Lectures 11 and 12 Virtue Ethics
Lectures 11 and 12
Lecture 11: Virtue Ethics and Aristotle
References:
Marcia Homiak “Moral Character” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-character/
Rosalind Hursthouse “Virtue Ethics” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/
Plato The Republic trans. Benjamin Jowett. http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.html
Plato Gorgias http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/gorgias/html
Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics trans. W.D.Ross http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.html
(note spelling error in URL).
11.1 Opening Questions
a). Thinking of Kant.
Kant thought that any virtues would not make you a good person. Instead, he argued that virtues could merely make somebody a better villain. Which ones, do you think, could be ‘used for evil?’ Which ones are incorruptible? Which ones are prone to becoming vices in excess?
c). The Question of Moral Motivation
The ‘visiting the ill friend’ case. Imagine that you are thanking a friend for visiting you in hospital. She replies, “oh, it was nothing. It was obvious that morality required me to come” (Rachels p.185). What do we make of this example? And is it really a big moral issue? (Perhaps think of some ‘morally demanding’ profession, such as emergency services, the police, or the medical professions). Do we need to want to be good, or actually like the people we help, for us to be truly moral? Or is this asking too much? (Perhaps it’s the other way round- perhaps the man in the example is morally good because he isn’t a close friend- he’s just tactless for admitting as much).
d). What is Flourishing?
-How much of your answer depended on morality?
(Can there be a non- moral definition of flourishing?)
-Is flourishing subjective? I.e., can you think that you are flourishing, even if you aren’t?
Does this still hold even if you are (according to deontological or Utilitarian ethics) completely evil?
e). Who is more morally praiseworthy – the person who does the right thing from a learned character disposition to do it? Or the person who apprehends the right thing to do, struggles against their desires and ends up doing the right thing?
f). List some admirable people. What virtues (if any) do/ did they embody? Do/did they have any vices? Would Aristotle say that they were virtuous?
g). What are the traditional Japanese virtues? Have virtues in Japan changed in the course of the 20th Century, do you think? If so, is this change good, or for the worse?
11.2 What is Virtue Ethics?
Three kinds of ethical theory:
Centering respectively on consequences, rights, and virtues.
That is, each theory concerns of the bearer of ethical value as the good state of affairs, right action, and the good person. Virtue ethics is more concerned with the psychological (and social) embodiment in individual disposition of action, thought & emotional action.
Kant approaches ethics by ‘respecting’ people, or ‘being consistent with’ rationality.
Utilitarianism approaches ethics through ‘promoting’ or ‘maximizing’ utility.
Virtue Ethics approaches moral issues by promoting the embodying of virtue.
Basic claim: Virtue Ethics says that to understand ethics we must understand what character traits make someone a good person.
We find out what the right action is, by seeing what the virtuous person would do.
What is a Virtue?
Rachels: A virtue ethics will:
1). Explain what a virtue is
2). Give a list of what the virtues are
3). Give an explanation of what the virtue consists in.
Rachels defines a virtue as “ a trait of character, manifested in habitual action, which is good for a person to have.” (Rachels EMP: 176).
“A virtue such as honesty or generosity is not just a tendency to do what is honest or generous, nor is it to be helpfully specified as a “desirable” or “morally valuable” character trait. It is, indeed, a character trait- that is, a disposition which is well entrenched in its possessor, something that, as we say, “goes all the way down…” but the disposition in question, far from being a single track disposition to do honest actions…is multi- track. It is concerned with many other actions as well, with emotions and emotional reactions, choices, values, desires, perceptions, attitudes, interests, expectations, and sensibilities. To possess a virtue is to be a certain sort of person with a certain complex mindset. (Hursthouse “Virtue Ethics,” 2003).
Virtue Ethics is (allegedly) built into our language
Rosalind Hursthouse writes:
Much invaluable information concerning action guidance comes from avoiding courses of action that would be considered irresponsible, feckless, lazy, inconsiderate, uncooperative, harsh, intolerant, selfish, mercenary, indiscreet, tactless, arrogant, unsympathetic, cold, incautious, unenterprising, pusillanimous, feeble, presumptuous, rude, hypocritical, self- indulgent, materialistic, grasping, short sighted,…and so on.
(Hursthouse “Virtue Ethics”).
Aside:
Ayn Rand, Jean- Paul Sartre, Karl Marx, John Stuart Mill, Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, Michel Foucault, David Hume can be said to have written of an ethics of virtue (all of whom having spoken vaguely of ethics, yet none of whom wrote a code of conduct, as it were).
11.4 Virtue Ethics as a Response to the Shortcomings of Normative Ethics
Modern ethical theories commonly hold that the task of moral theory was to come up with a code consisting of universal rule or principle which would have the following features:
a). The rules would provide a decision- making procedure for determining what the right
action was in any particular case
b). The rules would be stated so that any non- virtuous person would understand and be able
to apply them.
A number of philosophers felt that such a theory was impossible. In medical ethics in particular- such factors as moral sensitivity, perception, imagination, judgment- Phronesis-(practical wisdom)- are widely considered more important than just rule- following.
A virtue- centered ideal was proposed as a substitute to Kantian and Utilitarian ethics. The idea was that moral people (‘agents’) should be moved directly to do the right thing by their emotional concern for others. A ‘morality of duty’ (i.e. that of Kant) is said to pay insufficient attention to the ‘inner life.’ The dutiful agent is not merely doing, but feeling enough, to qualify as a moral person. (This is ironic, given that Kant is criticized for being too demanding).
Discussion: is this plausible, or reasonable? That people should have the right feelings? Does a nurse, a policeman, or a lawyer need to be emotionally connected to every client, every patient?)
G.E.M. (Elizabeth) Anscombe (1909-2001), in her 1958 essay “Modern Moral Philosophy,” declared all modern ethical theory bankrupt. She believed that it was a mistake for a morality to be grounded on legalistic notions such as ‘obligation’ or ‘duty’ in the context of a general disbelief in the existence of a general lawgiver (that is, God), as the source of such obligations. (This was ironic- Anscombe was a strict Roman Catholic). (You might want to discuss whether this is a valid view- perhaps the source of laws in deontology is a ‘general will,’ or ‘the community.’ Hobbes certainly didn’t believe in a ‘general lawgiver.’). Consequently, Anscombe argued that a moral psychology should replace moral philosophy.
According to Anscombe, one must start with the question as to what it means for a person to flourish or live well. This entailed returning to the ancient Greek moralists, in particular Aristotle and Plato. The central question for them was not what rules to follow, but what virtues to cultivate.
The central questions of ethics then become: what is the nature of virtue? (or what we might think of as an admirable moral character), how does one become virtuous (is it taught? Or does it arise naturally? And are we responsible for its development?) and the institutions that make the development of virtue possible. (That is: should, or can, virtue be taught in schools?)
11.5 Aristotle: Background
Aristotle (384-322 BCE)- a student of Plato- is unquestionably one of the fathers of Western philosophy and the Western worldview in general. He wrote on physics, poetry, zoology, logic, rhetoric, politics, government, ethics, and biology.
Socrates (470-399 BCE) was Aristotle’s teacher. We will discuss Socrates with regards to the question concerning the relationship between flourishing and virtue.
11.6 Telos and Aristotle’s Theory of Human Nature
Aristotle’s Worldview.
According to Aristotle, the whole universe (the Cosmos) has a unifying Telos (variously translated as ‘aim’ or ‘purpose’ or ‘end,’ or ‘reason for something’s existence’). (A Teleology is a theory that says that everything was created for a purpose. If you believe in teleology, you will believe that your eye was designed by someone or something so that it would let you see things, and so on. Christianity is teleological; Darwinism is not). All of the component parts of the universe, for Aristotle, fit together into a coherent whole. Human nature is tied to the telos of humans. Different humans have different talents and aims and purposes, but these are to be understood as different variations on a basic human nature, and a single goal. The telos of human beings is happiness (in Greek: Eudaimonia). Happiness is an in itself, desired for its own sake, But to be truly happy requires that we cultivate ourselves to be excellent. The function of man is to live the kind of life that follows a rational principle in “accordance with its proper excellence.” (Rachels TRTTD: 38).
Main Characteristics of Human Nature, for Aristotle:
Aristotle thought that humans had the following traits:
1). A capacity for political life (we are social, gregarious animals)
2). A capacity for speech
3). A capacity for practical reason or morality (a sense of good, or evil)
4). A capacity for theoretical reason (philosophical reflection, the highest and distinct expression of human nature).
Implications of this view of human nature:
Not all humans will display these characteristics equally, but the more a person neglects these dimensions of life, the more likely they will deform or corrupt their own human nature and decrease their chances of cultivating human excellence.
Natural Hierarchies
Aristotle sees humans as being divided according to several natural hierarchies. Women, for Aristotle, are essentially incomplete, imperfect men. Aristotle thought that slaves and masters had the following properties:
Women Men
-passive, reproductive role -active role in reproduction
in reproduction
Their Telos is to obey Their Telos is to rule
Slaves Masters
have a strong body but -have foresight
not much foresight; -good at giving sensible
good at following orders orders
Their Telos is to obey Their Telos is to rule
Both groups- women and men, or slaves and masters- need each other “by nature.” But one of the groups is thought of as being naturally superior to the other. (Obviously, this is open to question- how do we know that this arrangement is natural and not just conventional?)
This elitism is obvious if we read Aristotle in the original (Rachels RTTD: 37-43).
11.7 Aristotle and Virtue (Arête)
The rationality of virtue lies in the agent’s Eudaimonia (‘happiness’ or ‘well-being’). Since my Eudaimonia consist in the exercise of the virtues, I have no reason to live a non- virtuous life.
For Aristotle, virtue is a trait of character manifested in habitual action.
The term he uses is not in fact ‘virtue’ but êthikai aretai, or arête- “excellences of character.” The “excellences of character” are a combination of qualities that make an individual the sort of ethically admirable person he is (I would write “he or she,” but apparently Aristotle did not think that women could be excellent, therefore virtuous). The connection with telos is as follows: the “excellences of character” are representations of the fullest development of human beings.
Humans are “rational and social beings who need the company of other people.”
We live in communities among friends, family and fellow citizens.
In the case of honesty, for example, one is honest ‘as a matter of course.’ Honesty “springs from a firm and unchangeable character.”
Courage. As with the other virtues for Aristotle, courage is a balance between excess and deficiency.
Cowardice-----------courage-----------------foolhardiness
In the case of Generosity, a problem arises. For Aristotle, morality consists in hitting the mean between having too much of a character trait, and having too little. The virtue of generosity, therefore, sits in a continuum between stinginess and extravagance.
Stinginess------------generosity------ ---extravagance
Question: How much is too much, or not enough? Rachels notes that this depends on what morality you already presuppose. In other words, it depends on who you ask. Virtue Ethics alone (allegedly) won’t tell you which one.
Hobbes: There is no obligation to be charitable. You should just follow society’s rules.
Utilitarianism: give away all you possibly can
Kant: it depends on what you would expect others to do for you.
Rachels: virtues “are needed to conduct our lives well.”
Assumption: humans are “rational and social beings who need the company of other people.”
Aristotle defines excellences of character, or virtue, as follows:
Excellence of character, then, is a state concerned with choice, lying in a mean relative to us, this being determined by reason and in the way in which the man of practical wisdom would determine it. Now it is a mean between two vices, that which depends on excess and that which depends on defect. (Rachels RTTD:43).
Virtuous action is action at the right time, in the right circumstances, in the right manner, with respect to the right people, as judged by a person virtue.
Further, for Aristotle, your emotional reaction and your reasoning must be in harmony. Your emotions (the non- rational part of the soul) must “speak with the same voice.”
11.8 Phronesis (Practical Wisdom).
Hursthouse notes that “even many deontologists now stress the point that their action- guiding rules cannot reliably be applied correctly without practical wisdom.”
One can fall short of full virtue by lacking Phronesis.
Hursthouse again: “Adults are culpable if the mess things up by being thoughtless, insensitive, reckless, impulsive, shortsighted, and by assuming that what suits them will suit everyone instead of taking a more objective viewpoint.”
11.9 Eudaimonia (Flourishing, or Happiness)
For Aristotle, the rationality of virtue lies in its promotion of the agent’s flourishing, or Eudaimonia.
Since my happiness consists only in the exercise of the virtues, I have no reason to live a non- virtuous life.
To be virtuous means living in accordance with those principles that obtain ‘goods for the soul.’ Aristotle concedes that ‘virtue’ is similar to ‘wisdom’ or simply ‘prudence.’
When we are living well, we are worthy of imitation and admiration.
A happy life is one lived by rational people who act virtuously and who are not simply passive victims (or beneficiaries) of circumstances.
Good character traits are strong and enduring- they are products of learning and cultivation.
Virtuous activity perfects human life.
Rachels defines virtues as “traits of character that are good to have.” Rachels discusses four virtues and explains why they are good to have.
Courage: it is necessary to deal with life
Generosity: people need help from each other
Honesty: It is necessary for harmonious human relationships
Loyalty: it is necessary for friendship.
Virtues for Social Life
Basically, we must be good friends in order to have good friends. In general, the virtuous life is the good life. Rachels insists that “obviously, the point is not that the virtuous [person] will be richer,” but you might want to debate if that is really true. The point of Eudaimonia is that we are ethical so that our lives are better.
Three virtues discussed in Aristotle, specifically for friendship:
-generosity
-friendliness
-mildness of temper
The Virtue of Self- Actualization
(Being as good as you can become).
We take pleasure from self- realizing activity. Further, according to Aristotle, everyone is responsible for how well they express their true character.
Virtue is Not Enough to secure Happiness
According to Aristotle, virtue alone does not make one happy. This suggests that it is not some sort of ‘moral perfection’ that makes one happy. Happiness requires certain “external goods.”(To do “fine deeds,” he tells us, requires friends, wealth, and political influence. Happiness also requires personal beauty, and good ancestry. Consequently, if you are of “low birth,” or have “worthless children,” you can’t be happy. (Rachels: TRTTD: 40).
How does this idea contrast with Buddhist, or Christian teaching?
Question: Is the pursuit of Eudaimonia really moral? Or is it merely egoistic? Does it matter?
10.10 Moral Weakness (Akrasia)
Aristotle assumes that people do bad things because of a weakness of will (‘akrasia’). Each vice is thought of as the absence of the restraining influence of virtue, together with some natural self- centered motive. Cowardice is the absence of courage, to give in to fear. Self- indulgence is the disposition to give into bodily pleasure, and so on.
Problems:
Perhaps Aristotle’s psychology is simplistic here. (Along with his Doctrine of the Mean). The lack of concern for other people is considered completely ‘off the scale’- a form of beastliness or brutality that is simply not considered human. (Question: does it help in our understanding of evil people to simply describe them as sub- human?)
The problem is this- Aristotle’s ethics has no room for a concept of viciousness or sadism. The worst sort of person he can imagine is a sort of obsessed, unscrupulous hedonist. If we think of vices as mere failings, we seem to have failed to account for evil people who are not merely weak.
WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW
You should be able to explain Aristotle’s conceptions of telos (purpose), phronesis (practical reason) Eudaimonia (flourishing) and arête (excellence).
Discussion question for Lecture 12:
Is Kim Jong- Il Happy, do you think? Why, or why not?
Lecture 12
Problems with Virtue Ethics/ Can The Wicked Flourish?
12.1 The Cultural Relativism Problem
Every culture has its own notion of virtue. So how can Virtue Ethics avoid just telling us to do what is expected of our culture?
Reply: Arguably, both deontology and Utilitarianism have the same problem.
(Firstly, I don’t see how deontology has this problem, although Utilitarianism has to deal with cultural differences as to what is considered fun or pleasurable. Secondly, even if other theories have this problem, it’s still a problem for virtue ethics).
Martha Nussbaum (1988): much cultural disagreement arises from local understanding of the virtues, but the virtues themselves are not relative to culture. (This assumes some “universal virtue theory”). Rachels argues this. He says that every culture has, and needs, some sort of notion of virtue; something like the virtue of self control; something like the virtue of courage, etc. But variations of what these principles are, and whether they are important moral principles at all, vary considerably.
Question: can Virtue Ethics ground a critique of social practices and traditions that appear to be immoral or just plain evil.
12.2 The A- Historical Problem
We find that there is a big difference in the virtues of different Western societies. Cultural virtue- assumptions are different to some extent between Christians and Jews. Rachels discusses some of these differences. For St. Augustine, Rule of Law comes first. During the Renaissance, Divine Law became Moral Law. At some point during this transition, the question “what is the right thing to do?” became distinct from the question “what traits of moral character make somebody a good person?” Hence- the emergence of theories of rightness and obligation.
To illustrate this problem- below are the Seven Deadly Sins of early Christian teachings, together with the Seven Holy Virtues.
Vices: Avastia – avarice/ greed
Luxuria luxury
Invidia envy
Gula gluttony
Ira wrath
Acedia sloth
Virtues: Chastity
Abstinence
Liberality (generosity)
Diligence
Patience
Kindness
Humility
By contrast, Aristotle thought that one important virtue was megalopsuchia, “greatness of soul.” This is something like a grand social manner, rather than anything we would now consider a virtue. Aristotle did not consider kindness a virtue at all, and his concept of ‘fairness’ is almost entirely a legal and political notion. What Aristotle considers the ethics of truthfulness is concerned almost exclusively with boasting and modesty.
Later versions of Virtue Ethics only reinforce the contingent, historically shifting notion of virtue. St. Thomas Aquinas (an important Christian philosopher) modified Aristotle’s set of virtues to suit Christian teachings, and, at the end of the 18th Century, David Hume proposed a set of virtues to directly attack those of Christianity.
12.3 The Conflict Problem.
A friend comes to see you, and her haircut is terrible. She asks, “does this look good on me?” Do you lie to her to keep her happy? Or do you tell the truth? Virtue Ethics emphasizes acting appropriately in a given situation, according to practical wisdom. But that just sounds like empty banalities, like “be nice” and “use common sense” and “ be good.”
12.4 The Justification Problem
In English, the same concept can have both positive and negative terms- “being careful with money” can be described as either ‘miserly’ or ‘thrifty’ or ‘economic’ or ‘mean.’ Does Japanese have the same moral ambiguities?
Other ambiguities:
The case of the Nazi Soldier. Suppose a Nazi soldier fights with bravery. Does he really have the virtue of courage? Peter Geach doesn’t think so (Rachels EMP: 117). Why not? His argument seems to be something like this:
Morality consists in having the virtues (i.e. courage)
The Nazi soldier is not moral
The Nazi soldier does not have the virtues, including that of courage
Why not this argument?
Morality consists in having the virtues (i.e. courage)
The Nazi soldier is courageous
Therefore, the Nazi soldier is virtuous
The premise “the Nazi soldier is not moral” presupposes some moral principle- so what is it? (If we ask the soldier in question whether he thinks he is being moral, he will probably tell us that he thinks that he is moral indeed. The Nazis were obsessed with explaining and justifying their acts in terms of a return to the ‘warrior- virtues’ of the pre- Christian Germans).
Which Character Traits are Actually Virtues?
Humility- whether it is a virtue or not depends on the circumstances. Aristotle would agree. But there are bigger problems when we consider the ‘virtues’ as described by other Greek philosophers. The Stoic philosopher Epictetus (c.55-135)- argued that the death of one’s family members is no real loss and is no worse than the breaking of a cup. The Stoics had a notion of virtue independent of any particular social or political structure. Were they simply wrong?
Think also of people who are both made great and destroyed by the same character traits- the characters in Shakespeare’s tragedies, or Howard Hughes or Stanley Kubrick (whose obsessive attention to detail both created great work yet also made them incredibly unpleasant and difficult to work with).
12.5 Can an Ethics be grounded on a Theory of Human Nature?
Aristotle’s claims concerning Eudaimonia are based on assumptions concerning human nature. Arguably, people who follow Aristotle’s virtue ethics are relying on his notion of teleology (which has been discredited), or they are rationalizing their own personal or cultural values.
Reply: The best science of today (evolutionary theory, psychology) supports the ancient Greek assumptions- that we are social animals, and we need to live together, subjugating our egoistic desires in order to live harmoniously.
Deeper Problem: There are both nice aspects to human nature, and nasty aspects. (remember Hobbes!). We can’t just base a theory of morality on human nature, without deciding on what is ‘nice’ and what is ‘nasty.’ Without some moral guideline in place beforehand, we could end up making ‘virtues’ of aggressive, destructive instincts and potentials. (We will discuss Nietzsche with this problem in mind in Week 8).
12.6 Isn’t Virtue Ethics just Egoism?
Allegedly, VE collapses into Ethical Egoism (that is, “do whatever is best for you.”). Once again, Rachels defines the virtues as “traits of character which are good [for you] to have.” So the motive seems clearly to be self- interested.
Reply:
Acquiring virtues is a two- stage process.
1). You seek the virtue because it leads to your flourishing (egoistic motive)
2). Once you have the virtue, you act from it, not from self- interest, in fact if
you act out of self- interest you won’t act virtuously.
Reply: Rachels assumes that flourishing is your motivation for virtue, not just a way of defining virtue. To say flourishing of the agent makes the trait a virtue “ does not mean that flourishing of the agent is the motivation of the agent.
Reply: Against Kant: is self- interest really so bad?
12.7 The Elitism Problem
If (for Aristotle) virtue is to fully realize one’s true and full human potential, we have an elitism problem. That is, only a handful of people actually get to spend all of their time cultivating their special talents. Many people (in particular women and ‘slaves,’ working class people) “often endure low- paying, dead- end jobs that encourage feelings of self- hatred” (Marcia Homiak, “Moral Character”). Aristotle’s ethic is in effect incredibly elitist- only the very wealthy and powerful can be truly “excellent.” (Question: is there still something of benefit in his theory, nevertheless?)
12.8 The Guidance Problem
Deontology and Utilitarianism are theories that aim to systematize our principles and rules of action in ways that will, supposedly, help us to see what to do or to recommend in particular cases. A theory of virtue cannot do this: the theory itself says that what one needs in order to do and recommend the right things are virtues.
There is no independent account of right action. Instead, it focuses on good character, rather than on right action. Therefore, it is incomplete. We could try reinterpreting actions in terms of the virtues (something like “ the act is right if it is what a virtuous person would do”). But this does not seem to answer even the most basic questions. For example: “what’s wrong with lying?”
Any answer we give will be either in terms of Ethical Egoism, Utilitarianism, or Contract Theory.
‘Soft’ Virtue Ethics is one reply (Rachels p. 187). Soft VE: Right Action theory (deontology or Utilitarianism) plus Virtue Ethics; “a better account of right action.”
12.9 Can The Wicked Flourish?
Aristotle thought that any non- virtuous person is plagued by inner doubt or conflict, even if, on the surface, they seem as happy and relaxed as any virtuous person. Although a vicious person may appear to be happily disdainful of justice, and content to pursue pleasure and wealth, he will still have to keep the company of other people to try to forget their own immoral lifestyle. In the Nicomachean Ethics Book IX chapter 4, Aristotle says that immoral people do not love themselves and are in inner conflict. That is, they hate themselves. Virtuous people, on the other hand, enjoy who they are and take pleasure in being virtuous.
The question is addressed in more dramatic fashion in Plato’s Republic. Socrates discusses morality and politics with two debate partners, Thrasymachus and Glaucon. Glaucon and Thrasymachus argue that ethics is merely conventional, and that they would be happiest if they became immoral dictators, stealing power and having a life of self- indulgence. Socrates gives a thoughtful reply. The tyrant would have access to base physical pleasures to his heart’s content, Socrates agrees, but he argues that this is a low- quality sort of pleasure, the sort that only “commoners” indulge in (think of Mill’s distinction here). To indulge only in sex, food, wine and getting into fights (Socrates’s examples) is, allegedly, to allow oneself to become a victim of the worst aspect of one’s nature- described by Socrates as a great dragon- lion creature who is insensitive of any idea of decency- a creature we come to know in our dreams, who wishes to have sex with the Gods (or worse)- who wishes to kill, or eat forbidden food. Socrates explains to Glaucon:
“I think that some of the unnecessary pleasures and desires are lawless and violent. Perhaps we are all born with them, but they are disciplined by law and combination of reason and better desires till in some people they are got rid of altogether, or rendered few and feeble, though in some they retain their numbers and strength.”
“What desires do you mean?”
“The sort that wake while we are asleep, when the reasonable and humane part of us is asleep and its control relaxed, and our fierce bestial nature, full of blood and drink, rouses itself…as you know, there is nothing too bad for it and it’s completely lost to all sense and shame. It doesn’t shrink from attempting intercourse (as it supposes) with a mother or anyone else, man, beast, or god, or from murder or eating forbidden food. There is, in fact, no folly or shamelessness it will not commit.
(Plato The Republic trans. Desmond Lee, Penguin London 1990 p.392).
Although Socrates describes this aspect as being a part of all of us,. He thinks that to give in to its demands is to become enslaved, and to allow the divine part of ourselves to be starved. Further, owing to the tyrant’s social arrangements, he will by necessity be surrounded by rather crude and horrible people; anyone of quality would be driven away, or will present competition. You would have no real friends- just people who are frightened of you or people who want your money. Therefore, a totally immoral lifestyle would be incompatible with the basic human needs of living in a community and abiding by its social rules. Crime, it is argued, is contrary to our nature as social beings. As Voltaire puts it, “the wicked have only accomplices, the voluptuous have companions in debauchery, self- seekers have associates, princes have courtiers. Only the virtuous have friends.” Voltaire Philosophical Dictionary trans. Theodore Besterman , London: Penguin, 1992 p.29.
Question: What is flourishing?
-How much of your answer depended on morality?
(Can there be a non- moral definition of flourishing?)
-Is flourishing subjective? I.e., can you think that you are flourishing, even if you aren’t?
Does this still hold even if you are (according to deontological or Utilitarian ethics) completely evil?
Responses:
One could maintain that wicked people don’t really flourish, only virtuous people really flourish.
(Is this plausible?)
Think of Gaugin, Nietzsche, etc).
Is there a core set of virtues that are necessary to flourish?
12.10 The Ethics of Excellence: Discussion Questions
a). Is Kim Jong- Il happy? If so, does this cause problems with taking Aristotle’s ethics and theory of human nature seriously? Responses:
Remember the question posed at the beginning of the last lecture- what is flourishing?
One possible answer: wicked people don’t really flourish, only virtuous people really flourish.
(Is this plausible?)
Think of Gaugin, Nietzsche, etc).
b). At present, there is no “political virtue ethics”- that is, no professional, academic philosopher has written a virtue ethics for politicians. What virtues do you think a politician should have? And would having such virtues guarantee that they would be a good politician?
WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW
You should be able to explain some of the shortcomings of Virtue Ethics, in particular the incompleteness problem and the egoism problem.
You should be able to explain the question as to whether the wicked can flourish.
Questions for Lectures 14 and 15 (Nietzsche)
b). Genealogy of Morals.
Why did Greek virtue ethics die out, and why did Jewish and Christian moral principles take over in European society, do you think? We will discuss this question in week 8, when we discuss Nietzsche.
Lecture 11: Virtue Ethics and Aristotle
References:
Marcia Homiak “Moral Character” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-character/
Rosalind Hursthouse “Virtue Ethics” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/
Plato The Republic trans. Benjamin Jowett. http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.html
Plato Gorgias http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/gorgias/html
Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics trans. W.D.Ross http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.html
(note spelling error in URL).
11.1 Opening Questions
a). Thinking of Kant.
Kant thought that any virtues would not make you a good person. Instead, he argued that virtues could merely make somebody a better villain. Which ones, do you think, could be ‘used for evil?’ Which ones are incorruptible? Which ones are prone to becoming vices in excess?
c). The Question of Moral Motivation
The ‘visiting the ill friend’ case. Imagine that you are thanking a friend for visiting you in hospital. She replies, “oh, it was nothing. It was obvious that morality required me to come” (Rachels p.185). What do we make of this example? And is it really a big moral issue? (Perhaps think of some ‘morally demanding’ profession, such as emergency services, the police, or the medical professions). Do we need to want to be good, or actually like the people we help, for us to be truly moral? Or is this asking too much? (Perhaps it’s the other way round- perhaps the man in the example is morally good because he isn’t a close friend- he’s just tactless for admitting as much).
d). What is Flourishing?
-How much of your answer depended on morality?
(Can there be a non- moral definition of flourishing?)
-Is flourishing subjective? I.e., can you think that you are flourishing, even if you aren’t?
Does this still hold even if you are (according to deontological or Utilitarian ethics) completely evil?
e). Who is more morally praiseworthy – the person who does the right thing from a learned character disposition to do it? Or the person who apprehends the right thing to do, struggles against their desires and ends up doing the right thing?
f). List some admirable people. What virtues (if any) do/ did they embody? Do/did they have any vices? Would Aristotle say that they were virtuous?
g). What are the traditional Japanese virtues? Have virtues in Japan changed in the course of the 20th Century, do you think? If so, is this change good, or for the worse?
11.2 What is Virtue Ethics?
Three kinds of ethical theory:
Centering respectively on consequences, rights, and virtues.
That is, each theory concerns of the bearer of ethical value as the good state of affairs, right action, and the good person. Virtue ethics is more concerned with the psychological (and social) embodiment in individual disposition of action, thought & emotional action.
Kant approaches ethics by ‘respecting’ people, or ‘being consistent with’ rationality.
Utilitarianism approaches ethics through ‘promoting’ or ‘maximizing’ utility.
Virtue Ethics approaches moral issues by promoting the embodying of virtue.
Basic claim: Virtue Ethics says that to understand ethics we must understand what character traits make someone a good person.
We find out what the right action is, by seeing what the virtuous person would do.
What is a Virtue?
Rachels: A virtue ethics will:
1). Explain what a virtue is
2). Give a list of what the virtues are
3). Give an explanation of what the virtue consists in.
Rachels defines a virtue as “ a trait of character, manifested in habitual action, which is good for a person to have.” (Rachels EMP: 176).
“A virtue such as honesty or generosity is not just a tendency to do what is honest or generous, nor is it to be helpfully specified as a “desirable” or “morally valuable” character trait. It is, indeed, a character trait- that is, a disposition which is well entrenched in its possessor, something that, as we say, “goes all the way down…” but the disposition in question, far from being a single track disposition to do honest actions…is multi- track. It is concerned with many other actions as well, with emotions and emotional reactions, choices, values, desires, perceptions, attitudes, interests, expectations, and sensibilities. To possess a virtue is to be a certain sort of person with a certain complex mindset. (Hursthouse “Virtue Ethics,” 2003).
Virtue Ethics is (allegedly) built into our language
Rosalind Hursthouse writes:
Much invaluable information concerning action guidance comes from avoiding courses of action that would be considered irresponsible, feckless, lazy, inconsiderate, uncooperative, harsh, intolerant, selfish, mercenary, indiscreet, tactless, arrogant, unsympathetic, cold, incautious, unenterprising, pusillanimous, feeble, presumptuous, rude, hypocritical, self- indulgent, materialistic, grasping, short sighted,…and so on.
(Hursthouse “Virtue Ethics”).
Aside:
Ayn Rand, Jean- Paul Sartre, Karl Marx, John Stuart Mill, Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, Michel Foucault, David Hume can be said to have written of an ethics of virtue (all of whom having spoken vaguely of ethics, yet none of whom wrote a code of conduct, as it were).
11.4 Virtue Ethics as a Response to the Shortcomings of Normative Ethics
Modern ethical theories commonly hold that the task of moral theory was to come up with a code consisting of universal rule or principle which would have the following features:
a). The rules would provide a decision- making procedure for determining what the right
action was in any particular case
b). The rules would be stated so that any non- virtuous person would understand and be able
to apply them.
A number of philosophers felt that such a theory was impossible. In medical ethics in particular- such factors as moral sensitivity, perception, imagination, judgment- Phronesis-(practical wisdom)- are widely considered more important than just rule- following.
A virtue- centered ideal was proposed as a substitute to Kantian and Utilitarian ethics. The idea was that moral people (‘agents’) should be moved directly to do the right thing by their emotional concern for others. A ‘morality of duty’ (i.e. that of Kant) is said to pay insufficient attention to the ‘inner life.’ The dutiful agent is not merely doing, but feeling enough, to qualify as a moral person. (This is ironic, given that Kant is criticized for being too demanding).
Discussion: is this plausible, or reasonable? That people should have the right feelings? Does a nurse, a policeman, or a lawyer need to be emotionally connected to every client, every patient?)
G.E.M. (Elizabeth) Anscombe (1909-2001), in her 1958 essay “Modern Moral Philosophy,” declared all modern ethical theory bankrupt. She believed that it was a mistake for a morality to be grounded on legalistic notions such as ‘obligation’ or ‘duty’ in the context of a general disbelief in the existence of a general lawgiver (that is, God), as the source of such obligations. (This was ironic- Anscombe was a strict Roman Catholic). (You might want to discuss whether this is a valid view- perhaps the source of laws in deontology is a ‘general will,’ or ‘the community.’ Hobbes certainly didn’t believe in a ‘general lawgiver.’). Consequently, Anscombe argued that a moral psychology should replace moral philosophy.
According to Anscombe, one must start with the question as to what it means for a person to flourish or live well. This entailed returning to the ancient Greek moralists, in particular Aristotle and Plato. The central question for them was not what rules to follow, but what virtues to cultivate.
The central questions of ethics then become: what is the nature of virtue? (or what we might think of as an admirable moral character), how does one become virtuous (is it taught? Or does it arise naturally? And are we responsible for its development?) and the institutions that make the development of virtue possible. (That is: should, or can, virtue be taught in schools?)
11.5 Aristotle: Background
Aristotle (384-322 BCE)- a student of Plato- is unquestionably one of the fathers of Western philosophy and the Western worldview in general. He wrote on physics, poetry, zoology, logic, rhetoric, politics, government, ethics, and biology.
Socrates (470-399 BCE) was Aristotle’s teacher. We will discuss Socrates with regards to the question concerning the relationship between flourishing and virtue.
11.6 Telos and Aristotle’s Theory of Human Nature
Aristotle’s Worldview.
According to Aristotle, the whole universe (the Cosmos) has a unifying Telos (variously translated as ‘aim’ or ‘purpose’ or ‘end,’ or ‘reason for something’s existence’). (A Teleology is a theory that says that everything was created for a purpose. If you believe in teleology, you will believe that your eye was designed by someone or something so that it would let you see things, and so on. Christianity is teleological; Darwinism is not). All of the component parts of the universe, for Aristotle, fit together into a coherent whole. Human nature is tied to the telos of humans. Different humans have different talents and aims and purposes, but these are to be understood as different variations on a basic human nature, and a single goal. The telos of human beings is happiness (in Greek: Eudaimonia). Happiness is an in itself, desired for its own sake, But to be truly happy requires that we cultivate ourselves to be excellent. The function of man is to live the kind of life that follows a rational principle in “accordance with its proper excellence.” (Rachels TRTTD: 38).
Main Characteristics of Human Nature, for Aristotle:
Aristotle thought that humans had the following traits:
1). A capacity for political life (we are social, gregarious animals)
2). A capacity for speech
3). A capacity for practical reason or morality (a sense of good, or evil)
4). A capacity for theoretical reason (philosophical reflection, the highest and distinct expression of human nature).
Implications of this view of human nature:
Not all humans will display these characteristics equally, but the more a person neglects these dimensions of life, the more likely they will deform or corrupt their own human nature and decrease their chances of cultivating human excellence.
Natural Hierarchies
Aristotle sees humans as being divided according to several natural hierarchies. Women, for Aristotle, are essentially incomplete, imperfect men. Aristotle thought that slaves and masters had the following properties:
Women Men
-passive, reproductive role -active role in reproduction
in reproduction
Their Telos is to obey Their Telos is to rule
Slaves Masters
have a strong body but -have foresight
not much foresight; -good at giving sensible
good at following orders orders
Their Telos is to obey Their Telos is to rule
Both groups- women and men, or slaves and masters- need each other “by nature.” But one of the groups is thought of as being naturally superior to the other. (Obviously, this is open to question- how do we know that this arrangement is natural and not just conventional?)
This elitism is obvious if we read Aristotle in the original (Rachels RTTD: 37-43).
11.7 Aristotle and Virtue (Arête)
The rationality of virtue lies in the agent’s Eudaimonia (‘happiness’ or ‘well-being’). Since my Eudaimonia consist in the exercise of the virtues, I have no reason to live a non- virtuous life.
For Aristotle, virtue is a trait of character manifested in habitual action.
The term he uses is not in fact ‘virtue’ but êthikai aretai, or arête- “excellences of character.” The “excellences of character” are a combination of qualities that make an individual the sort of ethically admirable person he is (I would write “he or she,” but apparently Aristotle did not think that women could be excellent, therefore virtuous). The connection with telos is as follows: the “excellences of character” are representations of the fullest development of human beings.
Humans are “rational and social beings who need the company of other people.”
We live in communities among friends, family and fellow citizens.
In the case of honesty, for example, one is honest ‘as a matter of course.’ Honesty “springs from a firm and unchangeable character.”
Courage. As with the other virtues for Aristotle, courage is a balance between excess and deficiency.
Cowardice-----------courage-----------------foolhardiness
In the case of Generosity, a problem arises. For Aristotle, morality consists in hitting the mean between having too much of a character trait, and having too little. The virtue of generosity, therefore, sits in a continuum between stinginess and extravagance.
Stinginess------------generosity------ ---extravagance
Question: How much is too much, or not enough? Rachels notes that this depends on what morality you already presuppose. In other words, it depends on who you ask. Virtue Ethics alone (allegedly) won’t tell you which one.
Hobbes: There is no obligation to be charitable. You should just follow society’s rules.
Utilitarianism: give away all you possibly can
Kant: it depends on what you would expect others to do for you.
Rachels: virtues “are needed to conduct our lives well.”
Assumption: humans are “rational and social beings who need the company of other people.”
Aristotle defines excellences of character, or virtue, as follows:
Excellence of character, then, is a state concerned with choice, lying in a mean relative to us, this being determined by reason and in the way in which the man of practical wisdom would determine it. Now it is a mean between two vices, that which depends on excess and that which depends on defect. (Rachels RTTD:43).
Virtuous action is action at the right time, in the right circumstances, in the right manner, with respect to the right people, as judged by a person virtue.
Further, for Aristotle, your emotional reaction and your reasoning must be in harmony. Your emotions (the non- rational part of the soul) must “speak with the same voice.”
11.8 Phronesis (Practical Wisdom).
Hursthouse notes that “even many deontologists now stress the point that their action- guiding rules cannot reliably be applied correctly without practical wisdom.”
One can fall short of full virtue by lacking Phronesis.
Hursthouse again: “Adults are culpable if the mess things up by being thoughtless, insensitive, reckless, impulsive, shortsighted, and by assuming that what suits them will suit everyone instead of taking a more objective viewpoint.”
11.9 Eudaimonia (Flourishing, or Happiness)
For Aristotle, the rationality of virtue lies in its promotion of the agent’s flourishing, or Eudaimonia.
Since my happiness consists only in the exercise of the virtues, I have no reason to live a non- virtuous life.
To be virtuous means living in accordance with those principles that obtain ‘goods for the soul.’ Aristotle concedes that ‘virtue’ is similar to ‘wisdom’ or simply ‘prudence.’
When we are living well, we are worthy of imitation and admiration.
A happy life is one lived by rational people who act virtuously and who are not simply passive victims (or beneficiaries) of circumstances.
Good character traits are strong and enduring- they are products of learning and cultivation.
Virtuous activity perfects human life.
Rachels defines virtues as “traits of character that are good to have.” Rachels discusses four virtues and explains why they are good to have.
Courage: it is necessary to deal with life
Generosity: people need help from each other
Honesty: It is necessary for harmonious human relationships
Loyalty: it is necessary for friendship.
Virtues for Social Life
Basically, we must be good friends in order to have good friends. In general, the virtuous life is the good life. Rachels insists that “obviously, the point is not that the virtuous [person] will be richer,” but you might want to debate if that is really true. The point of Eudaimonia is that we are ethical so that our lives are better.
Three virtues discussed in Aristotle, specifically for friendship:
-generosity
-friendliness
-mildness of temper
The Virtue of Self- Actualization
(Being as good as you can become).
We take pleasure from self- realizing activity. Further, according to Aristotle, everyone is responsible for how well they express their true character.
Virtue is Not Enough to secure Happiness
According to Aristotle, virtue alone does not make one happy. This suggests that it is not some sort of ‘moral perfection’ that makes one happy. Happiness requires certain “external goods.”(To do “fine deeds,” he tells us, requires friends, wealth, and political influence. Happiness also requires personal beauty, and good ancestry. Consequently, if you are of “low birth,” or have “worthless children,” you can’t be happy. (Rachels: TRTTD: 40).
How does this idea contrast with Buddhist, or Christian teaching?
Question: Is the pursuit of Eudaimonia really moral? Or is it merely egoistic? Does it matter?
10.10 Moral Weakness (Akrasia)
Aristotle assumes that people do bad things because of a weakness of will (‘akrasia’). Each vice is thought of as the absence of the restraining influence of virtue, together with some natural self- centered motive. Cowardice is the absence of courage, to give in to fear. Self- indulgence is the disposition to give into bodily pleasure, and so on.
Problems:
Perhaps Aristotle’s psychology is simplistic here. (Along with his Doctrine of the Mean). The lack of concern for other people is considered completely ‘off the scale’- a form of beastliness or brutality that is simply not considered human. (Question: does it help in our understanding of evil people to simply describe them as sub- human?)
The problem is this- Aristotle’s ethics has no room for a concept of viciousness or sadism. The worst sort of person he can imagine is a sort of obsessed, unscrupulous hedonist. If we think of vices as mere failings, we seem to have failed to account for evil people who are not merely weak.
WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW
You should be able to explain Aristotle’s conceptions of telos (purpose), phronesis (practical reason) Eudaimonia (flourishing) and arête (excellence).
Discussion question for Lecture 12:
Is Kim Jong- Il Happy, do you think? Why, or why not?
Lecture 12
Problems with Virtue Ethics/ Can The Wicked Flourish?
12.1 The Cultural Relativism Problem
Every culture has its own notion of virtue. So how can Virtue Ethics avoid just telling us to do what is expected of our culture?
Reply: Arguably, both deontology and Utilitarianism have the same problem.
(Firstly, I don’t see how deontology has this problem, although Utilitarianism has to deal with cultural differences as to what is considered fun or pleasurable. Secondly, even if other theories have this problem, it’s still a problem for virtue ethics).
Martha Nussbaum (1988): much cultural disagreement arises from local understanding of the virtues, but the virtues themselves are not relative to culture. (This assumes some “universal virtue theory”). Rachels argues this. He says that every culture has, and needs, some sort of notion of virtue; something like the virtue of self control; something like the virtue of courage, etc. But variations of what these principles are, and whether they are important moral principles at all, vary considerably.
Question: can Virtue Ethics ground a critique of social practices and traditions that appear to be immoral or just plain evil.
12.2 The A- Historical Problem
We find that there is a big difference in the virtues of different Western societies. Cultural virtue- assumptions are different to some extent between Christians and Jews. Rachels discusses some of these differences. For St. Augustine, Rule of Law comes first. During the Renaissance, Divine Law became Moral Law. At some point during this transition, the question “what is the right thing to do?” became distinct from the question “what traits of moral character make somebody a good person?” Hence- the emergence of theories of rightness and obligation.
To illustrate this problem- below are the Seven Deadly Sins of early Christian teachings, together with the Seven Holy Virtues.
Vices: Avastia – avarice/ greed
Luxuria luxury
Invidia envy
Gula gluttony
Ira wrath
Acedia sloth
Virtues: Chastity
Abstinence
Liberality (generosity)
Diligence
Patience
Kindness
Humility
By contrast, Aristotle thought that one important virtue was megalopsuchia, “greatness of soul.” This is something like a grand social manner, rather than anything we would now consider a virtue. Aristotle did not consider kindness a virtue at all, and his concept of ‘fairness’ is almost entirely a legal and political notion. What Aristotle considers the ethics of truthfulness is concerned almost exclusively with boasting and modesty.
Later versions of Virtue Ethics only reinforce the contingent, historically shifting notion of virtue. St. Thomas Aquinas (an important Christian philosopher) modified Aristotle’s set of virtues to suit Christian teachings, and, at the end of the 18th Century, David Hume proposed a set of virtues to directly attack those of Christianity.
12.3 The Conflict Problem.
A friend comes to see you, and her haircut is terrible. She asks, “does this look good on me?” Do you lie to her to keep her happy? Or do you tell the truth? Virtue Ethics emphasizes acting appropriately in a given situation, according to practical wisdom. But that just sounds like empty banalities, like “be nice” and “use common sense” and “ be good.”
12.4 The Justification Problem
In English, the same concept can have both positive and negative terms- “being careful with money” can be described as either ‘miserly’ or ‘thrifty’ or ‘economic’ or ‘mean.’ Does Japanese have the same moral ambiguities?
Other ambiguities:
The case of the Nazi Soldier. Suppose a Nazi soldier fights with bravery. Does he really have the virtue of courage? Peter Geach doesn’t think so (Rachels EMP: 117). Why not? His argument seems to be something like this:
Morality consists in having the virtues (i.e. courage)
The Nazi soldier is not moral
The Nazi soldier does not have the virtues, including that of courage
Why not this argument?
Morality consists in having the virtues (i.e. courage)
The Nazi soldier is courageous
Therefore, the Nazi soldier is virtuous
The premise “the Nazi soldier is not moral” presupposes some moral principle- so what is it? (If we ask the soldier in question whether he thinks he is being moral, he will probably tell us that he thinks that he is moral indeed. The Nazis were obsessed with explaining and justifying their acts in terms of a return to the ‘warrior- virtues’ of the pre- Christian Germans).
Which Character Traits are Actually Virtues?
Humility- whether it is a virtue or not depends on the circumstances. Aristotle would agree. But there are bigger problems when we consider the ‘virtues’ as described by other Greek philosophers. The Stoic philosopher Epictetus (c.55-135)- argued that the death of one’s family members is no real loss and is no worse than the breaking of a cup. The Stoics had a notion of virtue independent of any particular social or political structure. Were they simply wrong?
Think also of people who are both made great and destroyed by the same character traits- the characters in Shakespeare’s tragedies, or Howard Hughes or Stanley Kubrick (whose obsessive attention to detail both created great work yet also made them incredibly unpleasant and difficult to work with).
12.5 Can an Ethics be grounded on a Theory of Human Nature?
Aristotle’s claims concerning Eudaimonia are based on assumptions concerning human nature. Arguably, people who follow Aristotle’s virtue ethics are relying on his notion of teleology (which has been discredited), or they are rationalizing their own personal or cultural values.
Reply: The best science of today (evolutionary theory, psychology) supports the ancient Greek assumptions- that we are social animals, and we need to live together, subjugating our egoistic desires in order to live harmoniously.
Deeper Problem: There are both nice aspects to human nature, and nasty aspects. (remember Hobbes!). We can’t just base a theory of morality on human nature, without deciding on what is ‘nice’ and what is ‘nasty.’ Without some moral guideline in place beforehand, we could end up making ‘virtues’ of aggressive, destructive instincts and potentials. (We will discuss Nietzsche with this problem in mind in Week 8).
12.6 Isn’t Virtue Ethics just Egoism?
Allegedly, VE collapses into Ethical Egoism (that is, “do whatever is best for you.”). Once again, Rachels defines the virtues as “traits of character which are good [for you] to have.” So the motive seems clearly to be self- interested.
Reply:
Acquiring virtues is a two- stage process.
1). You seek the virtue because it leads to your flourishing (egoistic motive)
2). Once you have the virtue, you act from it, not from self- interest, in fact if
you act out of self- interest you won’t act virtuously.
Reply: Rachels assumes that flourishing is your motivation for virtue, not just a way of defining virtue. To say flourishing of the agent makes the trait a virtue “ does not mean that flourishing of the agent is the motivation of the agent.
Reply: Against Kant: is self- interest really so bad?
12.7 The Elitism Problem
If (for Aristotle) virtue is to fully realize one’s true and full human potential, we have an elitism problem. That is, only a handful of people actually get to spend all of their time cultivating their special talents. Many people (in particular women and ‘slaves,’ working class people) “often endure low- paying, dead- end jobs that encourage feelings of self- hatred” (Marcia Homiak, “Moral Character”). Aristotle’s ethic is in effect incredibly elitist- only the very wealthy and powerful can be truly “excellent.” (Question: is there still something of benefit in his theory, nevertheless?)
12.8 The Guidance Problem
Deontology and Utilitarianism are theories that aim to systematize our principles and rules of action in ways that will, supposedly, help us to see what to do or to recommend in particular cases. A theory of virtue cannot do this: the theory itself says that what one needs in order to do and recommend the right things are virtues.
There is no independent account of right action. Instead, it focuses on good character, rather than on right action. Therefore, it is incomplete. We could try reinterpreting actions in terms of the virtues (something like “ the act is right if it is what a virtuous person would do”). But this does not seem to answer even the most basic questions. For example: “what’s wrong with lying?”
Any answer we give will be either in terms of Ethical Egoism, Utilitarianism, or Contract Theory.
‘Soft’ Virtue Ethics is one reply (Rachels p. 187). Soft VE: Right Action theory (deontology or Utilitarianism) plus Virtue Ethics; “a better account of right action.”
12.9 Can The Wicked Flourish?
Aristotle thought that any non- virtuous person is plagued by inner doubt or conflict, even if, on the surface, they seem as happy and relaxed as any virtuous person. Although a vicious person may appear to be happily disdainful of justice, and content to pursue pleasure and wealth, he will still have to keep the company of other people to try to forget their own immoral lifestyle. In the Nicomachean Ethics Book IX chapter 4, Aristotle says that immoral people do not love themselves and are in inner conflict. That is, they hate themselves. Virtuous people, on the other hand, enjoy who they are and take pleasure in being virtuous.
The question is addressed in more dramatic fashion in Plato’s Republic. Socrates discusses morality and politics with two debate partners, Thrasymachus and Glaucon. Glaucon and Thrasymachus argue that ethics is merely conventional, and that they would be happiest if they became immoral dictators, stealing power and having a life of self- indulgence. Socrates gives a thoughtful reply. The tyrant would have access to base physical pleasures to his heart’s content, Socrates agrees, but he argues that this is a low- quality sort of pleasure, the sort that only “commoners” indulge in (think of Mill’s distinction here). To indulge only in sex, food, wine and getting into fights (Socrates’s examples) is, allegedly, to allow oneself to become a victim of the worst aspect of one’s nature- described by Socrates as a great dragon- lion creature who is insensitive of any idea of decency- a creature we come to know in our dreams, who wishes to have sex with the Gods (or worse)- who wishes to kill, or eat forbidden food. Socrates explains to Glaucon:
“I think that some of the unnecessary pleasures and desires are lawless and violent. Perhaps we are all born with them, but they are disciplined by law and combination of reason and better desires till in some people they are got rid of altogether, or rendered few and feeble, though in some they retain their numbers and strength.”
“What desires do you mean?”
“The sort that wake while we are asleep, when the reasonable and humane part of us is asleep and its control relaxed, and our fierce bestial nature, full of blood and drink, rouses itself…as you know, there is nothing too bad for it and it’s completely lost to all sense and shame. It doesn’t shrink from attempting intercourse (as it supposes) with a mother or anyone else, man, beast, or god, or from murder or eating forbidden food. There is, in fact, no folly or shamelessness it will not commit.
(Plato The Republic trans. Desmond Lee, Penguin London 1990 p.392).
Although Socrates describes this aspect as being a part of all of us,. He thinks that to give in to its demands is to become enslaved, and to allow the divine part of ourselves to be starved. Further, owing to the tyrant’s social arrangements, he will by necessity be surrounded by rather crude and horrible people; anyone of quality would be driven away, or will present competition. You would have no real friends- just people who are frightened of you or people who want your money. Therefore, a totally immoral lifestyle would be incompatible with the basic human needs of living in a community and abiding by its social rules. Crime, it is argued, is contrary to our nature as social beings. As Voltaire puts it, “the wicked have only accomplices, the voluptuous have companions in debauchery, self- seekers have associates, princes have courtiers. Only the virtuous have friends.” Voltaire Philosophical Dictionary trans. Theodore Besterman , London: Penguin, 1992 p.29.
Question: What is flourishing?
-How much of your answer depended on morality?
(Can there be a non- moral definition of flourishing?)
-Is flourishing subjective? I.e., can you think that you are flourishing, even if you aren’t?
Does this still hold even if you are (according to deontological or Utilitarian ethics) completely evil?
Responses:
One could maintain that wicked people don’t really flourish, only virtuous people really flourish.
(Is this plausible?)
Think of Gaugin, Nietzsche, etc).
Is there a core set of virtues that are necessary to flourish?
12.10 The Ethics of Excellence: Discussion Questions
a). Is Kim Jong- Il happy? If so, does this cause problems with taking Aristotle’s ethics and theory of human nature seriously? Responses:
Remember the question posed at the beginning of the last lecture- what is flourishing?
One possible answer: wicked people don’t really flourish, only virtuous people really flourish.
(Is this plausible?)
Think of Gaugin, Nietzsche, etc).
b). At present, there is no “political virtue ethics”- that is, no professional, academic philosopher has written a virtue ethics for politicians. What virtues do you think a politician should have? And would having such virtues guarantee that they would be a good politician?
WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW
You should be able to explain some of the shortcomings of Virtue Ethics, in particular the incompleteness problem and the egoism problem.
You should be able to explain the question as to whether the wicked can flourish.
Questions for Lectures 14 and 15 (Nietzsche)
b). Genealogy of Morals.
Why did Greek virtue ethics die out, and why did Jewish and Christian moral principles take over in European society, do you think? We will discuss this question in week 8, when we discuss Nietzsche.
posted by G. Roche at 12:57 PM
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