‘principle of Utility’ is simply the doctrine that we should act so as to maximize happiness). This approach forces us to consider whether all `good' can be reduced to a single principle that should be maximized- in the case of the Utilitarians- to happiness. Is it really the case that happiness is all that matters? Further, is it simply the consequences of our actions that matter in our decision- making?
9/19 Utilitarianism Explained
9/21 Problems with Utilitarianism.
Reading: EMP: 91-111; RTD: 64-75.
Discussion: Are you a Utilitarian? We will discuss the case of a doctor who has the opportunity to `harvest' the organs of someone- without explicit consent- for the benefit of others. Even if the doctor can `maximize happiness,' is it truly the morally best thing to do?

Week IV. Deontology
Are there absolute, universal moral rules and principles to ethics, and if so, what are they? Does the famous ‘Golden Rule,’ which appears in Christian, Jewish, Chinese and Buddhist thought, provide a complete ethical theory? We will consider the approach of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), who considered human freedom, and its protection, as being fundamental to ethics.

9/26 Immanuel Kant and the Categorical Imperative.
9/28 Problems with Deontology
Reading: EMP: 117-140; RTD:76-81
Discussion: a). What do you think of the claim “let justice be done though the heavens fall” ? (in less poetic language- “When justice and utility conflict, as they may, always choose justice over utility”). b). Consider the case of a captain in command of a lifeboat, who is forced to abandon some in order to ensure the survival of others. Firstly, what possible decisions may he make? Secondly, what (moral) reasons would he offer to explain why he made his decision? Of central importance here is the issue of individual rights, and the duties that the captain must (assumedly) fulfil.

Week V. Morality’s Detractors
Since the beginning of moral philosophy, there have been those who have rejected the most basic tenets of moral thought. Two such counter-morality figures will be discussed here; Glaucon, the semi- fictional figure in Plato’s Republic, and Friedrich Nietzsche, who infamously declared all normative ethics as a trap for the strong, set by the spiritually weak.

10/10 Ethical Egoism: Glaucon and Thrasymachus in The Republic
10/12 Friedrich Nietzsche on ‘slave’ morality.
Reading: readings from Nietzsche The Genealogy of Morals and Plato The Republic (to be distributed in class).
Discussion: Do you agree with Nietzsche’s assessment of Jewish- Christian morality? Does it commit any fallacies? What are the implications of taking Nietzsche’s theory seriously?

Week VI. Test I

10/17 Review Tutorial
10/19 Test I.

VII. Virtue Ethics
For thinkers such as Aristotle, ethical thought was not so much concerned with establishing moral principles and acting in accordance to them. Rather, ethics was thought of as the practice of cultivating the virtues in oneself, and the attainment of an ideal of human life. This approach, known as virtue ethics, is discussed here.

10/24 Aristotle’s Virtue Ethics
10/26 Discussion: can the wicked flourish?
Reading: RTD: 37-43, EMP: 173-187
Discussion: Can virtue be grounded in the notion of flourishing? Can wicked people flourish, in a deep sense? (Could they really have true friends, for example?) If so, is this a problem for virtue ethics? Further, how are the virtues to be defined (bravery, for example)? Can cultures disagree about right and wrong acts whilst agreeing about the virtues? Does being virtuous require that one follow ethical rules? And what virtues would a Utilitarian emphasise?

Week VIII: The Social Contract
Here we consider the ‘Social Contract’ theory of ethics- that is, the view that ethics is to be understood as a social contract between rational agents. Other moral theories, as we have seen, attempt to ground a framework in morality in some absolute moral principle or value. Social Contract theory, by contrast, defines morality in terms of an agreement reached between rational individuals. Here we assess this notion of morality, in particular its description of morality as a mutually beneficial behavioral strategy.

10/31 Social Contract Theory.
11/2 No Class
Reading: RTD:8-10,50-59; EMP141-155.
Discussion: Does social contract theory successfully deal with the ‘why be moral’ problem?
Further, does it matter that the Social Contract is based on an historical fiction?

Part II: Applied Ethics
Week IX. The Euthanasia Debate
Here we grapple with one of the most difficult, and relevant, moral issues, that of euthanasia. In particular, we will focus on voluntary active euthanasia (VAE), better known as doctor- assisted suicide. Those who oppose VAE typically argue that 1). VAE is contrary to the professional principles of medical practice, and 2). That allowing VAE will lead to grave social consequences. Those in favour of VAE frequently argue that it is not human life that is intrinsically valuable per se, but the quality of that life. Hence, for the terminally ill in great pain, they should have the freedom (if and only if they so choose) and the choice, to end their lives.
11/7 Euthanasia: Introduction
11/9 Euthanasia: Discussion
Reading: RTD:175-189
Discussion: Euthanasia in Japan is illegal. Should it be? If not, under what circumstances should it be allowed?

Week X. Justice and Punishment
There are two schools of thought on this question. Firstly, there are those who take the death penalty as the only fitting punishment for murder or treason, on the grounds that the ‘punishment must fit the crime.’ Ernest van den Haag, for one, adds that execution acts as a deterrent; Kant held that executing murderers actually pays the criminal the respect befitting a rational agent. On the other hand, it has been argued that capital punishment is unfair, , inhumane and grotesque. The two sides of the debate will be addressed.
11/14 The Death Penalty
11/16 The Death Penalty (discussion)
Reading: RTD: 240.
Discussion: Should Japan retain the death penalty?

XI. Paternalism and Autonomy
We can speak of roughly two basic principles in public policy- the principles of paternalism and autonomy. Broadly speaking, a paternalistic approach to policy treats the populace as a father treats his children; the people are considered too uninformed or irrational to decide for themselves, and the State must decide for them what is acceptable or safe conduct. Legislation that respects autonomy, on the other hand, allows people to make their own decisions. Legislation concerning drugs (that is, substances that alter consciousness), in most countries, are a strange mixture of the two approaches. Here we will consider the debate on drugs, which is largely intelligible in terms of paternalism vs. autonomy. In particular, we will consider Milton Friedman’s view that all drugs should be legalized, and William J. Bennet’s view that illegal drugs (note that he does not suggest banning tobacco or alcohol) should remain illegal.

11/21 The Drugs Debate
11/23 No Class
Reading: RTD: 248-254
Discussion: What could a Utilitarian consistently say about the drugs issue? (Note that Utilitarian arguments are typically cited in the ‘War- on Drugs’). What does Kant’s Categorical Imperative have to say on this issue? Could lifting the ban on illegal drugs be morally justifiable? If so, which ones, and why? Or, conversely, should some legal drugs (i.e. tobacco) be banned?

Week XII. The Drugs Debate
11/27 The Drugs Debate
11/30 Exam Preparation Tutorial

XIII.

12/5 Exam
11/7 Exam



Coursework Essay Questions

Essay 1
Question 1: Cultural Relativism.
Either a: Choose one of the arguments for cultural relativism. Describe and offer a critical evaluation of that argument.
Or: Relativism is associated with the idea that we should show tolerance towards the values and norms of other cultures. Explain what the connection is and, if there is one, whether it provides a reason to accept relativism. Discuss also what room there is for the idea of tolerance within an objectivist approach. Does objectivism in any way exclude tolerance?



Question 2: Utilitarianism.
It is sometimes suggested that Utilitarians cannot explain the obligation to keep promises. Why might someone think this? How might a Utilitarian respond?

Essay 2
Question 1. Kant
Kant thinks that you must have ‘good will’ to be a good person. What does he mean by this? Do you agree with him? In your answer, discuss at least one of the possible counterexamples to Kant’s claim that the good will is necessary for being a good person ( i.e. the virtuous person, the self interested person, the person who always brings about good consequences or the naturally kind- hearted person).
Question 2. Virtue Ethics.
In what ways is virtue ethics different from Kantianism or Utilitarianism? In your view, are these distinctive features advantages or disadvantages for a moral theory? In your answer, focus on no more than two features, and include a critical discussion of at least one objection to virtue ethics.

Thursday, September 28, 2006

Essay Writing Guide

Guidelines for writing Philosophy Essays


To write philosophy requires that you handle a pen as a surgeon handles a scalpel.
Philosophy is not about learning facts and then regurgitating them. It is the skill of reasoning clearly. The essay should show that you have mastered this skill. Further, If you can write philosophy well, you will be able to read it well. And if you can read philosophy, you should be able to read anything.

BEFORE YOU START

You should both understand what the essay question is about, and what the relevant arguments and theories are, before you start writing anything. If you can explain to someone the theories and arguments without your notes, and have some idea of what your conclusion will be, you are ready. Otherwise, the essay will just be a bunch of notes that you have thrown together.

1). Structure
The essay should follow a clear argumentative structure. Write in paragraphs. Each paragraph should have one main idea. The following is a rough guide:

Paragraph 1. Introduction- in which the problem is introduced.

Paragraph 2 (a, b, c etc) . Present the main argument to be discussed
Paragraph 3. (a, b, c etc). Present one or more counterargument(s) to the main argument
Paragraph 4. Present the possible responses to these counterarguments.
Paragraph 5. Conclusion: A coherent statement of your findings. Explain which of the two
positions you think is stronger, and why.

For example: The Cultural Differences Argument

Introduction: Presentation of the CD Argument
Counterargument a: the first premise (premise a)is false, or at least weak. Cultures actually have a common morality.
Counterargument b: The logic of the argument is flawed. Disagreement across cultures does not imply that there is no universal morality.
Reply to argument a. There might be good reasons for accepting premise a). nevertheless.
Reply to argument b. Perhaps this counterargument is not sound.
Conclusion.

Each part of the text should fit in with those preceding it, and should be presented as such (“the first objection is that…” “It has been argued that this argument commits a fallacy”… “furthermore,” “finally,” “in conclusion” etc).
The worst thing you can do is state something in the conclusion that contradicts the rest of the essay. This simply shows a lack of understanding. Another serious error is mixing up two different arguments for the same claim- for example the CD argument and the Tolerance argument.
Good philosophy essays have a clear structure- a sequence of paragraphs that slot together into a coherent whole. It is often possible for a marker to distinguish the A- essays from the C’s within seconds, just by looking to see whether they are written in paragraphs or not. (Of course, that isn’t how I mark them!). Numbering paragraph sections might also be suitable (1.1, 1.2, 1.3 etc).

2). Style
Include everything about the argument that is relevant, but explain it as efficiently as possible.
Do not skip over important argumentative points.
Write as impersonally as possible.
Do not mention anything that is not relevant to the argument.
Do not write long introductions or conclusions.
Do not write general statements, like

Since the dawn of time, philosophers have argued over whether the soul is immortal.

This is sloppy. Philosophical writing should be hard and sharp.

A good style guide is the William Strunk and E. B. White text The Elements of Style. (Available free on Wikipedia).

Avoid redundancy. Write concisely.

If a word, a sentence or a paragraph can be removed without changing your argument, take it out.

Grammar and Syntax:
Only the quality of the argument is relevant in marking philosophy essays. Having said that, if the grammar is so poor that it is not clear what you are trying to say, this will seriously harm the essay.

3). Coherence
The argument should be clear. An intelligent, non- philosophy student should be able to read the essay and understand your writing perfectly. Further, do not write something that you don’t yourself understand, or you can’t explain to someone face to face.

4). The Principle of Charity
Explain the argument that you are discussing as strongly as possible. This is so that, when you analyze it, you are testing the strongest version of that argument. Analogy: a medical researcher who is looking for a cure for a disease wants to show that the cure works on even the strongest version of that disease.


5). References.
All quotations or citations should be referenced. We’ll use the Chicago Manual of Style rules.

Do not give references to my lectures or course notes. These are not publications. And they aren’t original. The first time you cite a reference, you put the full reference in a footnote, and tell the reader which abbreviation you will use, like this:

Geoffrey Gorer (1905-1985) wrote The Life and Ideas of Diderot (hereafter LID),in 1934, motivated, he wrote, to understand the rise of Capitalism.

Whenever you refer to the same text again, just give the letters and pagination (page numbers), like this:

Writes Gorer, “for this reason alone, I consider Doraemon a classic of
Japanese anime” (LID:231).

Put short quotes in brackets (“”). Put longer quotes in 10- point font and indent them an inch from the edge. This makes it easier to read them.
Only use quotes when it is not possible or appropriate to paraphrase.
Bibliography references (at the end of the essay) for a book should be like this:

Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Anti-Christ. trans. Michael Tanner. London: Oxford University
Press, 1972.

For an essay in a journal:

Newfield, Paul “Nietzsche’s Dream: Romantic Love in Zarathustra,” Corporate
Philosophy (Vol 3 no.4: November 2001):34-35.

Online resources used should have a full URL.(web address) , as well as the date that you accessed it, so that I can go straight to it.

DO NOT USE WIKIPEDIA.
EVER.
It is high- quality graffiti. It is not a reference work.


6). PROOF READ
When you finish writing an essay, put it in a drawer and go have a coffee or something. Come back to it after a few hours and do the final check. Don’t rely on anyone else to find your errors, and do not rely on spill- checking software. (spell checking software). Finally, don’t even bother writing the introduction until the rest of the essay, in particular the conclusion, is finished.

If you just hand in the first draft and rely on luck, you’re just throwing marks away.

7). Hard Copy

Type the essay on a computer. Use 12 point font (10 point for indented quotes), and use double spacing, so that I can write comments in the margins. I prefer Times New Roman font. Please number the pages and staple the essay together. NEVER hand in an original essay without keeping a spare copy. That’s just asking for trouble.

8). Plagiarism.
Don’t even think about it. At the least, you will fail the course. Refer to the Lakeland College Information Booklet for details.

Summary:
How are philosophy essays marked?

Spelling, grammar, research and so on are secondary to whether the following objectives have been met.

1).Show that you have understood the essay question
2).Show that you have understood the material
(by this I mean the arguments and positions discussed in the lectures- I don’t expect
anyone to be able to understand every line of Kant in the original).
3).Show that you have answered the essay question
4).Show that you have understood the philosophical problem(s) at hand
5).Show that you have thought about the problem
6).Express your own reasoning in a clear, structured manner.

Basically, philosophy essays fall into four classes.
D- range (fail)- did not answer the question. Did not show understanding.
C-range- Answered the essay question, correctly, but did not show clear understanding.
B- range- Answered the essay question, showed understanding; did not show much original discussion.
A- range- Answered the essay question, showed understanding of the material, gave an original analysis.


Pitfalls

Avoid all writing that does not directly contribute to the argument of the essay
Avoid merely expressing an opinion
Avoid fallacies
Avoid excessive quotation.


Dr. Geoffrey Roche
Lakeland College Shinjuku

Ethics Course Blog
Lecture notes and so on:
www.unblinking-gaze.blogspot.com

Lectures 1 and 2

Ethics Course Lakeland College Fall Semester 2006

What is Philosophy?
Critical debate on anything worth arguing about.
The prior, most fundamental questions on any topic are philosophical questions,
including the question as to what philosophy is.
Main functions:
-Analysing ideas, and clarifying viewpoints.
Traditional questions:
What does it mean to know something? Is there a God? Does the soul survive the physical death of the body? Is man merely an animal? Why is there something rather than nothing? How should I live? What is the meaning of life? What is art? Is it important? What is the nature of reality? What is the best form of government?
What is Morality?

Rachels defines morality as
“the effort to guide one's conduct by reason.” To do what there are the best reasons for doing- while giving equal weight to the interests of each individual who will be affected. »

Making distinctions between right and wrong.
Suggestions: Bernard Gert:
httondup://plato.standford.edu/entries/morality-definition/

Morality provides a guide for the behaviour of the people in a society.
-A universal code of conduct that would be endorsed by all rational persons (at least, that is the standard view of all modern Western ethical theorists since Kant).
Hobbes, Bentham; Mill: morality means behaviour that affects others.

Basic Questions concerning our Definition of Morality
Is it immoral to
-harm yourself without harming anyone else?
(I.e. Stay drunk all the time, or become a complete recluse, just living inside your bedroom and playing computer games all the time?)

(does such a code really exist? Some meta-ethicists would say that such a code does not exist).
-Is it immoral to not help others, even if you could do so easily ?
(Note that philosophers disagree strongly with each other over these questions).




How are Philosophy Essays Marked?
● Have you shown that you understand the problem?
●Do you understand the essay question?
●Have you answered the essay question?
●Have you shown that you have thought about the problems
by yourself?
●Have you expressed your reasoning clearly, and in a structured, orderly way? (We will go over structuring an essay before the first essay is due).
●Have you removed all text that does not directly discuss the argument?

Showing that you understand the material is more important than showing that you have done lots of reading.
Avoid:
● Mere expression of opinion
● Dogmatism
● Excessive quotation that does not show that you
really understand the ideas. (This is not to say that quoting is incorrect- but you should only quote when it is inappropriate to use your own words).
Opinion is nothing. Argumentation is everything.

The Baby Theresa Case

1.1 Preliminary Questions:
1).What is a person? (That is, how are people different to, say, dogs or powerful computers?)
2).What is death? That is, does death occur when the heart stops, the breathing stops, or when something else happens?
3).How are your answers to 1). and 2). above connected?

1.2 The Case
Theresa Ann Campo Pearson was born in Florida in 1992. She was born with a condition called anencephaly ( ‘ an-’ in Greek means 'without,' '-cephaly'  means something to do with the head). Important parts of the brain were missing. However, parts of the brain responsible for breathing and heart rate were still working.
Theresa's parents made an unusual decision. They knew that Theresa would not live for more than a few days, and that she would never wake up (she would never have a conscious life). So, Theresa's parents volunteered her organs for transplantation. (In the USA, at least 2,000 infants need transplants each year, and there are never enough organs available). The doctors agreed that this was a good idea. There were problems, however. The organs had to be removed from Theresa before her heart stopped to still be usable. Florida law defines death as brain- death, so this was not in itself a problem. Yet, when the case went to court, the judge rejected the reasoning of the parents. As he knew that part of Theresa's brain was still alive, he decided that Theresa was not, in fact, brain dead. A few weeks later, Theresa died, and her organs were not donated.
Questions for Discussion.
1).Do you think that organ donation is a good idea? Why, or why not?
2).Do you think that Theresa's parents made the right decision?
3).Do you think that Florida law on the question of death is sound?
4).Do you think that the judge made the right decision?
5).How does Japanese law define death? (As heart/lung, cardiovascular death, or as brain death?) Should the law in Japan be changed, do you think? Why?
6).Are organ transplants done in Japan?


Possible Responses to the Baby Theresa case (actually stated by professional ethicists, as Rachels notes):
The Benefits Argument
The Argument that we should Not Use People as Means
Argument against the Wrongness of Killing

Reading before Lecture 2 and Week 2:
RTTP: 1-28 ; 144-153. EMP 1-14 (book available Wednesday)
Discussion Preparation: Read over the Iceberg Case.
Read the text, and think of what you would decide if you were on the jury. Think of the basic reasons behind your decision. Note that you cannot merely say that this is the decision that 'feels right.'









Lecture 2.
Assessing and Making Arguments

To be covered:
Premises and Conclusions.
Validity and Soundness
Fallacies.
Consider the following argument. From Rachels RTTD:144-153.

Homosexual acts are unnatural. All unnatural acts are immoral. Therefore, Homosexual acts are immoral, and homosexual people are sinners.

-What is the conclusion of this argument?
Homosexual people are sinners.

-What are the reasons (the premises) of this argument?
-Homosexual acts are unnatural.
Unnatural acts are immoral.

Evaluating an argument is a two- step process.
Step 1. Firstly, we evaluate the structure of the argument. We do this by identifying the structure of the argument.
All A are B
All B are C
_________
All A are C

Is this structure valid? Try substituting terms so that the premises are true, but the conclusion is untrue.
The argument is valid. (Note that this does not mean that the argument is correct).

Step 2: Are the premises true?
-are homosexual acts unnatural? What does 'natural' mean here, exactly? Contrary to the laws of physics? Or contrary to the laws of animals? In either case, the claim is incorrect; homosexuality cannot be said to violate physical laws, and homosexuality in animals is well known. As for humans, how could it be unnatural, if it keeps occuring?
Premise 2 is even more problematic. To see this point, think of all the things that are quite natural behaviors for humans that are destructive (Buddhism is largely concerned with escaping natural instincts). Think also of all the natural substances that are lethal or unhealthy for us, and all the unnatural things we do to avoid cold, pain, boredom, and so on. Note that the Vatican considers events that cannot be explained in terms of natural laws as miracles- that is, as unnatural phenomena.

Example:

All Greeks are Mortal
Socrates is Mortal

Therefore

Socrates is Greek

Is this a valid form?
A=Greeks
B= Mortals
C=Socrates

All A are B
All C are B
therefore

All C are A

This argument is INVALID



Try substituting the terms as follows to test the argument to show its invalidity:

A= yakuza
B= Japanese
C= Geisha



An important point: even if the conclusion, or even every premise, is correct, it does not follow that the argument is sound. It is crucial that you distinguish validity from the truth of the premises.


All aliens are Japanese prime ministers
Koisumi is an alien
Koisumi is a Japanese prime minister

Valid argument; false premises

Smoking tobacco improves short term memory
Jean- Paul Sartre was a heavy smoker, and so was Sigmund Freud
Smoking is not dangerous

True premises, invalid argument




Discussion for Week 2: Moral Dilemmas.

United states vs. Holmes

On the 13th of March 1841, the American ship, the William Brown, left Liverpool for Philadelphia in the United States. At 10 O'Clock on the night of the 19th of April, the William Brown struck an iceberg. 41 survivors- the captian, the first mate, seven other crew, and 31 passengers, in all 41 people, were crowded into a lifeboat designed to hold 7. 31 other passengers went down with the sinking ship. As soon as the lifeboat was put to water, it began to leak. Even without the leak, however, the boat was seriously overloaded- the waterline was only 10 inches from the gunwale (the sidewalls of the boat). As a storm threatened, and the water was full of icebergs of various sizes, it became obvious that the lifeboat would have to be lightened if anyone were to survive. The captain reasoned that the right thing to do in this situation was to force some individuals to go over the side and drown. Such an action, he reasoned, was not unjust to those thrown overboard, for they would have drowned anyway. If he did nothing, however, he would be responsible for the deaths of those whom he could have saved. Some people opposed the captain's decision. They claimed that if nothing were done and everyone died as a result, no one would be responsible for these deaths. On the other hand, if the captain attempted to save some, he could do so only by killing others and their deaths would be his responsibility; this would be worse than doing nothing and letting all die. The captain rejected this reasoning. Since the only possibility for rescue required great efforts of rowing, the captain decided that the weakest would have to be sacrificed. In this situation it would be absurd, he thought, to decide by drawing lots who should be thrown overboard. The captain and crew simply threw the weakest men on board over the side, sparing only the strongest and those married couples who were together on board the lifeboat. (There were several 'honorable suicides'). As it turned out, after days of hard rowing and bailing, the survivors were rescued and the captain was charged with 'unlawful homicide.'
(adapted from Victor Grassian Moral Reasoning).
full details, plus the arguments for the defence:
tp:/wings.buffalo.edu/law/bclc/web/holmes.htm

Question: Imagine you were on the jury for Captain Hood's manslaughter charge. Would you declare Hood innocent, guilty of murder, or guilty of manslaughter? Why?
Objectives in this exercise:
-To construct an argument
-To identify some basic moral principles;
Notes for Lectures 5 and 6
Dr. Roche- Ethics
Lecture 5
Consequentialism and Utilitarianism

5.1 What is Utilitarianism?
Utilitarianism is an ethical theory that holds that the only good thing is welfare (or 'happiness', or 'utility.'). The central idea here is that one should act to maximize happiness, whether that of humans or other sentient beings. The Utilitarian approach to ethics has early origins. Plato discussed welfare as the best balance of pleasure and pain. Both Stoicism and Christianity held to similar principles. During the Enlightenment (the 18th Century), three theorists in particular promoted Utilitarianism. These were Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), and Claude Adrien Helvétius (1715-1771). (The latter thinker is almost totally forgotten now, but is interesting as he largely anticipated the scenario of Aldous Huxley's novel Brave New World [1932] in which the State is essentially an apparatus for maximizing pleasure through the careful administration of sex and drugs ).Bentham and Mill are essentially similar in that they are hedonistic utilitarians ― that is, they consider pleasure to be the only intrinsic good. Other, important Utilitarians are British philosopher Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) and Peter Singer (b.1946), an Australian, who is still writing.
Utilitarianism is to be understood in the context of the massive shift in worldview that occured in the West during the 18th Century. Religion was no longer considered the sole arbiter of right and wrong. New cultures had been discovered which appeared to many to be morally equivalent, or superior, to those of Europe. Ethics had to be based on something other than religious authority. For the Utilitarians, ethics was about making the world as happy a place as possible.

5.2 Main Features of Utilitarianism
In its original formulation, Utilitarianism is hedonistic act consequentialism. That is, it endorses the maximization of happiness; it is based on the evaluation of particular acts, and as a is a consequentialist theory, it considers as relevant the outcomes of one's
actions (and not the ethics of the means used to bring about an outcome).
Hedonism claims that pleasure is the only intrinsic good and that pain is the only intrinsic bad. Together, these claims imply that an act is morally right if and only if that act causes “the greatest good for the greatest number. ”

5.3 Implications
As Rachels notes, Utilitarianism seems to give standard answers to two key moral problems- euthanasia and animal rights (Rachels pp.93-101).

5.4 Arguments for Utilitarianism
Mill's 'proof' (1861).
1.Happiness is Desirable
2.The general happiness is desirable (that is, everyone's happiness is desirable)
3.Nothing other than happiness is desirable.

Mill's whole theory rests on these claims, and each one of them has been criticized. The second claim appears to overlook the distinction between egoistic and universalistic hedonism.
(That is- how does making other people happier necessarily make yourself happy?)

5.5 Psychological Assumptions
'Classical', Hedonistic Utilitarianism assumes that you could actually compare people's lives and decide on whose life is more pleasurable. That is, it assumes that we can compare welfare across people's lives. (To decide on a moral decision, we need to be able to decide on which outcome is the more beneficial; that is, which will increase welfare). Bentham actually thought that you could chart any given pleasure on an x-y axis, according to duration and intensity. He also assumed that people enjoy things in much the same way.
Utilitarianism seems to assume that happiness can be distributed in some way, but psychological studies suggest otherwise. Some studies show that happiness seems to be based on relative, rather than absolute wealth. In one study, Harvard students were given two options:
Option 1: 50,000 dollars a year for me; 25,000 for my friends
Option 2 : 100,000 dollars a year for me; 200,000 a year for my friends.
Most students chose 1.
5.6 Value Assumptions
Utilitarianism assumes that only pleasurable states are valuable. Hence, Utilitarians were accused of hedonism. Mill attempted to excape this objection by distinguishing between higher and lower pleasures, arguing that the quality of pleasure had to be taken into account. How to choose between two pleasures? Mills writes:

On a question which is the best worth having of two pleasures, or which of two modes of existence is the most grateful to the feelings, apart from its moral attributes and from its consequences, the judgement of those who are qualified by knowledge of both, or, if they differ, that of the majority among them, must be admitted as final. (in Rachels RTTD:69).



Is this a good test? Or is it merely elitist? Or is he sneaking some other criterion, besides 'happiness,' into the decision?


5.7 Is Happiness the Only Good?
The bigger problem is the assumption that pleasure is the only good. The following scenario is from Robert Nozick (1938-2002 ), an American philosopher.

“ Suppose there were an experience machine that would give you any experience you desired. Superduper neuropsychologists could stimulate your brain so that you would think and feel you were writing a great novel, or making a friend, or reading an interesting book. All the time you would be floating in a tank, with electrodes attached to your brain. Should you plug into this machine for life, preprogramming your life experiences? [...] Of course, while you are in the tank, you don't know that you're there; you'll think that it's actually happening... would you plug in? ”

(The similarity to the plot of The Matrix is probably not a coincidence- Larry Wachowsky, one of the script writers, is a serious philosophy reader). So would you get into the experience machine, or not? And what would a Utilitarian say? Similarly, is Neo a hero, or a villain, for wanting to unplug the human race? What goods are we missing out on if we have perfectly happy, but illusory lives? What of reality?

5.8 A related problem.
Consider this: according to recent studies, there is only a vague relationship between happiness and wealth, or such goods as rights and justice. Consider the following argument.
People in Japan are no happier in 2006 than they were in 1950, although income in Japan has increased five-fold in that period. According to Utilitarianism, life in Japan has not improved.
Why? Because the level of happiness is the same.

Women's Liberation.
Women haven't become happier since the 1950 's. Does this mean that things haven't
improved?
Yes, I'm afraid so (Bentham).

No, but not because women's lives have improved, but rather because the
situation has improved in other respects. Women are better off in other ways.

So, what other 'goods' are there, that cannot be reduced to 'happiness?' Truth? Freedom? knowledge? Friendship? Autonomy? Achievement? Justice? Fairness?

Samuel Brittan " 'Happiness' is not enough” Samuel Brittan: Templeton Lecture Inst. of Economic
Affairs 22/11/01. URL: www.samuelbrittan.co.uk/spee22_p.html
Shankar Vedantam “You really can't buy happiness, study confirms” Washington Post, Sunday
July 9th, 2006 URL: www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/ c/a/2006/07/09/MNG02JPKK61.

In response, we could replace 'happiness ' with some other overrarching value. Preference- maximalization, for example. Or desire- fulfillment.

The Desire- Fulfillment Theory.

-What matters is if people get what they want, achieve their aims and realize their projects.
-A person is benefitted by getting his or her desires or preferences satisfied, and harmed by having them frustrated.
-The extent to which a life is a good life for the person leading it depends entirely on the extent to which his or her desires are fulfilled.
-Preference- satisfaction is the only thing that has positive intrinsic value, whereas the only thing that has negative intrinsic value is preference- frustration.

Desire- Fulfillment theory is attractive. It gives the right verdict about women's liberation, it gives the right verdict about Nozick's Experience Machine, and it is non- paternalistic.


5.9 Utilitarianism has no conception of Justice
Utilitarianism is incompatible with any notion of justice. Consider the cases in Rachels EMP: the case of the sheriff who allows the lynching of an innocent black man to prevent a race war; medical experiments of the unwilling; the use of torture in interrogations to save others; the peeping tom case (Rachels EMP:106-107).
If a benefit can be given to either a rich person, through no fault of his own, or a poor person, through no fault of his own, and the benefit is only slightly more beneficial to the rich man than to the poor man, Utilitarianism requires that it go to the rich man.
(The homework Question concerns this problem).


5.10 Utilitarianism does not recognize Agent- Specific Duties
W.D. Ross argued that, if breaking a promise created only slightly more happiness overall than keeping the promise, then you ought to break the promise, according to Classic Utilitarianism.
Similarly, critics of Utilitarianism might argue that Utilitarians cannot be good friends, because a good friend places more weight on the happiness of his or her friends than on the welfare of complete strangers. This is because Utilitarianism requires impartiality towards all people.
One response is to suggest agent- relative consequentialism. An agent- relative consequentialist gives more importance to the welfare of a friend when assessing the consequences of that person's acts.


5.11 Utilitarianism is Too Demanding

Utilitarianism requires that you consider the interests of total strangers as being equal to that of your own family, your friends, or, indeed, yourself. Utilitarianism dictates that you give up all of your projects, and dedicate all of your ressources and time to, say, famine relief. Teaching philosophy just isn't as important as simply spending my time working for OXFAM, or UNICEF, so I should quit teaching philosophy.
Some Utilitarians might simply bite the bullet. In "Famine, Affluence, and Morality", one of Peter Singer's best-known philosophical essays, he argues that the injustice of some people living in abundance while others starve is morally indefensible. Singer proposes that anyone able to help the poor should donate part of their income to aid poverty and similar efforts. Singer reasons that, when one is already living comfortably, a further purchase to increase comfort will lack the same moral importance as saving another person's life. Singer himself donates 20% of his salary to Oxfam and UNICEF. In "Rich and Poor", the version of the aforementioned article that appears in the second edition of Practical Ethics,[8] his main argument is presented as follows: If we can prevent something bad without sacrificing anything of comparable significance, we ought to do it; absolute poverty is bad; there is some poverty we can prevent without sacrificing anything of comparable moral significance; therefore we ought to prevent some absolute poverty. (from Wikipedia article on Peter Singer).

5.12 Other Bizarre Implications
The Repugnant Conclusion
Derek Parfit (Reasons and Persons, 1984) gives the following argument. Suppose that you had to choose between two different scenarios: a world (World A) in which everyone is very happy, but there are only a million people, or a world (World B) in which there are a trillion people, each of whom is just comfortable enough to not want to kill themselves. Because the 'overall utility' in
World B is higher, you should act to create such a world (you would ban condoms in the Third World, for example). It has also been suggested that, on Utilitarian grounds, it might be moral to kill people to minimize pain (Asahara's 1992 sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway may have had some sort of rationalization like this).

5.13 Utilitarianism places moral importance on Consequences, not on Intentions
Suppose that Alice meets a runaway teenager, and decides to help her. Alice reasonably believes that giving Alice a bus ticket to go back to her home will help her, so buys her a ticket. Unfortunately, the bus is involved in a freak accident, and the runaway is killed; If actual consequences are what determine wrongness, then it was morally wrong for Alice to buy the bus ticket for this runaway. Opponents think that this result is absurd enough to refute Classical Utilitarianism.

Lecture 5 :What You Need To Know
You should be able to give a definition of Hedonistic Utilitarianism
You should be able to give a definition of Consequentialism
You should be able to understand the psychological assumptions, value assumptions and counterintuitive implications of Hedonistic Utilitarianism.
You should be able to offer counterarguments to Hedonistic Utilitarianism.
Readings:
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong “ Consequentialism ,” plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/
wsa@dartmouth.edu
Brad Hooker “ Rule Consequentialism ” plato.standord.edu/entries/consequentialism-rule/

Homework for Week 3
Think about the following case.
Imagine that each of five patients in a hospital will die without an organ transplant. The patient in room 1 needs a heart, the patient in room 2 needs a liver, the patient in room 3 eedgs a kidney, and so on. Also, the patient in room 1 is a critically acclaimed novelist, the patient in room 2 is a mother of five young children, and the patient in room 3 is a human rights activist. The person in room 6 is a tramp, and needs immediate assistance or he will die soon. Nobody knows the tramp, but his life seems quite unhappy and empty. Coincidentally, the tramp's organ tissue is compatible with that of the other patients.

Question 1.
What would be the consequences of the doctor allowing the patient to die, and transplanting his organs to save the other five patients?
Question 2.
Would this decision be in keeping with Act Utilitarianism?


Lecture 6
Utilitarianism: Problems and Suggestions
Summary of Objections to Utilitarianism, that appeal to its Counterintuitive Implications
1).CU does not acknowledge agent- relative duties
2).In evaluating actions, CU assigns no weight to the intentions behind them
3).CU says that it can be right to sacrafice one in order to save others
4).CU says that it can be right to harm one in order to benefit others
5).CU does not attach weight to considerations relating to justice; how the sum total of welfare is distributed is irrelevant
6).CU is too demanding, it says we should do things that can only be expected of saints
7).CU makes no distinction between acts and omissions.


6.1 Act Utilitarianism vs. Rule Utilitarianism
Act- Utilitarianism holds that the right action is that which brings 'the greatest good to the greatest number ' (note the double- maximand problem- you can't maximize both). As was clear from Lecture 5, this formulation brings up all sorts of problems, and has been rejected by many philosophers as being impractical.

As such, Rule- Utilitarianism has been proposed. According to Rule- Utilitarianism, the right action is that which is consistent with those rules which maximize utility. The corollary: Rule- Utilitarianism claim that an act is morally wrong if and only if it is forbidden by rules justified by their consequences.

Decision Procedure: In normal circumstances, people should decide what to do by applying rules whose acceptance would produce the best consequences. Examples of such rules: ‘don't harm innocent people,’ ‘don't steal or vandalize property, ’ ‘ don't break promises. ’

Objections to Rule- Utilitarianism
-Rule Utilitarianism collapses into Act Utilitarianism in Difficult Cases
It has been argued that Rule Utilitarianism can collapse into incoherence, as it can end up saying that an act is immoral though it maximizes the expected good. Examples: you lie to the secret police to save an innocent person from being killed, or you borrow your friend's money and send it all to charity. (Or: you borrow money from a total stranger and give it all to a charity).


6.2 Criterion of Rightness vs. Decision Making Procedure
There is a further option that a Utilitarian might have to save the theory. We could retain Utilitarianism as a theory of what moral rightness is, but not use it in decision making. Rule- Utilitarianism, or even Kantian ethics, might be used to make decisions, but what is morally right is defined by Act Utilitarianism. (That is, if someone accidentally causes unhappiness by following Utilitarianism, this does not contradict Utilitarianism, as Utilitarianism itself says that unhappiness is bad).
To make this distinction clear:

Classical Utilitarianism has two components:

Normative Component :
1). Act always so as to make the outcome best.

Evaluative Component:
2) Whether an outcome is better than other depends entirely on how much pleasure (and pain) it contains or brings about

Problems for Rule- Utilitarianism

Suppose that the best set of rules (those the universal adherence of which brings about the best consequences) involves an absolute prohibition against violence. That is, suppose that if everyone were to adhere to this rule, then the outcome would be best. Then it can never be right to use violence, according to rule utilitarianism.

Now, suppose also that one person does not in fact adhere to it, and as an effect causes enormous suffering. And suppose also that that person cannot be stopped unless we use violence. Then, intuitively, and contrary to what Rule Utilitarianism has to say, it is legitimate to use violence against him or her.


What You Need to Know
You should be able to explain the distinction between Act Utilitarianism and Rule Utilitarianism.
You should be able to explain how maximizing preference- satisfaction might make better sense than maximizing pleasure- satisfaction.
You should see that there is a danger, in difficult cases, of Rule Utilitarianism of collapsing into Act Utilitarianism.

Homework for Week 4
By now you should be thinking about Essay 1. As soon as you have time, please try to email me a brief outline of your essay for commentary, or bring it in during the office hour. We'll start Lecture 7 with an overview of the essay writing process. Essay 1 is due October 6th. Essay length is no less than 1000 words, and no more than 1,500 words.

Wednesday, September 27, 2006

Kant lectures- lectures 7 and 8

Lectures 7 and 8

Immanuel Kant ( 1724- 1804)



7.1 Main features of Kant’s Ethics:



Kant formulates ethical principles that respect the dignity and equality of human beings;



§ without presupposing theological claims



§ without presupposing a metaphysical concept of the good.





Kant felt that consequentialist ethics (in particular Utilitarianism)- is basically immoral.(He would refer to the “ serpent-windings of Utilitarianism”). This is because consequentialism not merely permits but requires that persons be used as mere means if this will produce good results. Kant's view is that the consequences of actions are simply not relevant to deciding whether an act is moral.



§ Kant’s ethical thought is deontological. (Etymology: from the Greek, deon, ‘obligation' or 'duty').This is simply the view that there are certain duties that one must do.



§ Kant attempted to codify some key aspects of Jewish - Christian notions of ethics and justice, in a clear and rational way.



7.2 Some central claims in Kant’s moral thought:



? Theological and Metaphysical grounds for Morality are not available to us. (This is based on Kant's theories of what we can and can't know, that is, his epistemology. This is a huge and complex topic in itself, but we don't have time to go into it in an ethics course. If you are interested, try looking at Kant's central work The Critique of Pure Reason).



?Reasons for action must be reasons for all. Ethical claims must be universalized.

? No- one must be used as a means to an end

?A person’s freedom and rationality must be respected.

? In universalizing ethical decision making, the theory (like any true morality) insists on impartiality.



( Note the assumption: people are essentially free and rational. Animals are not; therefore, they are not considered ethically relevant) .



7.3 The Categorical Imperative.



This is a more precise variant of the ‘Golden Rule’ principle as expressed in Confucius, Jesus, Rabbi Akiba, etc. The Golden Rule is ' do as to others as you would have done to yourself.’



Two famous formulations in Kant:(Both are in Rachels TRTTD:76-82 )



“Act only on that maxim (principle) through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law”RTTD:78









“...treat humanity...never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.” RTTD:81





How does the Categorical Imperative work?



7.4 The Universalizability Test.



Kant has a test that we can use tocheck if a decision is moral. A simple version it is: If you want to know what you are doing is right, turn your intention to act into a rule for everyone. This is called "universalising", because we are considering whether we can accept that our intention be acted on by everyone, universally. The result is that we will always act consistently, treating people and situations the same, and not making exceptions for ourselves. Kant thinks this follows from the application of reason. You know what a rule is (something that applies to everyone) therefore, you can "rule" yourself, by making sure that you act only in ways that everyone can act. According to Kant, all moral rules are of this form - they command categorically - no one can escape them by saying that they don't have a particular goal or desire. All moral rules are categorical imperatives - Kant's test is THE categorical imperative that grounds and justifies all the others. Notice that he seems to have succeeded in his "enlightenment project" of basing ordinary (Christian) moral rules on reason.



Another way of seeing how the categorical imperative is based on reason is to see that if we apply the same rule to everyone, we are free from inconsistency. Treating two people differently is like saying that they are the same (they are both rational beings) and they are not the same (we are treating them differently). This is a contradiction - like saying that right here and now it is both raining and not raining. (Formally, "P and not-P are both true.")



The full formal version of Kant's test is "Act only on that maxim which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." This is the first formulation of his Categorical Imperative. To be clear about what Kant is asking us to do here, we can rephrase the formulation as "Act only on that maxim which you can at the same time CONSISTENTLY OR RATIONALLY will to be a universal law."

The second formulation is "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person, or in the person of another, never simply as a means, but always at the same times as an end". A simple way of seeing the connection between the two is to see that we do not want others to treat us as "means" or tools for their purposes, (or slaves, for example) so, to be consistent, we can not treat others in this way either. This formulation of Kant's test reminds us what is (in his view) the only thing of ultimate value in the world - rational and free agents - and requires us to respect them and their self determination.



What does the first formulation mean? We will look at Kant's 4 examples of the use of the Categorical Imperative, and see that in each case, Kant means something slightly different by "consistently or rationally will".(In Rachels The Right Thing To Do pp.76-81).



1). The suicide example. p..78. (Perhaps there is a naturalistic fallacy here).

2). The false promise example p. 79

3). The talent neglect example. p.79 (this one is tricky. Would it really be a better world if everyone cultivated their talents?)

4). The helping others example. p.79



Is what Kant is saying here really an improvement on the Golden Rule? How has Kant made the obligation to help "inescapable?". The worry is that I might still be such a rugged individualist that I would never want or accept help in any form at all. Can the obligation to help others be escaped after all?





To recap- To use the test . . .

1.Identify your maxim (your intention for action)

2.Universalise – imagine the world in which everyone acts that way, as a “law”

3.Ask – are any contradictions generated?



7.5 Kant on Justice.



In Week 10 we will look at the issue of punishment. Their are two basic approaches to punishment; one is essentially Utilitarian, and the other is essentially deontological.Utilitarian philosophy tends to see all punishment as bad.Why? Because punishment causes pain. By contrast, Kant is a retributivist.. That is, he believes in the justice of retribution. He does not care that punishment increases, rather than decreases, the amount of suffering in the world. Nor does Kant care for rehabilitation ( which he would see as merely manipulative). Rehabilitation (that is, trying to correct, or reeducate the criminal) merely insults the criminal's intelligence, and treats him or her like a child.



According to Kant, Juridical punishment can never be administered merely as a means for promoting another good either with regard to the criminal himself or to civil society, but must in all cases be imposed only because the individual on whom it is inflicted has committed a crime. (You could think of what happens to Alex in the Stanley Kubrick film A Clockwork Orange, based on the novel by Anthony Burgess. Instead of merely punishing Alex for rape, the penal system uses brain surgery and drugs to alter his brain. After this 'therapy,' he feels sick whenever he thinks of being violent). Secondly, it is important to punish the criminal proportionately to the crime. Kant has this to say about punishment.





Even if a civil society resolved to dissolve itself with the consent of all its members- as might be supposed in the case of a people inhabiting an island resolving to separate and scatter throughout the whole world- the last murderer lying in prison ought to be executed before the resolution was carried out. This ought to be done in order that every one may realize the desert of his deeds, and that bloodguiltiness may not remain on the people; for otherwise they will all be regarded as participants in the murder as a public violation of justice. (Rachels EMP:137).



Kant’s theory of justice treats criminals as rational beings. That is, as a being capable of reasoning about his conduct and who freely decides what he will do, on the basis of his rational conception of what is best. Hence, a rational being is responsible for his actions. Punishment ( as opposed to ‘correction’) assumes that one not treat criminals as dumb animals.



To execute a murderer, for Kant, is to turn the murderer’s own Categorical Imperative upon themselves- their maxim being something like “ this is how one treats other people.” “ ...thus if we treat him in the same way in return, we are doing nothing more than treating him as he has decided people are to be treated” (Rachels p. 137).



What You Need to Know



You should be able to identify the main assumptions and principles of Kant's ethics

You should be able to explain the Categorical Imperative

You should be able to explain how to use the Universalizability Test

You should be able to understand the Kantian attitude towards capital punishment

For homework: please read the Kant excerpt at the end of this handout, and the Kant sections in the two Rachels books. If you're very keen, Robert Johnson's encyclopedia on Kant's ethics, 'Kant's Moral Philosophy," is available on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy website.

On Thursday I will give you a handout for writing philosophy essays, and will tell you what topics will be covered in the first test.





Lecture 8



Kant's Notion of the Good Person / Problems with Kant's Ethics



8.1 Kant's Conception of the Good Person



Kant's theory presupposes that the only way to be a moral person is to have the motive of duty. The good person, for Kant, is the person with the "good will" - i.e. having good motives or good intentions. A motive is only good if it is a motive to do the right action - to do your duty. Therefore, you have to know what the right action is ― what your duty is ― before you can say what a good person is. Duty is not what you are told to do by your parents or commanding officer, but what you work out yourself by universalising. For Kant, having the motive of duty is both necessary and sufficient for being a good person.(That is- Kant thinks that the motive of duty is all you need to be a good person). Is this true? We will look at some of Kant's counterexamples. (The text here is

Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, published in 1794. (available for free from Project Gutenberg; www.gutenberg.org/etext/5682). The relevant pages are reproduced at the end of this handout.



8.2 Counterexamples to the claim that the motive of duty is necessary for being a good person.





Kant considers, and rejects, four possible counter examples to this claim. If any of the people listed below turn out to be good people, though they lack the motive of duty, that would show Kant is wrong in his claim that the motive of duty is necessary for being a good person. These cases are very important, as Kant thinks that only duty is necessary to be moral. But is this true?



8.3 The virtuous person:



Kant claims that a person who has virtues is not a good person. The Greeks thought that a person was good if she had developed certain talents of mind and a character that disposed her to act well. The virtues that Kant mentions are intelligence, wit, judgment, courage, resolution, and constancy of purpose. But, Kant argues, having these virtues does not make you a good person, because they can be used for bad purposes. We could use our intelligence and courage and judgment to help us hold up banks and do all kinds of other evil things.



8.4 The person who produces good consequences:



Kant says that the intention to do your duty is good in itself, not because of what it produces. He argues that we value the good will more than we value good consequences by pointing out that we still esteem those who have good intentions but are unable to carry them out.



8.5 The person who acts out of self-interest:



Kant gives two examples of this kind of person: a shopkeeper who deals with his customers honestly because they will shop elsewhere if he doesn't and someone who preserves their life out of a natural interest in doing so, rather than because it is their duty. Kant doesn't give an argument for why acting from self-interest is not morally worthy. He thinks that we will all agree that self-interest is not a good motive for doing the right action.

Note: Some ethicists, such as Thomas Hobbes, or Robert Nozick, seem to have thought that ethics is only coordinated self- interest. Hence, Kant would say that this is not morality. Kant actually said that even devils would agree to a social contract if it was useful to them.





8.6 The naturally kind-hearted person:



For Kant, any action that proceeds from an emotion like natural sympathy or kindness cannot have any special moral worth. The act can be in accordance with duty, but unless it is also motivated by reason, it does not make you a good person. Kant thinks that the naturally kind person has no moral worth for two reasons. First, she is unreliable, second, she is not free. Let's think about this idea.



1) The "fickle or unreliable" objection.



Kant thinks that people motivated by feelings are unreliable, because their feelings are not reliable - they might lead them in the opposite direction. Kind-hearted people might be less than perfectly kind, firstly, when they have some problem of their own overshadowing their lives - like a death in the family. In this situation they might fail to be kind and loving when duty requires them to, because the emotion that underlies kind action would be blocked by feelings of mental or physical pain. Secondly, they may be less than perfectly kind when they are faced both with the needs of their own family and the needs of strangers. In this situation, the kind-hearted person would probably be partial, for their kind actions are based on emotion and this would be stronger for their own family than for others. Duty, however, which is based on reason and not emotion, would dictate impartiality. If we are following duty, then no matter what happens in our emotional life, reason will tell us to do the right thing. Emotions fluctuate but reason is constant. Reason, therefore, is the only thing on which we can base moral obligations that must always be obeyed.



2) The "not free" objection.



A person who is naturally kind is just lucky, according to Kant. They are kind because of the way they were brought up; because of their conditioning, we would now say. If this is true, then they have not chosen to be kind-hearted but have been determined to be so by external factors, for instance, their childhood environment. If one has not freely and consciously chosen to be kind, then being kind has no special moral worth. There is an interesting implication here: only people who could be bad can be truly good.

(a possible response: very dutiful people themselves might be culturally or genetically predisposed to duty).

It is important to note that Kant does NOT think that being kind hearted disqualifies you from being a good person - he merely claims that it is not enough on its own. A person who acts from kind heartedness may be a good person, if it is true that, in cases where their emotions do not lead them to act in accordance with duty, their reason “comes to the rescue” and leads them to act appropriately.



Discussion: Counter examples to the claim that the motive of duty is sufficient for being a good person



If we can argue that the people mentioned below do have the motive of duty, but are not good people, then we have shown that the motive of duty is not sufficient to make you a good person.



1) The cold hearted person. Kant uses the example of a man who has a cold temperament, has little sympathy for others and is indifferent to their sufferings. This man might be cold hearted, but he does his duty when required. Is he a good person? We might not call him a nice person, but mustn't we admit that at least he is a good person? Perhaps Kant is right, and having the motive of duty is sufficient.



(If we have any lingering doubts about this person being a good person, it might be because we mean something different than Kant by "good". We might mean not "a morally good person" but "a good example of a person".)



2) The person who makes mistakes about what their duty is.



First case. Imagine a man who whips his children for every little mistake they make. He firmly believes that he is doing the best for them because ‘sparing the rod will spoil the child ’ But he universalizes, and asks himself: " Can I accept that my intention to whip my children for their own good is a rule for everyone?" Now clearly this man would be perfectly happy for everyone else to whip their children, because it is best for them. He would even accept it being done to him as well. It seems he is acting from the motive of duty. He thinks he is doing his duty by his children and he has succeeded in universalizing his intention.



The person who chooses the wrong intention to universalize.





Imagine a member of Al Qaeda whose job is to blow up aeroplanes. Is he doing his duty? Well, it is his duty to Al qaeda to follow orders. But of course this is not what Kant means by duty. So can the terrorist universalise his intention? He asks himself if his intention to blow up this plane to further the cause of Al Qaeda could be a rule for everyone. Lets imagine that he would be quite happy for everyone in to world to blow up planes for Al Qaeda, even if that meant he or her family might be blown up too. If we accept the way he has conducted the universalisability test, we have to say that this person is a counter-example to the claim that acting from duty is sufficient to make you a good person.



But perhaps something has gone wrong in the test. He has chosen the wrong intention to universalize. The intention he used was the intention to blow up the plane to further the cause of Al Qaeda. Now the whole point of the universalisability test is to see if you are making exceptions for yourself. What he should be asking herself is "can I accept that everybody blows up planes in their own causes." He has posed the test in that way he then has to ask himself "can I accept that my family and I be blown up in the cause of, for instance, the State of Israel or the Aum Shinrikyo Cult." And the answer to that will probably be no. In this case it seems that he has not really acted from the motive of duty, and therefore his being a bad person does not challenge Kant’s claim that the motive of duty is sufficient for goodness.





If it is possible to make mistakes though, does that show that reason is not infallible? Do we need emotions to save us from mistakes in reasoning? Or would we be able to trust our reason if our negative emotions did not get in the way? Could emotion play some important role in detecting morally significant situations?

This is the basic question : what is more important in ethical decision making: reason, or the emotions? Kant's belief is that the emotions have no importance. Is this correct?



8.7 Criticisms of Kant's Ethics



?It's too formulaic, or rigidly uniform



?As it emphasises rights and justice, it neglects other ethical categories, such

as virtue, good character or good lives



?There is no guidance as to how to deal with conflicts amongst the duties. There is no acknowledgement for moral perplexity.





More specific problems:



?People may have different notions of the good, or which principles ought to be universalized.

(We have a split even within Utilitarian thinking concerning the good).



?The Universalizability maxim may lead to absurd consequences. A masochist, or nihilist, could will the end of the Human Race; the universalization of the maxim “do banking at precisely 3pm on Tuesdays” would cause frustration and chaos; paying off your credit card; ditto. This is called the The problem of trivial duties. Say you wanted to take all your money out of the bank this Friday, but wondered if it was moral to do so. Universalising your maxim would lead to a world where everyone took their money out of the bank at the same time, thus causing the banking system to collapse. You would be willing to use the banking system, and also that it collapses and becomes unusable - and this is a clear inconsistency. Is taking my money out of the bank then immoral? Surely not.



?A rugged and selfish individualist may prefer maxims that Kant would find disagreeable; ditto the suicidal person, or the person who prefers not to develop special talents. Kant assumes that such people are irrational. (Imagine what sorts of principles Mike Tyson, or Friedrich Nietzsche, or a Yakuza boss, might universalize). Is this necessarily true?



? Certain assumptions in Kant are open to question. Socialists might think that the notion of stealing is merely grounded on the rationalization of the self- interest of a privileged class. ( Why would the desperately poor not want to universalize a maxim of theft?)



?The issue of exceptionless rules. Kant thought that moral rules had to be exceptionless in order to be valid at all. His thought was, that if there was any situation in which a rule was not valid, then that showed that the rule was not a rule at all - because rule just means something that applies universally. So if there are any rules, then they must, by definition, be exceptionless. See The Case of the Inquiring Murderer (Rachels pp.124-125). (What could we add to the theory to fix this problem?)





What You Need To Know



You should be able to explain Kant's ideas concerning the qualities of the Good Person, who has the Motive of Duty

You should be able to explain some problems with Kant's scheme.

You should be able to explain Kant's notion of justice and retributivism.

You should be able to explain some problems with Kant's ethics in general.



NB: Kant is incredibly difficult to read, so don't worry if reading Kant isn't easy. Try reading a Japanese translation side by side with the English if you can find one.



The text below is just the first three pages of a 70- page book. (available for free from Project Gutenberg; www.gutenberg.org/etext/5682).



Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals (1794)





FIRST SECTION



TRANSITION FROM THE COMMON RATIONAL KNOWLEDGE



OF MORALITY TO THE PHILOSOPHICAL





[virtues can make a person a better villain, so cannot be the basis of morality].



Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good, without qualification, except a good will. Intelligence, wit, judgement, and the other talents of the mind, however they may be named, or courage, resolution, perseverance, as qualities of temperament, are undoubtedly good and desirable in many respects; but these gifts of nature may also become extremely bad and mischievous if the will which is to make use of them, and which, therefore, constitutes what is called character, is not good. It is the same with the gifts of fortune. Power, riches, honour, even health, and the general well-being and contentment with one's condition which is called happiness, inspire pride, and often presumption, if there is not a good will to correct the influence of these on the mind, and with this also to rectify the whole principle of acting and adapt it to its end. The sight of a being who is not adorned with a single feature of a pure and good will, enjoying unbroken prosperity, can never give pleasure to an impartial rational spectator. Thus a good will appears to constitute the indispensable condition even of being worthy of happiness.



[Kant seems to be saying here that you can't be truly happy unless you have a good will, but is this true?]



There are even some qualities which are of service to this good will itself and may facilitate its action, yet which have no intrinsic unconditional value, but always presuppose a good will, and this qualifies the esteem that we justly have for them and does not permit us to regard them as absolutely good. Moderation in the affections and passions, self-control, and calm deliberation are not only good in many respects, but even seem to constitute part of the intrinsic worth of the person; but they are far from deserving to be called good without qualification, although they have been so unconditionally praised by the ancients. For without the principles of a good will, they may become extremely bad, and the coolness of a villain not only makes him far more dangerous, but also directly makes him more abominable in our eyes than he would have been without it.



[Why a good will is good even if a person is too powerless to actually help anyone]



A good will is good not because of what it performs or effects, not by its aptness for the attainment of some proposed end, but simply by virtue of the volition; that is, it is good in itself, and considered by itself is to be esteemed much higher than all that can be brought about by it in favour of any inclination, nay even of the sum total of all inclinations. Even if it should happen that, owing to special disfavour of fortune, or the niggardly provision of a step-motherly nature, this will should wholly lack power to accomplish its purpose, if with its greatest efforts it should yet achieve

nothing, and there should remain only the good will (not, to be sure, a mere wish, but the summoning of all means in our power), then, like a jewel, it would still shine by its own light, as a thing which has its whole value in itself. Its usefulness or fruitfulness can neither add nor take away anything from this value. It would be, as it were, only the setting to enable us to handle it the more conveniently in common commerce, or to attract to it the attention of those who are not yet connoisseurs, but not to recommend it to true connoisseurs, or to determine its value.



There is, however, something so strange in this idea of the absolute value of the mere will, in which no account is taken of its utility, that notwithstanding the thorough assent of even common reason to the idea, yet a suspicion must arise that it may perhaps really be the product of mere high-flown fancy, and that we may have misunderstood the purpose of nature in assigning reason as the governor of our will. Therefore we will examine this idea from this point of view.



In the physical constitution of an organized being, that is, a being adapted suitably to the purposes of life, we assume it as a fundamental principle that no organ for any purpose will be found but what is also the fittest and best adapted for that purpose. Now in a being which has reason and a will, if the proper object of nature were its conservation, its welfare, in a word, its happiness, then nature would have hit upon a very bad arrangement in selecting the reason of the creature to carry out this purpose. For all the actions which the creature has to perform with a view to this purpose,



and the whole rule of its conduct, would be far more surely prescribed to it by instinct, and that end would have been attained thereby much more certainly than it ever can be by reason. Should reason have been communicated to this favoured creature over and above, it must only have served it to contemplate the happy constitution of its nature, to admire it, to congratulate itself thereon, and to feel thankful for it to the beneficent cause, but not that it should subject its desires to that weak and delusive guidance and meddle bunglingly with the purpose of nature. In a word, nature would have taken care that reason should not break forth into practical exercise, nor have the presumption, with its weak insight, to think out for itself the plan of happiness, and of the means of attaining it. Nature would not only have taken on herself the choice of the ends, but also of the means, and with wise foresight would have entrusted both to instinct.







[Reason does not make us happy- so reason must be for some other purpose, such as helping us to be good people].



And, in fact, we find that the more a cultivated reason applies itself with deliberate purpose to the enjoyment of life and happiness, so much the more does the man fail of true satisfaction. And from this circumstance there arises in many, if they are candid enough to confess it, a certain degree of misology, that is, hatred of reason, especially in the case of those who are most experienced in the use of it, because after calculating all the advantages they derive, I do not say from the invention of all the arts of common luxury, but even from the sciences (which seem to them to be after all only a luxury of the understanding), they find that they have, in fact, only brought more trouble on their shoulders, rather than gained in happiness; and they end by envying, rather than despising, the more common stamp of men who keep closer to the guidance of mere instinct and do not allow their reason much influence on their conduct. And this we must admit, that the judgement of those who would very much lower the lofty eulogies of the advantages which reason gives us in regard to the happiness and satisfaction of life, or who would even reduce them below zero, is by no means morose or ungrateful to the goodness with which the world is governed, but that there lies at the root of these judgements the idea that our existence has a different and far nobler end, for which, and not for happiness, reason is properly intended, and which must, therefore, be regarded as the supreme condition to which the private ends of man must, for the most part, be postponed.



For as reason is not competent to guide the will with certainty in regard to its objects and the satisfaction of all our wants (which it to some extent even multiplies), this being an end to which an implanted instinct would have led with much greater certainty; and since, nevertheless, reason is imparted to us as a practical faculty, i.e., as one which is to have influence on the will, therefore, admitting that nature generally in the distribution of her capacities has adapted the means to the end, its true destination must be to produce a will, not merely good as a means to something else, but good in itself, for which reason was absolutely necessary. This will then, though not indeed the sole and complete good, must be the supreme good and the condition of every other, even of the desire of happiness. Under these circumstances, there is nothing inconsistent with the wisdom of nature in the fact that the cultivation of the reason, which is requisite for the first and unconditional purpose, does in many ways interfere, at least in this life, with the attainment of the second, which is always conditional, namely, happiness. Nay, it may even reduce it to nothing, without nature thereby failing of her purpose. For reason recognizes the establishment of a good will as its highest practical destination, and in attaining this purpose is capable only of a satisfaction of its own proper kind, namely that from the attainment of an end, which end again is determined by reason only, notwithstanding that this may involve many a disappointment to the ends of inclination.



We have then to develop the notion of a will which deserves to be highly esteemed for itself and is good without a view to anything further, a notion which exists already in the sound natural understanding, requiring rather to be cleared up than to be taught, and which in estimating the value of our actions always takes the first place and constitutes the condition of all the rest. In order to do this, we will take the notion of duty, which includes that of a good will, although implying certain subjective restrictions and hindrances. These, however, far from concealing it, or rendering it unrecognizable, rather bring it out by contrast and make it shine forth so much the brighter.